

The CAVALRY JOURNAL



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The CAVALRY JOURNAL

PUBLISHED BI-MONTHLY BY
THE UNITED STATES CAVALRY ASSOCIATION
COLONEL GEORGE M. RUSSELL, Cavalry, Editor

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THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

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Organized November 9, 1885

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
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Major General Guy V. Henry



Major General Leon B. Kromer

Major General Guy V. Henry

THE Cavalry regretfully parts with the Chief who has done so much to increase its efficiency and to enhance its prestige.

Born January 28, 1875, our outgoing Chief of Cavalry was graduated from the United States Military Academy in April, 1898, and had war service in Puerto Rico with his soldierly father, General Guy V. Henry (U. S. M. A., 1861). His grandfather, Major W. Seton Henry, was also a graduate of West Point, Class of 1835.

General Henry had service in the Philippine Islands as Captain and Major of the 26th Volunteer Infantry and later organized and commanded the 1st Battalion of Panay Scouts. He was cited for gallantry in action at Balantang, Panay, November 18, 1899.

General Henry made early contact with Cavalry School activities at Fort Riley, as he was one of the original organizers of the School and graduated from the School of Application for Cavalry and Field Artillery in 1904.

After another tour in the Philippines and regimental duty at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, General Henry attended the French Cavalry School at Saumur and was an observer with the 31st French Dragoons.

He was Senior Instructor in Equitation, Mounted Service School in 1907-'8 and went from there to the Military Academy as Senior Instructor in Cavalry Tactics. Thus, both at the Military Academy and at the Cavalry School, General Henry has had a marked influence on horsemanship in the service. His experience in international horse competitions, also, has given him an exceptional background in this particular field. He was a member of the first team of American officers to participate in an international horse show at the Olympia, London, in 1911. In 1912, at Stockholm, he was Captain of the Army Olympic Equestrian Team, which set a high standard for our participation in subsequent games. He was decorated (V Olympiad) by the King of Sweden.

From his second detail as Senior Instructor in Equitation, Mounted Service School, General Henry went again to the Philippine Islands, returning to be again Senior Instructor of Cavalry Tactics at West Point, and then Commandant of Cadets.

In 1918, after a short tour of duty in France, he was promoted to Brigadier General and commanded the 15th Division. He is an Officer of the French Legion of Honor.

General Henry is a graduate of the service schools at Fort Leavenworth and of the Army War College. He was Assistant Commandant of the Cavalry School in 1923-'4 and then Chief of Staff, Philippine Department. At the time of his selection to be Chief of Cavalry, he was commanding the Third Cavalry.

The Cavalry may consider itself fortunate to have had, as its Chief in the American Olympic year (1932), an officer of such exceptional experience in equitation—such a horseman. He was, and still is, President of the International Equestrian Federation with headquarters in Paris. As Chairman of the 1932 Olympic Games Equestrian

Committee, he was in direct charge of these games; to him is due the credit for their smooth functioning.

General Henry has also shown himself to be a worthy Chief by his handling of the mechanization problems, which have become a preoccupation of the arm. He has preserved the "golden mean" between over-enthusiasm for machines and reactionary devotion to the horse. Ever abreast of progress in mechanization, but taking account of its limitations, he has striven to "make the best of the old and the new."

General Henry's appointment as Brigadier General, U. S. Army, will give the service the continued benefit of his professional attainments, sound judgment, and devotion to duty.

* * *

Major General Leon B. Kromer

AS the JOURNAL goes to press, the announcement is made that the President's nomination of Colonel Leon B. Kromer, Cavalry, to be Chief of Cavalry has been confirmed.

General Kromer was born in Michigan, June 25, 1876. Upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in February, 1899, he was assigned to the 10th Cavalry. He was promoted First Lieutenant, 11th Cavalry, February 2, 1901, and Captain, 10th Cavalry, August 2, 1905. He had varied regimental service in Texas, Cuba, the Philippine Islands, Iowa, and Nebraska, and details as a tactical officer and instructor in Mathematics at the Military Academy and served a detail in the Quartermaster Corps during which, for a time, he was in charge of the Remount Depot at Fort Reno, Oklahoma.

When General Wood, as Chief of Staff, instituted an experiment to see to what degree of efficiency units composed of recruits, except for noncommissioned officers and specialists, could be brought in one year of intensive training, Captain Kromer's troop carried out the test for the Cavalry.

He went into Mexico in 1916 as Quartermaster of the 11th Cavalry and later became Quartermaster of the expedition.

Promoted to Major of Cavalry, May 5, 1917, he was appointed Lieutenant Colonel in the National Army, August 5, 1917, and went to France as Division Quartermaster, 82nd Division. He was graduated from the Army General Staff College at Langres.

He was promoted Colonel, U. S. A., July 30, 1918. His services with the A. E. F. are best stated in his citation for the Distinguished Service Medal, which reads as follows:

"For exceptionally meritorious and distinguished services. As Assistant Chief of Staff of the 82d Division during the St. Mihiel offensive, he displayed military attainments of a high order in the planning of operations of great moment. Later, as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 1st Corps, and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, 1st Army, during the Meuse-Argonne operations, his initiative

Rola
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sound judgment, and tireless energy solved difficult problems of traffic control and regulation, playing an important part in the successes achieved."

Besides the award above mentioned, General Kromer is Officer of the French Legion of Honor and was awarded the British Distinguished Service Order.

After the dissolution of the 1st Army staff in April, 1919, he served as G-1, Headquarters Base Section No. 9, S. O. S., with Headquarters S. O. S., and as Chief of Graves Registration Service, American Forces in France.

Returning from France in January, 1920, General Kromer was Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Southern Department, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, Febru-

ary 3 to June 30, 1920, and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Headquarters 8th Corps Area, to June 22, 1922.

His next assignment was to the War Department General Staff, G-3 Division, September 18, 1922, to June 30, 1924. He graduated from the Army War College in 1925.

From September 9, 1925, to August 2, 1928, he commanded the 11th Cavalry and Post of the Presidio of Monterey, California. From there he went to the Army War College as instructor, later becoming Assistant Commandant. His last assignment before his appointment as Chief of Cavalry was as Deputy Chief of Staff, First Army, Governors Island, New York.

Reduction and Readjustment of Packs on Cavalry Horses


BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARLES L. SCOTT, CAVALRY

WHEN equipped with animal-drawn field trains, the cavalry problem was how to keep our wagons up with the mounted elements, even though the horse carried approximately 245 lbs. including rider and pack. All cavalry regiments will soon be equipped with motorized field trains, and this problem will be reversed and become a question of how we can use these motors to increase the speed of our mounted elements. Our rate of march and the length of march can undoubtedly be greatly increased by removing as much of our packs as possible and placing them in trucks.


From my experience in five 300-mile endurance tests, in which I generally made 60 miles per day in 9 hours, I

concluded that every pound taken off is of tremendous value. In two of these rides 245 lbs. were carried, in one 225 lbs. and in two 200 lbs. I would say from this experience that the removal of 25 lbs. made the test 30% easier on the horse and that the removal of 45 lbs. made it 50% easier. Similarly, in other long rides and marches in which I have participated, I have found that removal of dead weight from the horse's back adds tremendously to the speed and distance that can be made without exhaustion. This fact is so well known that it needs little discussion.

When the cavalry takes part of the pack off and carries it in its trucks, as should normally be done, the problem



Rola Kay. Day after 100-mile hike. $\frac{3}{4}$ T.B. Height, 16-2. Age, 6. Weight, 1222-1221 (start-finish). Load, 247. This horse made the 100-mile forced march with a squadron of cavalry in 1931 in 23 hours. Carried 247 lbs. This squadron also did 60 miles in 9 hours' marching time. Picture taken 24 hours after the march.



Reno Allover. Day after 100-mile hike. $\frac{1}{2}$ T.B. Height, 15-1. Age, 6. Weight, 1000-1062. Load, 240. This horse participated in 100-mile forced march of 23 hours' duration and made 60 miles in 9 hours' marching time. Photo taken 24 hours after the march.

of how to readjust the remainder of the pack still left on the horse will at once arise. For the following reasons I am convinced that two-thirds of the dead weight directly on the horse should be carried on the pommel of the saddle.

FIRST: As is well known by horsemen and as clearly pointed out in an article in the September-October issue of *The Horse* by Captain S. N. Kournakoff, the average horse is so built that about two-thirds of his total weight is carried on his fore legs and one-third on his hind legs. In putting dead weight on the horse in the form of a pack, it would seem that it is not logical to disturb this normal distribution, or natural balance, so to speak.


SECOND: Placing the weight forward on the horse's forehands, as is done by the Tod Sloan seat in racing, by the forward seat in jumping and cross country and by leaning forward in posting, has added greatly to the efficiency of the horse. Why should it not have the same effect on the march with dead weight?

THIRD: When first attempting long, hard rides, I started out with the dead weight equally distributed from front

to rear on my saddle. With such distribution my horse first showed fatigue in his hindquarters by stumbling, knuckling over, etc., behind and particularly at the walk. By changing the dead weight and putting fully two-thirds of it on the forehead, great improvement was at once noted. In fact, my observation and experience in all hard tests of every nature with the horse have firmly convinced me that the great majority of horses show fatigue in their loins and hindquarters long before they do in the forehead. When so fatigued they lower their heads to their knees and thus themselves put as much weight forward as possible.

FOURTH: The hind legs furnish the majority of the impulsion in forward movement, and in view of this additional work required of them and not of the fore legs, they *should* under no conditions be required to carry an equal part of the weight.

We all know how exceedingly tiring it is to the horse to walk for long periods and long distance and how a trot will freshen him up. Isn't this more than likely to be due to the fact that at the walk the rider sits fairly erect



Pathfinder, ridden by Lieutenant Colonel C. L. Scott in five 300-mile endurance tests. In two this horse carried 245 lbs., in one, 225 and in two, 200 lbs.

and thus overweights the hindquarters, whereas as soon as the trot is taken up the rider leans well forward and thus relieves the horse's loins and hindquarters of the strain imposed on them at the walk?

In substance, I believe we may say that the value of removing weight from the horse's back is well recognized; that the natural balance of the horse, strenuous tests of every nature and every effort on the part of the horse itself indicate that the majority of the weight carried should be placed on the forehead. To increase our marching ability we therefore should remove our canteen pack and as much of the equipment as possible now carried in our saddle bags and readjust the remainder of the weight,

if necessary, so as to carry about two-thirds of it on the pommel of the saddle.

Before the advent of motorization and mechanization, horse cavalry was acknowledgedly the most mobile arm of the service, so consequently there was little need to speed up. However, in this day and age the more we can increase our strategic mobility for distances up to 100 to 150 miles, until it approaches that of large motor units, the more valuable we become in working with or against such units. And in conclusion, I wish to state that none of us know the *full capabilities of a well bred horse*, nor have we yet learned *all the ways and means* of using these wonderful capabilities to the greatest advantage.

Post-Depression Personnel

BY FIRST LIEUTENANT GEORGE J. RAWLINS, 26TH CAVALRY (P.S.)

IT IS axiomatic that in times of depression the Army gets better recruits. The converse being equally true, it behooves us advocates of preparedness to consider that time when the country returns to normalcy.

This return will take several years. Even so, it will be relatively sudden. Ever since 1914, and especially since 1917, all sorts of artificial or unnatural restraints and stimulants have been imposed upon the laws of economics. These pyramided until they collapsed of their own weight, and we had The Depression. When the country achieves normalcy again, in whatever time, we shall have arrived at that point of economic development which should have been attained through regular evolution over the entire period since 1914. This is because science and invention have steadily progressed without artificial restraints, and our economic structure must finally rest on them.

Untold volumes have been written on causes and cures of the depression, and there is no intention of elaborating here. However, for clarity, three fundamentals may be mentioned:

First: The basic laws of economics, like those of tactics, do not change. Their applications do change according to the tools with which we work.

Second: The cause of the depression may be stated in one word—overproduction—which in turn was a direct result of maladjustment to the Machine Age.

Third: The only ultimate cure is economic readjustment to the Machine Age in which we live.

Since every machine is primarily a labor-saving device, and since it is neither possible nor desirable to arrest the advance thereof, it follows that we shall have an ever increasing ratio of production per man-hour. Upon this condition, supply and demand must be balanced.

Of all the factors governing demand, there are only two which are reliable, predictable and constant. They are increase in population and increase in living standards.

The first cancels itself (relatively); it also increases the labor supply. The second, if normal, is a slow process of education—the conversion of healthy luxuries into necessities. This implies ever increasing mass purchasing power.

Now, since science and invention advance far faster than human requirements, it follows that there must be considerable curtailment of the rate of acceleration of production. There is no escaping the fact that such curtailment means fewer and fewer man-hours.

This very thing was accomplished, but in a most disastrous manner. The discharge of employees certainly reduced man-hours. Just as certainly, the unemployed practically ceased to be consumers. The adage of the goose and the golden egg has no finer justification. If this nation is to survive—and it will—we must adopt the only other possible system of reducing man-hours; namely, fewer hours of work per individual, to the point where all who require it will have employment. In other words, the five-hour day, the five-day week, the eleven-month year, is not a theorist's dream—it is mathematically demonstrable, and quite inevitable.

What has this to do with post-depression personnel in the Army? It is a chain of evidence that helps us form a picture of that environment from which our future recruits must come. It predicates conditions which are bound to materialize, despite human fallacies. It is as inevitable as was the railroad or the bathtub, though both were once scoffed at by conservatives.

The world of that future period will be a much better world than we have today. As much better as water works and the electric light are better than the old pump and oil lamps. Shorter hours of work, more leisure, more culture, more recreation. Very likely, the really good things of life will be limited by the individual's ability

and appreciation thereof, rather than by their availability. Take that group from which our recruits of the next ten years will come. Even with Depression still depressing, consider the sophistication of any boy from six to sixteen. Then, gentle reader, consider your own boyhood at a similar age! Indeed, the world is progressing, and rapidly.

Against such competition the army of that period must compete in recruiting.

/ / /

Now let us picture that future Army and its requirements.

Under our system of government, and in times of peace, the Army of necessity is less modern than civil pursuits. Any successful invention in civil life pays early dividends on its capital investment. In the Army, the capital investment is eminently present, but the dividends (though quite real in national insurance) are neither immediately apparent nor positively calculable. The combat value of any new war machine must rest largely on opinions. And the only certain thing about opinions is that they will differ. No wonder the powers that hold the purse strings are slow in loosening. Despite that lag, the Army does modernize—develop its own machine age.

However, the reaction on the individual is radically different from that in civil life. The civilian skilled laborer has more and more leisure, is more and more a specialist. All odd jobs are done for him by other specialists. The wheelwright of a few years ago was an iron worker, a carpenter and somewhat of a painter. The lathe worker of today need know nothing of allied trades. Even his templates and patterns are made for him and may be automatically applied.

Not so in the Army. New inventions diversify and lengthen training requirements. The airplane carries war into three dimensions. Gas enforces defensive training on all personnel. The machine gunner must still know his rifle. Tanks and armored cars must be met with new formations and new types of fire. All this, and much more, is superimposed upon the basic trooper. Almost none of the old basic requirements can be reduced. Naturally, we must have specialists—the machines demand it—but they cannot be exclusively specialists, as is possible in civil life.

Not so many years ago common labor far outnumbered skilled labor. At that time, and still today, we class the soldier with the skilled laborer. But in this modern machine age the common laborer is sinking into the minority. It seems then, in justice to the modern soldier, that we might raise our concepts of him—think of him more as a technician. The word, unfortunately, implies a restricted field and in that sense is not applicable, but it does fix his probable status as compared to the civilian.

The machines themselves, which these men serve, like all others are true labor-savers. And here the argument that if all our fire weapons were automatic we could not

feed them, does not bear analysis. Quite true, the battle service of supply would appear extremely heavy; but if we rate our combat strength in fire power rather than man power, then there would be a real saving in personnel.

Today there are few things which men do that cannot be done better, faster and more accurately by some machine. This is true, whether it be digging ditches or calculating involved mathematics. It is conceivable that some day machines can do any of the physical or mental labors of man not requiring originality. It might seem, then, that the guiding hands of a relatively few highly skilled technicians may some day fight our wars for us! It has been seriously suggested.

Such fallacy had best be dispelled, ruthlessly. All machines presuppose certain conditions of operation. The more complex the machine, the more exacting those conditions. On the other hand, the individual trooper (today he is a rifleman) is a self-contained fighting unit. Properly trained and equipped he is equal to any conditions that campaign or combat may impose. He needs machine assistance—lots of it—but he is the ultimate instrument by which our will is imposed upon the enemy. His versatility, flexibility, adaptability, are far beyond the realm of mechanics.

These very qualities have made man superior to the lower animals. Unaided, he cannot run so well as a horse, climb so well as a cat or goat, nor swim so well as a beaver. But he can do all of these things reasonably well, which the others cannot. Likewise the individual trooper—pitifully weak compared to machine guns, desperately vulnerable in terms of tank armor, infinitely slow when viewed from the air—this individual will carry on long after all of the above have ceased to function or have become ineffective, through enemy activity, failure of supply, adverse terrain or weather.

And, in passing, just as truly will the horse remain upon the field of battle. His numbers will be reduced, but his elimination is not possible. He is to motorization as the trooper is to war machines in general.

/ / /

We have considered in very inclusive terms the source of our recruits and the type of recruit desired. There is a third major factor, the attitude of the nation toward the Army. History reveals the following:

(1) A nation containing powerful and wealthy elements is usually generous to its military establishment, satisfying its desire for safety, power and glory through that channel.

(2) A poor and discontented nation also will maintain a strong army, because it is dissatisfied. Consciously or subconsciously, dissatisfaction breeds the desire to fight.

(3) A nation in comfortable circumstances, neither very rich nor very poor, but with widespread contentment, is quite likely to neglect its army. It has neither the wealth to indulge in glory nor the dissatisfactions that demand a change of *status quo* by force of arms.

Our own country is headed for the third class and, barring the accidents of international politics, will look upon the Army with mild friendliness, but no great enthusiasm.

To sum up the foregoing, and without any claim to prophetic powers, the three governing factors of our post-depression personnel are:

(1) The Army will require recruits of an ever increasing order of intelligence and training.

(2) Recruits will come from an environment of relatively easy life.

(3) We may expect no great stimulus to efficiency either from popular interest or political support.

What, then, in these circumstances, can we ourselves do to maintain a personnel capable of meeting our ever increasing standards? The purpose of this article is to present a question, so it might be well to leave it with the above interrogation. However, a few suggestions might not be amiss. Why not establish mentality tests for recruiting? All of us admit that we receive an astounding number of recruits who "make good horse holders," and no amount of training can get them materially beyond that. As well try to fashion a Toledo blade from a bar of scrap iron. Mentality tests are easy to give, simple in grading, and taken en masse are remarkably accurate. We strive constantly for better blood in our horses, more durability in our equipment—why not more brains in our recruits? Education is not nearly so important. We can give a man an education if he has intelligence, but no power on earth can raise mental age ten above mental age ten.

Then how about the making and promotion of non-commissioned officers? There are regiments in which the rule of seniority is almost a law. Even in officer personnel, seniority promotion sometimes leads to truly ludicrous and occasionally tragic conditions when the actual capabilities of men are considered. But other considerations outweigh this evil. However, promotion by selection among enlisted personnel has almost none of the disadvantages inherent to it when applied to officers. Yet far too often, when a troop commander would give some vacancy to a highly intelligent and capable young man, higher authority interposes in favor of length of service. The utmost respect and honor to all old-timers—the highest regard to the value of experience—but the simple process of consuming government chow over a period of years does not, in itself alone, fit a man for the noncommissioned grades. It is submitted that a too rigid adherence to promotion by seniority drives more ambitious and capable young men out of the Army than any other one cause.

And last, would it not be worth while for our service schools to include formal courses in psychology and pedagogy? It is not contended that these can be adequately taught in class—but neither can tactics. However, a foundation can be laid. All of us are school teachers, and every successful officer must be a practical psychologist. The schools give us long hours on material we seldom touch and then let us acquire as best we may the knack of handling men—a knowledge which is necessary in almost every official act. And how many officers boast that they treat all their men exactly alike—considering this high justice—yet use a different bit on every horse they ride?

Some Tactical Questions Concerning the Future

A CONTEMPLATION of the contrasting characteristics of mechanized and horse cavalry brings up many conjectures in the minds of those whose acquaintance with mechanization is limited to their reading and to their imagination. Will the horse cavalry commander of the future, unsupported by mechanized units, be always praying for rain, to rid him of the preoccupation of being constantly on the alert against the swift and overwhelming thrusts of combat cars (the apprehension being somewhat reduced, perhaps, by the warning rumble to be expected)? Will the desire to utilize the protection of obstacles restrict his freedom of maneuver? Or will the

power of antitank guns permit him to join battle with mechanized forces, wherever encountered?

Have we scratched the surface of the possibilities of using mechanization along with horse cavalry? Will it not be a godsend in reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance and in protecting the flanks and rear of horse cavalry from hostile mechanization and hostile horse cavalry? Can it not be used in combat to deliver the charge at opportune times and places when the enemy's lines have been developed and fixed in position by horse units?

War alone can give an authoritative answer to these questions, but the Fort Riley maneuvers will permit some well-founded predictions.

The War College Library, Etc.

THE War College Library is looking for authoritative information on the origin of the custom of reversing the boots of a deceased officer in the stirrups of the led

horse following the funeral caisson. If the research of any reader will throw light on the subject, please communicate with THE CAVALRY JOURNAL.

New Map-Reading Device


By SECOND LIEUTENANT H. G. HAMILTON (CAV-RES.)

IN ORDER to simplify the operation of plotting profiles in mapping and map-reading, and at the same time to provide an accurate and fool-proof method for the solving of visibility problems by the members of his Intelligence Section, the writer devised and had constructed the instrument herein described.

The device consists of two aluminum plates, 6 inches by 8 inches, separated by a frame $\frac{3}{16}$ ths of an inch thick. Both plates and frame contain an opening $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches by 6 inches, covered with heavy celluloid sheets, the uppermost of which was inscribed with coordinate lines, eight to the inch. A vertical scale was stamped on the upper aluminum plate corresponding with these lines.

A series of slots corresponding to the lines on the celluloid were cut in the lower part of the top plate to accommodate the sliding pointers which register on the coordinate lines. The frame was also grooved for the same purpose.

ASSEMBLY OF MAP-READING DEVICE



DESIGN PATENTED 1933


In operation, the device is placed directly on the map, thereby eliminating the transposition of data to cross-section paper. The map is visible through the opening. The indicators at the points where contour lines intersect the line of sight are pushed up to the proper elevation, as shown by the vertical scale. The profile is complete as soon as the last indicator has been pushed into position. Any straight-edge is then used to connect the first and last pointers. If *no* pointers project above the straight-edge, all points along the line of sight are visible. If any of the pointers *do* project above the straight-edge the objective is *not* visible from the observation point. If the objective is masked, reference to the vertical scale at the side of the instrument indicates the height of the mask, while the horizontal scale on the map shows its extent. By taking two or more readings, the size and extent of "dead-areas" due to reverse slopes may be easily and quickly computed.

The device is especially suited to classroom work, to more easily illustrate the principles of profile plotting and the contour method of ground form delineation.

In either classroom or the field, it is possible for the student or officer with little experience to use the device and quickly and easily arrive at the correct solution.

The size and construction of the instrument enables it to be carried in the field in the standard map case.





Profile Plotting by means of Map-reading Device

War in the Chaco

(ROBERT W. GORDON in *The Army, Navy and Air Force Gazette*, Cannon House, Pilgrim Street, London, E. C. 4, issue of March 8, 1934. Extracts).

ALTHOUGH Bolivia has three times the population of Paraguay, the smaller country so far has had all the best of the fighting * * * Paraguay has a powerful ally in geography.

The Gran Chaco is a desert of swamps, sandy plains and impenetrable scrub jungle growth. The climate is intensely hot in summer, while in winter it is bitterly cold, and with complete lack of rain is absolutely devoid of water supply over a greater part of the region.

The Paraguayans, living in the adjacent lowlands, are inured to the climate. Using cocoa leaves to numb their stomach muscles, they are able to go for long periods without suffering from hunger and thirst. The Bolivian army, on the other hand, is made up largely of Indians from the mountains. Living at heights of from 7,000 to 12,000 feet above sea level, these troops suffer unbelievable hardships in the Chaco—hardships multiplied many times over by the impossible lines of communication.

The 300-mile long front line is situated 1,000 miles from the Bolivian base. Only 500 miles of this distance are covered by a single-track railroad. * * * On the other

hand, Paraguay must maintain only 100 miles of communications to her bases on the Paraguay River. * * *

The air services are of little value for attacking ground troops, because the nature of dense scrub forest covering most of the terrain offers perfect concealment. * * *

The country is dotted with *fortines*—adobe, concrete, or masonry strongholds, and these are partially linked up by a disconnected line of trenches. To obtain contact between forces, one side cuts through the brush until the sound of chopping draws fire and reveals the enemy position. The Paraguayans owe much of their success in this form of warfare to the ability of their Indian troops, used to the jungles, to cut their way through the forest. Often they are able thus to advance around the flanks of the highland Bolivians and attack them in the rear.

Being mostly miners, the Bolivian troops are adept at the siege operation invariably preceding an attack on a *fortine*. Where the ground permits they invest the strong point with trenches, while the sappers mine the position. Much of the ground, however, is so sandy that mining operations are impracticable.

The Spanish Cavalry School

By FIRST LIEUTENANT EGON R. TAUSCH, CAVALRY

IN SEPTEMBER, 1932, the writer arrived in Madrid on a year's language detail and was assigned by the Spanish War Department to the 1932-'33 Troop Officers' Class at the "Escuela de Equitación Militar." Since attending this course he has been asked by many officers about the nature of the school, especially as regards horsemanship. Hence, it is believed that the following observations may be of interest:

In general, the instruction is similar to that at our own Cavalry School, both as to organization of the curriculum and as to details of the individual's "style" of riding. Classes, similarly, consist of a Troop Officers' Class, an Advanced Equitation or "2nd Year" Class, a class for older officers due for promotion, and a N.C.O. Class. The first is of greatest interest. It is a nine months' course consisting mostly of horsemanship. Tactical subjects are covered by an hour's lecture a day and practical exercises every Thursday morning. The first hour on Mondays and Saturdays is devoted to fencing. Under Tactical Subjects is included a thorough classroom course in hippology. No practical course in horseshoeing is given, nor does work at this school include musketry problems or maneuvers, since there are no cavalry troops at the school, other than the necessary caretaking and grooming detachments.

The course is difficult, but enjoyable to anyone more than passingly interested in horsemanship. It has some disagreeable features, such as the fact that the school is eight kilometers from Madrid (at Carabanchel), which necessitates getting up at a very early hour and commuting by trolley or autobus. Also the fact that daily work is carried right through until two o'clock in the afternoon, which means lunch at three. The Spaniard, especially the officer at the Escuela, has his meals hours later than we are accustomed to having them. A very pleasant feature, however, is that the authorities at the school, as well as the student officers, treat the foreign officer with courtesy and friendliness perhaps not equalled anywhere else and are more than pleased to assist him in every particular. He is considered a guest throughout the year and as such is extended every consideration, even being presented with complimentary passes to race meetings, horse shows, and similar competitions. Nor is he allowed to pay the customary entry fee when competing in a show. The Spanish officer adheres meticulously to certain old customs in his treatment of the foreigner, as well as of his own countryman. One such custom is that a friend who is sick or injured, and in the hospital, must be visited each day, and there is almost no excuse for failure to do so. Both students and instructors at the school observed this scrupulously when the writer had occasion to spend his last few weeks in the hospital.

Although the school is small as to its plant, one can

learn a great deal due to the smallness of the classes, the tact and experience of the instructors, and the excellence of the terrain, which is perfect for mounted work.

As at Riley, each student is given a remount to train during the nine months. The remount training is quite like our system in all particulars except one, namely, that no training in school movements is attempted until the colt has had at least a year's work. The average age of remounts at the beginning of the term is about three years. Practically all of this year's group had been raced as two-year-olds at Jerez de la Frontera and other tracks near government breeding centers. Contrary to common belief in our country, having raced did not seem to have a bad effect on the colts, insofar as their subsequent training was concerned. But perhaps this was because they had run only one season.

In addition to the remounts, the students are assigned four general groups of older horses which are, of course, rotated periodically. Work on these constitutes the greater part of all work at the school. They are grouped as follows: experienced jumpers and cross-country horses, which are also used in competitions; "green jumpers," or outdoor horses in training a year or two; old well-trained school horses; and green school horses. Most of these horses, and sometimes all of them, are worked every day. The term "worked" here is not used guardedly; there is very little "hacking" done; the horses are ridden hard and, one might almost say, furiously, every time they are taken out. In the writer's opinion a little more slow, individual exercise inserted in these horses' daily routine would have on them a quieting effect, which certainly seems indicated for a large percentage of them.

As for the breeds of riding horses one sees in Spain, there are several: the Thoroughbred, the Arab, grade Arab and Anglo-Arab, and the Native Spanish horse. It was the writer's observation that the Thoroughbred, although admitted to be superior for saddle purposes, is not plentiful there. At the Escuela, some of the instructors and 2nd Year students ride them, and there are some excellent race meetings where the Thoroughbred, of course, is king; but in general he is not plentiful. Incidentally, as obtains in some other European countries, the Spanish government in every way encourages officers and aids them by shipping their mounts to these races. With many officers this provides an excellent means of studying conditioning of horses, not to mention the interest it creates in the owning of superior mounts. It seems a pity that in our country, where we have race meetings almost throughout the year, it remains practically impossible for an officer to occasionally enter either his own or a public horse in a race.

Many of the horses in the Army and in civilian pur-



A Slide at the "Escuela De Equitación Militar," Carabanchel, Spain

suits are Arabs or have a strong cross of that blood. One sees quite a few Anglo-Arabs of pure blood on both sides in the horse shows.

But the majority of horses in the Army are Native Spanish. These, although frankly coarse in appearance, are quiet, sturdy, courageous, and are good keepers. They perform unexpectedly well, and it is surprising how these unprepossessing horses stand up on a long and fast gallop over big obstacles, or a hard and fatiguing march. These constitute the majority of the outdoor or "exterior" horses which the students ride cross-country.

Both in the hippodrome and in the surrounding terrain, obstacles are big and solid, and they are usually taken at speed. The jumps in horse shows and in the hippodrome are of the same types that we favor and vary in height between 1.4 meters (4 ft. 6 in. approximately) and 1.7 meters (5 ft. 6 in.). Wings are almost never used. The courses are arranged similarly to ours, but jumps higher than 1.6 meters usually have a low jump placed accurately either two strides or three strides in front of the big one, which arrangement places the horse correctly for the take-off. This distance between jumps is checked by putting several horses over them and arranging the jumps to suit the average. Time consumed in negotiating any course is given considerable weight in all shows. This does away with tiring "jump-offs." Hence, the emphasis given to speed in all training over jumps at this school. In this respect the work is probably similar to that at Tor de Quinto.

As may be surmised, the chief aim of the school is to develop bold horsemen, and in this it certainly succeeds. The rides across country, especially, are conducted with a startling abandon that only too often has its aftermath in the hospital.

In the spring a predominating feature of training is work on slides, culminating in an exhibition, during graduation exercises, of the class going down the biggest of these. This slide, more correctly called "precipice," of which there is a film with descriptions at Fort Riley, is a vertical clay bluff some 60 feet high, with, mercifully, a short slope of sand at the base. It appears frankly impossible and is no little disconcerting, especially when viewed from above. It is of only slight consolation to see the ambulance waiting expectantly at the bottom. This year only five of the class of twenty were injured, among them the writer, who escaped with a fractured leg.

Another very interesting event is the "Campeonato de Armas," which takes place in April. One or two officers

from every cavalry regiment and their mounts are assembled a week or so before the test is scheduled to take place, to allow them to acquaint themselves with the terrain. The test is a three-day event modeled very closely after the one conducted in connection with the Olympics and comprises Schooling, Cross-country, and Jumping phases. It is a severe test of training and conditioning, requiring the utmost of any rider or horse. As a three-kilometer steeplechase is part of the cross-country phase, and as much of the phase is laid out in terrain where the going is exceedingly soft, one can imagine what sort of horse it takes to win. Is it necessary to state that the little mare belonging to Lieutenant de Torres, which won the event this year, is a Thoroughbred? Such an event, with an entry or two from each regiment, could very well be held in our service, and would have splendid results.

As to strictly school-horse work, the writer's impression was that this is not up to the standard in outdoor work at the Escuela. In obtaining lateral movement of the haunches, for instance, the leg is used in a rather exaggerated manner and farther to the rear than is our conception of the orthodox application of this aid. Also, the rider inclines his body a little farther forward than we like to see. But the hands are uniformly as nearly perfect as it has been the writer's good fortune to see anywhere.

Since formation of the Republic, very little polo is played at the school. Although a string of ponies is kept, no real training in the sport was attempted this year, and only towards the end of the course were any matches played. However, one very popular sport is pack-rabbit hunting with greyhounds. These hunts, which the foreign officer is always invited to attend, take place every Thursday and Sunday in the country surrounding the school. A Hunt Club or "Caceria" is maintained by the Army, and there a lunch is served at noon to all who participated in the morning's hunting; after which the hunt continues, often until evening. As rabbits are plentiful, and many couples of hounds are brought to the meet by the country people, the hunts provide enough fast gallops to suit anyone and seldom fail to be enjoyable and even exciting.

Of all training at this school, the outstanding feature is the constant and well-conducted work over big, stiff obstacles, including all kinds of timber, stone wall, and dirt bank, as well as wide, deep ditches and trenches. It is not surprising that the Spanish team usually gives such a splendid account of itself at Nice, Rome, Madrid, Oporto, and other international shows.



Marshal Murat

By EDWARD DICKINSON

IF *Aramis* were to step from the novels of Alexandre Dumas and play as big a part in history as he has done in fiction, he would be Joachim Murat, Napoleon's chief of cavalry. Dumas, it is known, based his *D'Artagnan* romances on facts obtained by reading *The Memoirs of the Chevalier D'Artagnan*, a paper-bound volume picked up in a Parisian street book shop; but, being as familiar as he was with the Napoleon epoch, it is perfectly probable that he wrote *Aramis* from Murat. Certainly the early life of Murat parallels the youth of *Aramis*.

Joachim Murat was born March 25, 1767, at Bastide-Frontonière, where his father kept an inn, much patronized by the Talleyrands, as Murat senior had once been in their employ. At a nearly age Joachim exhibited the dare-devil spirit that characterized him all his life, and by his tenth birthday his exquisite horsemanship was the talk of the province. It was determined that he should enter the priesthood, and his admission to the school of Cahors and later the University of Toulouse was secured. But here his gay, generous manner won him more popularity with his fellow students than did his lack of interest in things philosophical with his professors. In his twentieth year Abbé Murat, as he was called, fell in love with a girl of Toulouse, fought a duel over her, carried her off and set up an establishment with her, which *sub rosa* affair, when it transpired to the authorities of the university, ended his ecclesiastical studies. Joachim enlisted in a regiment of chasseurs. Later he found his way back to his father's inn. Just what became of the girl is unknown. But there is no evidence that the change of garb affected the young man's propensity for getting into amorous troubles—like *Aramis*—and he was soon back in the army, in Paris, making the acquaintance of Napoleon Bonaparte, and throwing in his lot with the revolution.

Joachim Murat was with Napoleon in Egypt. He was on Napoleon's staff in the first Italian campaign, where he first found the hobby of collecting wines, not as a sot but as a connoisseur, and carrying the study of wine to such an extent that he became one of the first authorities on artificial fertilizers with respect to their application to the grape-growing industry. Murat married Napoleon's youngest sister, Caroline.

The passage of the Alps took place in the spring of 1800, and on June 14 of that year the battle of Marengo was fought. At first this battle looked like a victory for the Austrians, but the arrival in the afternoon of Napoleon with reinforcements, including a force of cavalry under Murat, changed the whole thing.

Five years later the Ulm-Austerlitz campaign was being contested. Between the Marengo and Ulm episodes



Marshal Murat

Murat had distinguished himself time and again by personal courage, by insight into military affairs, particularly those pertaining to cavalry, and now, still chief of cavalry, he won the title Grand Duke of Berg and Cleves.

Ulm is on the Danube River at its junction with the Iller. A hundred miles west of the Danube is the Rhine, and between them is the Black Forest. On September 25, 1805, Napoleon with Murat and two army corps was at Strasburg on the Rhine. At the larger cities on the Rhine, north of Strasburg, were other army corps. From Ulm the Austrian line extended southwest to the edge of the Black Forest, where the French were expected to attack. To gratify this expectation Murat with his cavalry was ordered to drive back, slowly, the Austrian outposts and to keep them so busy that the various French outfits to the north could, moving forward on routes that made a series of concentric circles, take both banks of the Danube and completely surround the city of Ulm. Murat performed his task admirably and moved his horsemen so adroitly, diagonally across the lines of French advance, that the Austrians had no knowledge of the forces converging on them till more than half of the French had crossed the Danube and had cut all communication between Ulm and Vienna. The campaign of Ulm was the

most brilliantly enacted of any of Napoleon's military achievements.

From October to December the war moved east, and Murat entered Vienna on November 13. On the 19th he was at Brunn and starting for Olmutz, where a large Russian army was allied with the Austrians. The allied force was too great for Murat's cavalry, which now became a rear guard (falling back), instead of an invading force, and at Austerlitz on December 2 the final battle of the war was fought. On December 1 the French army numbering 65,000 men, of whom 15,000 were cavalry, was on the west slope of the Goldbach Valley, running north and south. Facing the French were the allies, that is, Russians and Austrians. Murat commanded the French left made up of 40,000 in units led by Marshals Kellermann, Lannes, Bernadotte, Vandamme, and Bessières. The French center was commanded by Marshal Soult, and on the right was the command of Marshal Davoust. Early the next morning Davoust was attacked by a force of Russians and Austrians under General Buxhowden. A few minutes later the French center was pushed forward and secured a hold on high ground east of the Goldbach, which they were able to hold throughout the balance of the combat. In an effort to cut communication between this high point and the rest of the French army, a long, thin line of allied troops was sent behind, and west of this hold, a folly attempted by Russians who had never met the French and wanted to prove more than equal to them. Appreciating the weakness of a line as long as that of the allies, Murat put everything he had against it at the same moment reinforcements for the French right arrived. The whole Austrian and Russian force was driven from the Goldbach Valley to the Litawa Valley at a point at which the latter is a maze of swamps and lakes which were frozen over. French heavy artillery was turned on the ice, breaking it and drowning several thousand retreating Russians. Following the battle a treaty of peace was signed by the French and the allies.

A few months later France was at war with Prussia, and in the autumn of 1806 the battles of Auerstadt and Jena were fought within a few hours of each other, and both were French victories. Following the retreat of the Prussians from Jena, Murat set out for Weimar and then to Erfurt, taking both cities with supplies and some 29,000 prisoners in just a few hours. Other remnants of the defeated Prussian Army were gathering at Magdeburg, to the north, and to this point headed Murat and the cavalry from Erfurt. Napoleon started to Magdeburg, too, from Auerstadt and travelling by way of Naumberg, Merseberg, Halle, and Bernberg. From Magdeburg the French pursued the Prussians to Berlin, and while Napoleon and Davoust were entering that city, Murat's cavalry drove the Prussians from Spandau. The Prussians retreated northeast to Prentzlow, whither Murat followed, detaching a force under General Lasalle to take Stettin. Then the Prussians moved northwest and headed for the Baltic coast along which they moved into the free

city of Lubeck, with as little respect for neutrality as they exhibited in Belgium in 1914. Murat's cavalry promptly followed the Prussians into the town and proceeded to whip them in the streets, driving them on to Nossentin on November 1, to Wismar two days later, to Schwartzau, and, on November 7, Blucher, who commanded the Prussians, finding a powerful Danish Army barring his way into Denmark, was forced to surrender to the French who had him cornered at Ratkau.

Murat served Napoleon admirably at every turn. Following the battle of Austerlitz he was made Grand Duke of Berg and Cleves. In the Spanish campaign Murat held dreams of the throne of Spain for himself and his wife, but Napoleon had other plans, and Murat found himself crowned King of Naples, where he and his wife set up a court, a fine system of laws, and an educational program that might well be copied in many places today. Out of respect to the Emperor Murat assumed the title, King Joachim-Napoleon I. Then, reorganizing the little Neapolitan Army, he drove the English under Sir Hudson Lowe from Capri, a feat that promptly won him the loyalty of his subjects—a feat, too, that led to many meannesses practiced by the latter on Napoleon at St. Helena some years later. Murat's wife, the Queen Caroline, had much of her brother's executive ability; and she and Murat together gave Naples the first decent set of laws in the city's history. Till that time the Italian city-states had been governed tyrannically by whomsoever came into power making laws to fit the moment and enforcing them without trial and with the utmost brutality. The new Neapolitan law was a copy of the Code-Napoleon. A system of public education was set up. And Murat's knowledge of grape-growing won him the hearts of the farmers roundabout. But the failure of the Sicilian campaign in 1810, coupled with his ill-nature over it, turned many of his subjects against him.

In 1812 Murat was summoned to lead the cavalry in the Russian campaign, where, though disapproving the whole thing, he performed valiant service, exhibiting the same personal courage and energy that had characterized his youth and distinguishing himself at the Battles of Valentina and Borodino. On the retreat from Moscow Murat's horsemen, no match for the hordes of cossacks, behaved gallantly, and, when at Smorgoni Napoleon had to leave the army and hurry to Paris, Murat was named for chief command and skillfully led the French Army back to Posen.

Here, on January 17, 1813, word was brought to Murat that his wife was planning to take the throne of Naples for herself. He at once gave up his command and hastened home, where he and Queen Caroline patched up their differences which were more fancied than real.

On learning of the disaster to Napoleon at the Battle of Leipzig, Murat opened negotiations with Austria and England, seeking to secure his own crown. These two powers advised him to throw in his lot with the allies,

which he did, although half-heartedly. The Emperor on hearing of this wrote to him, expressing some doubt as to his own belief in the rumors concerning Murat's defection toward the allies, reminding him that he had obtained a kingdom from his support of Napoleon and suggesting that since he was French he would do well to remain a Frenchman. To this Murat replied with an assertion of loyalty to the Emperor.

During Napoleon's captivity at Elba Murat continued to seek the guarantee of his kingdom but kept in constant touch with Napoleon through Queen Caroline. But the sudden return from Elba fired Murat's imagination.

Wildly Murat threw the Neapolitan Army on to the Austrians in northern Italy, enthusiastically claiming that he'd drive them out and build a second Rome. His army was defeated. The battle of Waterloo was fought, and while Napoleon was being conveyed to St Helena, Murat found himself a fugitive, dodging in and out of bays and inlets along the Mediterranean shore of France, hiding in lowly huts and finally reaching Corsica, where a warm welcome was extended him because of his one-time loyalty to Napoleon. From Ajaccio friends interceded for him with the Emperor of Austria, who finally invited him to make his home there, subject to the conditions that he give up the title "King" and that he pledge himself not to leave the country without permission from the government. He was, however, to receive a comfortable country estate, the gift of Maria-Louisa who admired him greatly. Proudly Murat refused these terms and set about organizing a small army for an invasion of Italy, where he hoped that, by keeping up an endless guerilla warfare, he might be recognized as the popular ruler.

On October 18, 1815 Murat with twenty-eight soldiers and three servants landed from a small sailing vessel at Pizzo, where he was immediately recognized by some fishermen who loudly hailed him with, "Long live King Joachim." Encouraged, he led his men from the docks to the village square, at every step of the way friends joining him. At the square some soldiers refused to have anything to do with him, but believing that they were merely awaiting orders from their commanders who would throw them his way, Murat set out along the precipitous, rocky, dusty, hot road to Monte-Leone. Soon it was discovered that gendarmes under Captain Trenta-Capella were in pursuit. Murat turned and hailed them. The answer was a volley of musket balls, killing some of his men. Realizing that his only safety lay in flight, Murat led his force down a steep path to the seashore, where they

were surrounded by enemies. Quickly he drew his sword and offered it to them, shouting, "People of Pizzo, take this sword which has often been drawn at the head of armies, but spare the lives of the brave men around me." He might have saved his breath. Every one of his comrades was either killed or wounded. Murat and those not dead were dragged back to the town and thrown into prison, a common jail. Here Trenta-Capella stripped the fallen King of Naples of his purse, his jewels, his passports. Five days later he was tried for treason against Naples on a law he had framed. A few hours later he faced a firing squad.

During his last days Murat conducted himself with the utmost courtesy and dignity toward all. Letters to friends in Italy, France, and Austria, to Maria-Louisa, to Caroline, to Napoleon, to the Emperor of Austria, himself, written during his brief imprisonment and between the hour of sentence and death, were held up till his execution was accomplished for fear that they might circumvent the desires of those who wished to slay him. All his life he was guided more by impulse than judgment. Mental discipline would have done much for him. As a civil leader he was dependent on his wife, although in the duchies of Berg and Cleves he was regarded highly, because he set up in them fine institutions of all kinds, building their commerce and raising their efficiency in agriculture to a higher standard than ever before reached in Europe. As King of Naples he had other problems to face. As a soldier he was without peer. He was generous, fickle, gallant, ill advised, when away from Caroline or Napoleon. His morals were doubtful, but he made those around him happy. As a husband he was more affectionate than faithful. Certainly he was more loved than admired. In the Russian campaign the Westphalian troops hesitated to follow their leader, and when the support Murat was expecting from them failed to arrive, he went to their commander's tent to learn that they feared to advance. Without discussion he put himself at their head and lead them into action. Later, speaking to their commander he said, "Thy marshal's baton is half within thy grasp, take it the rest of the way, thyself." In his last great campaign in Italy, seeing a young Italian experiencing great difficulty with his horse in fording a river under fire, he put his own horse, regardless of personal safety, regardless of the beauty of the uniform he was wearing, into the water and led the youth to land, unharmed. "Had I Murat at Waterloo," said Napoleon, "my return from Elba would have had a different ending."



Thomas Lafayette Rosser

BY MAJOR JOSEPH MILLS HANSON, F.A. RESERVE

SOME men seem born to lead lives marked by swift changes of fortune and environment, whether as the result of their own strivings or through mere stress of circumstances. In the case of Thomas Lafayette Rosser, personality and circumstance both tended to that end. Dramatic successes and reverses figured in his youth and his later maturity as prominently as they did during his four tempestuous years in the Confederate Army. From the easy life of an ante-bellum plantation, he went to the austere life of the frontier. He rose in the stern school of warfare to the rank of major general; he sank to the estate of a penniless lawyer, and then to that of a day laborer, only to fight his way up again, making of himself one of the most distinguished engineers of his day, and wearing once more the uniform of a general. A fearless fighter for principles, but no bigot; often beaten down, but never defeated, he was an ideal exponent of old-fashioned American pluck and perseverance, with a happy faculty for shaping difficulties, fears and prejudices to his own ends.

Any inclination which may have existed within him to become a mere self-complacent aristocrat was overcome almost in childhood by sudden changes of prospect and environment quite unusual for a boy of his period and section of the country. Born on a farm near Charlottesville, Virginia, October 15, 1836, from his father, John Rosser, he inherited the blood of French Huguenots of an early colonial day, and from his mother, Martha Melvina (Johnson) Rosser, strains of English and Scandinavian ancestry. These were sturdy, pioneering stocks, seldom inclined to brook much dogmatism or oppression.

Having suffered financial reverses in Virginia, in 1849 John Rosser left there for Texas, with his wife and seven children, of whom Tom, then thirteen, was the second child and the eldest son. In the pine timber country of Panola County, beside the Sabine River, they settled on a farm of 640 acres. Except politically, no change of scene could have been much more radical. In the Old Dominion, life had run in methodical and well-established ways. But now the family came from them to a frontier state whose population of barely 200,000 was scattered over a vast territory limited on the west and north by the hunting grounds of hostile Indian tribes.

By the aid of a few slaves and with his own powerful arms and those of young Tom, who did as heavy a day's work as the best of them, John Rosser cleared the land, and built a commodious house, a cotton gin, a mill for grinding corn meal, and other buildings. An earthquake would hardly have disturbed those solid structures. Their material was wrought from the trees of the virgin forest; no match sticks, but timbers fit for ships' masts, sixty feet long, axe-hewn, and squared a foot thick from end to end. The roofs were of boards, riven with a frow from the raw

logs, dipped in tar, and anchored to the rafters with wooden pegs.

Its surroundings were in keeping with the primitive strength of the homestead. Wild animals abounded in the forests. People in the region were more than once attacked by panthers, and these "varmints," as well as bears and deer, were shot by Tom and his father within a few hundred yards of the house. Once an alligator came up out of the sluggish waters of the Sabine and killed one of their negro boys. It was no easy task for John Rosser to make a living for his big family. His only staple crops were cotton and corn, and the thin soil made poor cotton and worse corn. After the former had been ginned, it was usually Tom who hauled what there was of it to market, at Shreveport, Louisiana, forty miles away.

But Mr. Rosser was firmly resolved to educate his children, though he had enjoyed only a meager schooling himself. When Tom was sixteen, his father scraped together the money to send him to the nearest school of any standing, at Mount Enterprise, in the next county. Tom attended it for four years, and had then about decided to make a life work of school teaching, when the



General Thomas L. Rosser, C.S.A.

(From *The Photographic History of the Civil War*,
The Review of Reviews Company)

Congressman from his district changed his destiny by giving him an appointment to the United States Military Academy.

No doubt, as he first looked over West Point, the lanky young Texan, twenty years of age and six feet, two inches tall, felt awkward and ill at ease among the refinements of a civilization to which he had grown unaccustomed. To his dismay, he also learned that, owing to some misunderstanding he had arrived six months before he was expected, and that much earlier than he could enter. It was out of the question to return to Texas, so he settled himself at Buttermilk Falls and spent the time in study. It was a wise precaution, for without the additional knowledge gained in those months he would probably have failed in his entrance examinations.

But he succeeded in passing, and then for five years in remaining a cadet. During those long seasons of undergraduate joys and tribulations, his happiest hours were the ones spent with his classmate and roommate, John Pelham, of Alabama, and with certain other congenial spirits in the class of '61, especially George Armstrong Custer, of Michigan. In their dormitory, Custer and James P. Parker, of Missouri, occupied the room next to that of Rosser and Pelham. Three of these four were to send their names down in history. It is said that Pelham and Custer were among the handsomest young men in the cadet corps, in which Custer, owing to his delicately cut features, was popularly known as "Fanny," a nickname by which his school mates referred to him long after he became famous. Rosser was such a big fellow that in the ranks of his company he stood in the first squad, to which Pelham also belonged. But Pelham was a little shorter, and there was a danger that the two would be separated at formations when a happy thought occurred to Rosser. He put padding between Pelham's socks and shoes and increased his height just enough to keep him in the same file.

But such harmonious relations did not exist between Rosser and all of his fellows. One night during his plebe summer camp, some upper classmen slipped a rope over his leg as he lay asleep in his tent and dragged him over the parade ground. One of them, a cadet officer, kicked him. Rosser recognized the bully and next morning forced him to fight. The Texan thus became technically guilty of striking a superior officer (which he did, hard and often) and he spent the ensuing six months in the guard-house.

But with the coming of spring in 1861, more serious issues had to be met. As a champion of Southern principles, Rosser felt himself obliged to resign and go South but a few weeks before he might have received the diploma for which he had worked so hard. It was a bitter experience to part with his old schoolmates of opposite opinions. Although he and Pelham were on the same side and destined to see much service together, Custer adhered to the Union. It was one of the tragedies of those

dark days that such devoted friends as he and Rosser were to meet in many bloody conflicts.

Making his way as best he could to Montgomery, Alabama, where the troops of the infant Confederacy were gathering and beginning their training with youthful enthusiasm, Rosser soon found himself assigned as a first lieutenant to the Washington Artillery, a famous old organization of New Orleans. With it he went before long into his first battle, at Bull Run, where he commanded the Second Battery, with two classmates, James Dearing and John J. Garnett, as lieutenants. Without a chance to do much fighting he conducted himself intelligently at Blackburn's Ford and on other parts of the field, and Jeb Stuart, the rising cavalryman, marked him with an appraising eye.

The panting remains of the Union Army having fled back to Washington from the Bull Run rout, their surprised opponents followed, to watch with interest during the ensuing months, from convenient hilltops and crossroads south of the Potomac, the elaborate processes by which General McClellan transformed his amateur army into a real fighting machine. This commander experimented hopefully with every innovation calculated to aid his troops, and he was the first general to put into the field a well organized service of observation balloons.

But if McClellan thus became a pioneer of warfare in the air, Rosser the juvenile artilleryman, was the first successful exponent of antiaircraft defense. Serving with Stuart's ever inquisitive cavalry brigade, he one day saw the Federals run up a balloon close behind their front line. Here was a chance for sport. Galloping one of his guns forward as far as possible, he opened fire. The first shot arched aloft and fell short. So he dug a hole for his gun trail and increased the elevation. The second shot, beautifully aimed, hit the observer's basket and cut some of the ropes. The balloon was hauled down in haste, and when used thereafter it always went up well behind the line.

For this feat, it is said, Rosser received his promotion to captain, in which grade he commanded his battery at the siege of Yorktown and until the fight at Mechanicsville on May 24, 1862. Here he received a severe wound in the arm, the first of several bad hurts that he got during the war. A mere wound, however, could not long hold him inactive; he was back, with a promotion to lieutenant colonel of artillery, before the Seven Days battles began. But Jeb Stuart had not been watching him for nothing. The cavalry chief immediately obtained him a commission as colonel of cavalry and put him in command of the 5th Virginia Regiment. He took it during the fighting before Richmond and remained at its head for fifteen months.

The story of Rosser's career from this time would be the history of the cavalry corps, Army of Northern Virginia, for he had an important part in all of its activities, except when he was recovering from wounds. "A fine artilleryman as well as bold Cavalier," rhetorical Stuart once

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called him, and, indeed, by his brilliant utilization of both arms he was able to multiply results on many fields. Fertile in expedients, tireless and daring as Stuart himself, he was as quick to pounce on a quarry as one of the panthers of his old Texas pine barrens. His first fight after the Seven Days was typical.

Lee, moving north from Richmond in early August, was sparring with Pope in front of Washington, hopeful of finding a chance to beat him before McClellan could come up from the Peninsula. Along the upper Rappahannock, Stuart engaged the attention of Pope's right wing while Jackson swung past behind him to Thoroughfare Gap, on the dazzling flank march which ended at Manassas Junction. Playing Stuart's game, at dawn, August 21, Rosser broke across Beverly ford, opposite the Union center, captured the outposts with their arms stacked and with cavalry and horse guns held the position all day, completely mystifying Pope, who prepared to resist a general attack on his river line. But next morning Rosser, with the rest of Stuart's division, was twenty-five miles away. Far up river they crossed again and marched to Warrenton, well beyond the Union right. Stray pickets were scooped up, and the enemy was still ignorant of the whereabouts of Stuart when the latter started with 1,500 men for Pope's headquarters at Catlett's Station, ten miles east of the railroad to Washington, with Rosser and the 5th Virginia in the van.

Darkness fell while they were still miles from Catlett's, and with it began a terrific thunderstorm, drenching the men to the skin and warning Stuart that the streams behind him would be swimming deep before he could return. But presently the column approached the station, the pickets, through Rosser's uncanny second sight, being found and overwhelmed without a sound. Before the enemy knew they were there, Stuart's men were charging through the camps. A party surrounded and took Pope's headquarters, but the Federal chief, to their chagrin, was not there. However, stumbling about through sheets of rain laced with rifle flashes and forks of lightning, they gathered in three hundred prisoners, among them Pope's field quartermaster, and took the general's dispatch book, his spare horses and equipment, money chests, and personal baggage, including his dress uniform. This last was subsequently displayed, amid much hilarity, in a Broad Street show window in Richmond.

Then the raiders took the back track and soon after day were once more safely across the Rappahannock. Perhaps then some of them rested. But not Rosser. The enemy followed hotly to Waterloo bridge, and Stuart sent his Texas colonel back with a hundred sharpshooters to hold the structure intact. He held it, all day and all night, against determined attacks of infantry supported by artillery, and finally turned it over safely to a regiment of infantry sent to relieve him.

So it went with Rosser, always, everywhere. At second Bull Run his regiment, alone, covered Jackson's right flank throughout the first day's battle, and on the last day

he raided Manassas Junction for the second time, capturing prisoners, ambulances, and quantities of medical stores and arms. In the Antietam campaign he held Fox's Gap for some time against several brigades of Union infantry, and throughout the long series of hot cavalry engagements from the Potomac to the Rapidan in the autumn he played a conspicuous part, often fighting shoulder to shoulder with "the gallant Pelham," now famous as the chief of the Stuart Horse Artillery. On March 17, 1863, he was present at the cavalry engagement at Kelly's Ford, the first of the year's campaign, which has a mournful distinction because there, in front of the stone wall in Wheatley's field, Pelham was killed. Not far away, and at almost the same moment, Colonel Rosser was struck down by his second severe wound. Though it kept him incapacitated for weeks, undoubtedly his physical wound was less painful to him than the death of his beloved friend.

But a joy now came to him to alleviate his sorrow. Even in the stress of war he had met and won a charming daughter of Virginia, Betty Barbara Winston, of Hanover Court House. If Pelham had lived he would doubtless have been close to the bridegroom's side when they were married, on May 28, 1863. The short-lived Confederacy perhaps never saw a more brilliant military wedding, for it brought together most of the notable officers from Fredericksburg to the Hazel River. General Stuart himself, red-bearded, bubbling with good spirits, was there with his wife, daughter of a Federal general; among the groomsmen were Rosser's brigade commander, General Fitzhugh Lee, and his classmates, Colonel Pierce Young and Major Jimmy Dearing. And mingling with the guests, suave, agreeable, was an officer whom the bride took for a friend of the groom; the groom, for a friend of the bride. In fact, he was a Union spy; Rosser met him again, years afterwards, in Minnesota. Music, laughter, soft Southern speech; and in the velvet dusk the summer stars looking down on gray frock coats and white gowns, side by side beneath the trees where the air was heavy with the scent of old-fashioned garden flowers. Then, all too soon, back to the smoky camp-fires, the sound of booming guns. But for Mrs. Betty Barbara Rosser they held no terrors. To the camps she went with her husband, to live as the soldiers lived through most of the next two years.

Only twelve days after the wedding came the battle of Brandy Station, greatest of all American cavalry combats, and then the campaign into Pennsylvania. Rosser, at the front in every fight where Fitz Lee's brigade was engaged, came through uninjured, with added laurels. Stuart always praised him officially. "The cavalry under Colonel Rosser played an important part"; "a brilliant charge as foragers was made by Colonel Rosser's cavalry"; "my thanks are due to Colonel Rosser for the zeal and ability displayed." Such phrases are frequent in his reports. Yet all was not right between them. Following Gettysburg, in a letter to his wife Rosser criticized the handling of the

cavalry, declaring that he might go back to the artillery, even at his old rank of lieutenant colonel. Writing for publication years after the war, there was a sting in his comments on Stuart which brought hot rejoinders from some of the latter's friends. Rosser sensed in his chief a favoritism toward the older officers and probably resented his own delayed, though richly deserved, promotion to brigadier. He got his step in September, 1863, taking the staunch old "Laurel Brigade," of Turner Ashby and "Grumble" Jones. But the mischief between him and Stuart had been done. They were two strong men, each with his foibles as well as his virtues; that they sometimes differed radically in opinion was not surprising.

With Gettysburg, Custer entered upon the scene, in anything but a friendly part. The picturesque Michigander, with his yellow curls, velveteen uniform, and red necktie, after serving a long apprenticeship as a staff captain, had been accurately measured by General Pleasonton and jumped four grades to the command of a cavalry brigade. His troops and Rosser's had clashed at once, at Gettysburg; from that time forward on nearly every field they seemed to come into contact like magnet and steel. But there was a chivalric glamor as of ancient days in their battlefield rivalry, for deep in their hearts still burned affectionate admiration for each other. They were as thoroughgoing public enemies, and as understanding personal friends, as Turenne and Condé.

The first clean-cut encounter between them resulted in Rosser's carrying off the honors. In the autumn of 1863, General Lee undertook his Bristoe maneuver toward Washington. When Meade, by his prompt movements, had thwarted it, and the Confederate Army was retiring once more to the Rapidan, General Stuart one day in October undertook to lead Kilpatrick's division, which included Custer's brigade, into a trap near Buckland Mills. With Hampton's division he retreated down the Warrenton pike, Kilpatrick following ardently, while Fitz Lee's division lay off the Union left in the woods, and at the proper moment jumped out at the enemy's flank. Hampton, on hearing Lee's guns, turned and hurled his three brigades at the head of Kilpatrick's column, Rosser charging up the north side of the pike.

The combination would have worked perfectly, had not Custer's brigade, bringing up the rear, withstood the stampede of the routed Union van in a galloping get-away for five miles. Even as it was, Rosser smashed in Custer's right and captured all the Union transport, including Custer's headquarters wagons and baggage. The Confederates derisively called the affair, "Buckland Races." The dashing Michigan cavalryman had to confess that he had lost this heat, and await, with what patience he could, the chance to run another with Tom Rosser.

When the battles of the Wilderness campaign began in the spring of 1864—battles which were to hold the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia in practically continuous struggle for almost a year

—Rosser found himself with his brigade on the right of the Confederate Army south of the Rapidan, near the Orange Plank Road. Here, on May 5, operating on the outer flank of A. P. Hill's corps, he did notable work in driving back Wilson's cavalry division and temporarily protecting the ground over which Hill desired to extend his line.

Three days later he performed a still more signal service. General Grant, having on May 7 begun to move by his left flank in the direction of Richmond, ordered his leading corps, under Warren, to march on Spotsylvania Court House, which was the junction point of several important roads. He instructed Wilson's cavalry division to seize the courthouse in advance of the infantry, thus cutting Lee's direct route to Richmond. Wilson moved down the Fredericksburg road toward Spotsylvania but before reaching there encountered Rosser's brigade, which fought so stubbornly that the Union advance was seriously delayed. Eventually he forced Rosser back and got possession of the courthouse, but held it for only two hours. Long before any Union infantry could reach and support him. Fitzhugh Lee's division came up to Rosser's assistance, Wilson was driven out, and the Confederates secured the coveted point. Had they not done so, it would have been impossible for Anderson's infantry to have deployed northwest of the courthouse and stopped Warren's corps, as it did; Lee would have been obliged to move farther south, and the battle of Spotsylvania would not have been fought.

In the cavalry fighting incident to the battle of Cold Harbor, General R. E. Lee himself, in one of his dispatches to Richmond, reported that Rosser's brigade "fell upon the rear of the enemy's cavalry" near Hanover Court House, on the Confederate left flank, "and charged down the road toward Ashland, bearing everything before him."

A few days afterwards he again collided with his perennial rival, Custer. On June 5th Sheridan set out from the rear of the Union Army at Cold Harbor with two divisions, of which Torbert's included Custer's brigade, under orders to proceed west to Gordonsville, break up the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg Railroads, and then move to Charlottesville and join General Hunter, coming from the Shenandoah Valley. All went well until Sheridan got within a short distance of Trevilian Station, ten miles from Gordonsville, at dawn of June 11. Here Torbert, less Custer's brigade, encountered Butler's South Carolina brigade, of Wade Hampton's division, across his road, and in sharp fighting pushed the Confederates back toward the station.

Custer had been sent to the left to strike the Virginia Central near Louisa Court House and thence move westward toward Trevilian. He did so, and presently coming up behind Butler, charged into the rear of the South Carolinians, spreading confusion and gathering in a large miscellaneous assortment of pack mules, ambulances, and wagons, together with 350 prisoners, all of which he sent

to the rear. Butler, outflanked, abandoned Trevilian in haste and fell back westward, Custer following and pressing him vigorously. However, at this juncture a mass of gray horsemen, formed in column of squadrons and rolling the dust up in clouds, suddenly appeared on the right of Butler's hard-pressed line. It was Rosser. To quote General Butler, he "thundered down the Gordonsville road, charged and scattered Custer's forces, recaptured what the latter had taken and besides got possession of Custer's headquarters ambulances and a number of his horses and men." The score now stood two to nothing, and Custer still had to await his satisfaction.

Late in the afternoon of that noisy day of charges and counter-charges, Rosser was severely wounded in the leg and had to leave the field, taking no part in the battle of the next day, which resulted in Sheridan relinquishing his effort to reach Gordonsville and Charlottesville and rejoining Grant's forces before Richmond and Petersburg. General Rosser was obliged to spend several weeks in recovering from his wound but was back with the army in time to participate in the "cattle raid," while Grant was before Petersburg, and late in September started for the Shenandoah Valley with other reinforcements for General Early's army, which had suffered heavy defeats at Winchester and Fisher's Hill.

General Lee sent a dispatch to Early, advising the latter to redistribute his cavalry, which had been shaken by its reverses, giving Rosser enough troops to raise his command to a division and making other changes. Rosser's brigade reached Early on October 5, and the very next day was engaged with part of Custer's cavalry at Brock's Gap in Little North Mountain. On the same date General Sheridan, having learned that Early had been largely reinforced, began retiring northward toward Winchester, sweeping the Valley so clean of provender as he went that, as he himself declared, "a crow could not fly across it without carrying a knapsack."

Custer, by this time, as well as Rosser, was commanding a division, with which he covered the withdrawal of the Union Army and completed the destruction of food and forage along the so-called "Back Road," several miles west of the Valley pike, while Merritt's division performed those functions along the pike itself. On the part of the Confederates, Lomax's cavalry division followed Merritt, while Rosser, with three little brigades, dogged Custer, the men wild with rage as they watched the barns and mills and grain stacks go up in smoke at the hands of their adversaries. Attacking furiously at every opportunity, the gray troopers, seeing those in blue steadily fall back, got to thinking that this "Fanny" Custer the West Point officers talked about wasn't such a long string of patching, after all.

Having withdrawn his army as far as Cedar Creek, on October 8 Sheridan gave orders to his chief of cavalry, General Torbert, to turn and attack the enemy, and either whip him "or get whipped himself." Accordingly, at daybreak of the 9th, Merritt and Custer moved out

over the smooth Valley ground, long since denuded of fences. It was a beautiful autumn morning, and Rosser, on the back road, stood to meet Custer on a low range of hills behind Tom's Brook, the long lines of battle deploying in full view of each other.

Custer completes his arrangements and then, swinging his horse into a long stride, gallops alone to the front and halts, a glittering figure, between the hosts. Lifting his broad sombrero, he sweeps it to his knee in a profound salute to his honorable foe. Up on the hill surrounded by his staff, sits Rosser, watching him.

"You see that officer down there?" Custer's biographer, Whittaker, quotes Rosser as saying. "That's General Custer, and I intend to give him the best whipping today that he ever got. See if I don't."

So boastful a speech hardly sounds like Rosser. But, if he made it, he was badly mistaken. Next moment Custer raises his hand, and the 3rd Division, a long line of flashing sabers, sweeps forward at a trot. The pace quickens to a gallop, the batteries, Yankee and Rebel, open furiously, smoke and dust roll up, carbines crackle, and with a pounding thunder of hoofs the charge closes in on Rosser. Too late he sees that his flanks are overlapped. It is more than his men can stand. From flanks to center they crumble back and dissolve in a wild rout that runs for twenty miles with hardly a pause along the Valley pike, through Woodstock to Mount Jackson, losing all their trains and artillery, this time including "the headquarters wagons, desks, and papers of the rebel general Rosser," as Custer reported, with pardonable satisfaction. Thus ended "Woodstock Races," Custer's revenge for Buckland and Trevilian.

Matters were certainly going badly enough for the Confederates in the Valley, but General Early was a man of both courage and persistence. The discomfiture of his cavalry did not deter him from pressing steadily on northward until he came before the position north of Cedar Creek in which Sheridan had halted his army and begun fortifying. The Confederates stopped at Fisher's Hill and fortified, also, while daily skirmishing occurred between the lines. Rosser covered General Early's left, in an advanced position along the Back Road, where Custer lay in front of him.

Having been informed by his scouts that the camp of Custer's division was some miles behind the Union front, at Petticoat Gap, west of Winchester, Rosser on the night of October 16-17 made a daring effort to capture it. Taking two of his own brigades and mounting the infantry soldiers of Grimes' brigade behind his men, he made a wide circuit of thirty miles around the Union right flank and just before daybreak fell upon the designated spot. His attack was overwhelming, and if the camp had still been there it would have been wiped out. But fortunately for the Federals, it had been moved, and all the reward Rosser had for his pains was the capture of the picket post on Custer's extreme right, consisting of a major and about fifty men.

Next day, October 18, he was back with the army, in time to join the rest of the division commanders at General Early's headquarters on Round Hill, where the plans were formulated for the attack on Sheridan's position on Cedar Creek which was put into execution that night. The story of the brilliant early success and subsequent crushing defeat of the Confederates in this, their last bid for a decisive victory in the Valley, is too familiar to require repetition. Rosser, operating on the left, made a bold advance at the beginning of the battle but was later driven back with the rest of the army. Nevertheless, he took and kept a good many prisoners, and after the beginning of the rout he was sent for by General Early to cover the retreat of the broken forces to Edenburg a service which he performed as well as could have been expected under the circumstances.

There followed more of the same bitter medicine. Early's troops outnumbered three or more to one, after Cedar Creek were able to do little more through the winter than lie on the defensive in the lower Valley. But Rosser, elastic under whatever stunning blows, remained pugnacious. Promoted major general on November 1, he rounded up absentees, maintained and heightened the morale of his men by leading them more than once into spirited engagements with the hostile cavalry and from that time to the end conducted independent operations that would have added luster to the fame of any cavalry leader.

Although he was weak in numbers, his ingenuity and abundant daring enabled him on several occasions to put some of his most exalted opponents in a ridiculous light. One of these occasions came late in November, 1864. At that time Major General George Crook, commanding the Department of West Virginia, and his subordinate, Brigadier General Benjamin F. Kelley, at Cumberland, Maryland, were roused by rumors that Rosser had crossed the mountains and might attack some of their posts, and raid the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad near Cumberland. They telegraphed their suspicions to their immediate superior, General Sheridan, commanding in the Valley, and so did John W. Garrett, president of the Baltimore and Ohio. Sheridan, much irritated, on November 28 replied to Garrett in his usual blunt fashion, stating that ample precautions had been taken against any incursions by Rosser, and concluding: "General Kelley is very cautious about that which is in little danger, and not remarkably so about that which is. I will advise you when to commence running."

Even as this curt message was being transmitted, Rosser with 2,000 men, having moved rapidly northward across the mountains, "with great skill and boldness," as General R. E. Lee reported, was in the midst of the large Union supply depot at New Creek, West Virginia. Surprising the garrison in broad daylight, he had assaulted a strong fort armed with eight pieces of artillery and taken it, with its 700 defending troops, their flags and guidons, losing only two men killed and two wounded in the at-

tack. In the government warehouses close by, the clerks were captured at their desks, the buildings fired, and a great quantity of quartermaster and commissary stores burned or carried off. That afternoon a strong detachment appeared at Piedmont, on the railroad, destroyed the warehouses, machine shops, and many cars, and wrecked nine locomotives. Rosser returned safely to Early's army with his prisoners and a battery of captured field guns, together with about 1,500 head of horses and as many beef cattle which he had taken.

Generals Crook and Kelley were very severe upon the commanding officer at New Creek for allowing his command to be surprised, and he was placed under arrest and brought before a general court-martial. In ironic commentary upon this action, Rosser, a few weeks later, sent Lieutenant Jesse C. McNeill with thirty well-mounted men to the department headquarters at Cumberland, where many Union troops were stationed. Entering the town at 3:00 o'clock on the morning of February 21, 1865, McNeill's men overpowered the pickets, went straight to headquarters, located in a hotel, and seized the guards. Men then hurried to the rooms of Generals Crook and Kelley and some other officers and, without disturbing anyone else, roused them from sleep, forced them to dress, and hustled them down to the street, where saddled horses awaited them. Taking the headquarters flag along, the raiders marched swiftly out of Cumberland, cutting the telegraph wires as they went. The alarm was out within ten minutes, but though Union cavalry by the hundreds immediately began scouring the country, McNeill and his party with their distinguished prisoners were back in Staunton in three days.

Already, before the McNeill raid, Rosser himself, in the second week of January, had slipped, unsuspected, with a picked force of 300 men, over the crest of the Great North Mountain, where the snow lay from six to eighteen inches deep. The weather was shrivelling for Southerners; some days earlier even Custer, on a reconnaissance up the Valley, had 230 of his thick-blooded Yankees frostbitten. Nevertheless, Rosser marched a hundred miles from Staunton and before daylight on the 11th, having moved by a country lane around a spur of Cheat Mountain, came out in rear of the Union camps near Beverly, West Virginia.

The setting was reminiscent of Colonel Rall and his Hessians at Trenton, on Christmas night, 1776. Convinced that any attack in such weather was impossible, all the Federal outposts were drawn in save a few pickets; most of the officers were making merry at a ball in Beverly. No hint of danger disturbed the soldiers of the 34th Ohio Infantry and the 8th Ohio Cavalry, sleeping snugly in their log huts, until a swarm of gaunt, travel-worn rebels smashed in the doors and, thrusting rifles into their faces, summoned them to surrender. A dozen or so who resisted were shot down; the rest threw up their hands. Six hundred men, the entire personnel of the two

regiments excepting the absent officers, were marched off, with their arms and horses, to Staunton.

Kept thus to a keen edge, the spirits of Rosser's men were still unbroken when he led them into the most amazing fighting of his career, at Petersburg and in the retreat of Lee's exhausted army to Appomattox. On April 1, when the Confederate right was crushed in at Five Forks, he threw his slender division in front of two Union corps, holding the crossings of Hatcher's Run and saving the wagon trains north of it, at the same time keeping the vitally important Southside railroad open through that night. Five days later, while Lee's famishing troops struggled westward through apple and peach orchards sweet with bloom, Rosser, in advance, learned that a large body of Union cavalry had got ahead and reached High Bridge over the Appomattox River, intent on burning it and breaking the line of retreat.

He overtook the enemy and drove into them like a thunderbolt, killing their commander, General Theodore Read, taking 800 prisoners, and sending the rest flying. But he lost heavily himself, among the killed being his West Point classmate, General James Dearing, who was one of his brigade commanders, and Major James W. Thompson, his chief of artillery. Next day, April 7, the blue cavalry, attacking the fugitive columns from the left flank, tried to break in upon the wagon train. While Munford's division resisted them in front, Rosser's dashed around and struck them in flank, driving them back and capturing their division commander, General J. Irvin Gregg.

These successes, it is to be remembered, were gained while the Army of Northern Virginia was drawing its last gasps. On the night of the 8th, that army having reached Appomattox Court House, General Lee informed his corps commanders, in effect, that if strong forces of hostile infantry, as well as cavalry, should be found across the line of retreat in the morning, he would regard it as his duty to surrender. Rosser and General John B. Gordon desired to make an attack on the rear of Grant's columns and attempt to burn his supply trains, which they believed might compel him to halt or even retreat, but they were overruled. General Fitzhugh Lee, commanding the cavalry corps, stated that if a surrender was impending, he would make an effort to extricate the mounted troops before negotiations should be opened.

The worst fears were realized when at dawn Gordon's infantry, with the three cavalry divisions on his right, attacked the enemy in front, drove back the opposing horse, and developed dense masses of infantry in line of battle beyond. Rosser, at the head of his own and Munford's divisions and Chew's battalion of horse artillery, having by his charge driven aside Mackenzie's cavalry division from the direct road to Lynchburg, rode right on and arrived at that city before night.

From Lynchburg, Rosser went to Danville, where some of the Confederate civil authorities had gathered. John C. Breckenridge, Secretary of War, authorized him to re-

organize the Confederate troops still scattered through the country and placed him in command of all forces he could collect in Virginia. With unquenchable optimism, Rosser issued orders, posted proclamations, and was otherwise busily engaged in carrying forward his utterly hopeless plans, when he was surprised and captured at "Courtland," the home of his wife's family near Hanover Court House, on May 2, 1865.

So, at last, and tardily, the war was over for General Tom Rosser. Twenty-eight years old, and two hundred pounds of active muscular manhood, he was flat broke, like millions of his countrymen. With a wife and three small children dependent upon him, he had to do something or sink. Hopefully he set out to study law with Judge Brockenborough, at Lexington. But the confinement irked him, and he went to work for the National Express Company, under General Joseph E. Johnston. Something happened, and before long he was in Baltimore, employed at the city water works. But by 1868 this was over, and he was holding a minor engineering position on the Pittsburg and Connellsville Railroad.

Thus far this ex-major general of cavalry had found nothing more than petty jobs. But he would not be downed. Though he had no technical training beyond the engineering he had studied at West Point, he determined to make his way in railroad construction—something which would give him freedom in the open air, and play for his fertile brain and capacities for leadership. He applied to the Cincinnati and Ohio Railroad for a slightly better position than he held on the other line, but was refused because he was "too much of a rebel."

"Very well," thought Tom Rosser. "Out in the Northwest they're not so prejudiced. That's where they're building real railroads, anyway." So one day in 1871, in the booming little city of Saint Paul, Minnesota, William L. Banning, president of the Lake Superior and Mississippi Railroad, looked up from his desk into the bronzed face of a stranger who had to duck his head when he came through the doorway. Mr. Banning asked his name, and through his mind shot vivid impressions of yelling rebel cavalry at Catlett's, Buckland, Trevilian, with this long-legged centaur right out in front of them. He leaned back in his chair and smiled kindly.

"I'm sorry, General Rosser, but all the leading places in the engineering department are full."

"Mr. Banning, I thank you, sir," said Rosser, in his courtly Southern way. "I do not wish a leading position. I just want a job, sir."

So President Banning wrote a note to his chief engineer, and shortly Major General Rosser was handed an axe and told to report to a gang that was clearing timber on the right of way. He was also advised that if he chopped satisfactorily, he would find forty dollars in his pay envelope at the end of the month. Rosser laid to with the Swedes and the Finns, doubtless sizing up this Minnesota stumpage with the Panola County pines he had felled and squared with his father along the Sabine, in days be-

fore the war. That experience stood him in good stead now; he stayed on the construction gang just long enough to draw his forty dollars once. The next month he was advanced to transit-man, and in 1872 he went over to the Northern Pacific as an assistant engineer of construction.

Highly trained professionals were abundant, but Rosser's combination of abilities gave him a great advantage. He was soon made chief locating and constructing engineer to complete track from Lake Superior to the Missouri River and to run the preliminary survey from that stream to the foothills of the Rockies. By this time he was earning a good salary, and he purchased a home in Minneapolis and moved his family there.

Then one day in the early summer of 1873, at track end in the wild frontier town of Bismarck, on the shore of the Missouri, there occurred an incident as romantic as could be found in fiction. Rosser, arriving to start his survey westward, met the lieutenant colonel, United States Army, who was to command the cavalry of the escort for the surveying party through the Indian country. This officer was a high-strung, blond man in a broad sombrero, with a red necktie, and yellow curls rippling over the collar of his buckskin suit. They stared, then fell on each other's shoulders. It was Custer, no longer the gallant foe of Buckland, Trevilian, and Woodstock, but the still earlier comrade of the Military Academy: "cadets together," as Custer himself wrote later, "occupying adjoining rooms, members of the same company, often marching side by side in our military duties."

It was little wonder that there was rejoicing that day, and all that summer, as the two of them rode, side by side once more, over the Montana uplands or the grassy bottoms beside the Yellowstone, in chase of antelope and buffalo, or occasionally of a prowling war party of Ogalallas. And what reminiscences of war and peace around the flickering bivouac fires, or on the deck of the supply steamer *Josephine*, in the short summer evenings, while the coyotes yelped out on the empty prairies, and Custer's pack of deer hounds bayed the moon down by the wagon corral. They carried the preliminary survey that summer to Pompey's Pillar, where it was closed on the line already run east from Bozeman. In the fall the expedition returned to Bismarck.

Three years after that came the tragic death of General Custer in the battle of the Little Big Horn. His passing was a blow to General Rosser, who thought that he saw the cause for the disaster in the conduct of certain of Custer's subordinates and said so with characteristic loyalty and vigor in an open letter published in some of the leading newspapers of the country. In concluding, he expressed his emotion concerning his old comrade and adversary in feeling words. "I have known General Custer intimately from boyhood and, being on opposite sides during the late war, we often met and measured strength on the fields of Virginia; and I can truly say now that I never met a more enterprising, gallant or dangerous an enemy during those four years of terrible

war, or a more genial, whole-souled, chivalrous gentleman and friend in peace than Major General George A. Custer."

His letter was answered hotly by Major Marcus A. Reno, Custer's second in command, who in the battle had conducted the defense of the surviving companies of the 7th Cavalry. The controversy was finally terminated by Rosser, who handsomely retracted his charges of misconduct when he had read the official reports of the engagement, though still insisting that grave errors on the part of others had occasioned the failure and death of Custer. In later years, volumes have been written in either criticism or defense of every act and nearly every actor in the Little Big Horn campaign, but Rosser was the first to publicly take up the cudgels in that classic controversy.

Continuing with the Northern Pacific, except for one interval of two years, until 1881, General Rosser carried the line across the Missouri and superintended its construction as far as Livingston, Montana. His genius for driving the work ahead was well illustrated in the winter of 1878-'9, when he saved a delay of four or five months by laying a track on the thick ice of the Missouri River at Bismarck and hauling steel, ties and other materials across, so that construction might not be halted west of the stream. Immediately after leaving the Northern Pacific, he became chief engineer for the Canadian Pacific, and planned and built its line across the prairies of Alberta and Saskatchewan from Winnipeg nearly to the foot of the Selkirks.

By 1883 General Rosser had acquired a competence, and though the people of the Northwest urged him to remain among them, the land of his ancestors, his childhood, and his battles called him. He returned to Virginia, bought the farm near Charlottesville which had once belonged to his father, built a home where his children might attend the University of Virginia, and settled down to spend the remainder of his life as a gentleman farmer, living, as one of his warm friends in Republican Minnesota once wrote, "in dignified retirement," except when "occasionally giving vent to an epistolary shout on the Democratic side of politics, or a stump speech which set the political teeth of the nation on edge." This was written at a time when General Rosser was reported to be a candidate for Congress from his district in Virginia. But the Minnesotan boldly avowed political heresy in this case. "General Rosser's ability has been manifested in every field," he declared. "His courage, tenacity of purpose, and rectitude of character are recognized by all who know him, and while I am a Republican, I am ready to confess a strong personal predilection for General Rosser."

He did not run for Congress, preferring the varied pursuits of a country life. A robust, nature-loving man, though he now weighed 250 pounds, his son, Thomas L. Rosser, Jr., declares that he was "very active, and could outrun and out-jump any of us boys." So he still was, at sixty-two years of age, when in 1898 the calls to arms rang over the country for the war with Spain.

The die-hard ex-Confederate who never surrendered, burned at once to prove by an act of signal devotion his loyalty to the reunited country of which he had become so prominent a citizen. Still within the limit of military age, he offered his services to the government and President McKinley commissioned him a brigadier general, United States Volunteers, on June 10, 1898. He was placed at the head of the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division, 1st Army Corps, his command consisting entirely of Northern troops: the 14th Minnesota, 2nd Ohio, and 1st Pennsylvania regiments of infantry. The brigade mobilized at Chickamauga Park, and throughout the summer General Rosser was engaged there in drilling and equipping his troops for battle. The war terminated, however, before they were called into the field, and at the end of November General Rosser was honorably discharged.


A man of his disposition, however, could never remain inactive. With his old friend and commander, General Fitzhugh Lee, he became interested in some land development in Cuba, but returned in about a year to Virginia. Here he continued the management of his model dairy farm, at the same time promoting a soapstone quarry near Charlottesville. In 1904 he was appointed postmaster at Charlottesville. He was still holding this position, active and alert to all the affairs of life, when the final call came. On March 29, 1910, in the seventy-fourth year of his age, General Tom Rosser, head high and clean of soul, reported before the Great Commander-in-Chief.

Here was a man who, from childhood to age, never admitted timidity of any sort into his life. Courage was of the very fiber of his being, alike on the battlefield and in the peaceful affairs of existence. Nevertheless, he was as logical as he was brave. Fighting to the last for the cause in which he devoutly believed, when it was lost he saw that the people of the South must, inevitably, accept the situation and go right on living with the people of the North, and the sooner they got back into teamwork, the better for both. He applied that reasoning

personally and proved it true by actually going North and making a notable place for himself among his former foes.

In his application of the same fearless realism to every problem which he confronted may be discovered one of the reasons for his numerous successes, particularly in those swift surprise attacks which have always been favorite enterprises with American cavalry. To be sure, when acting under the command of others he was a good subordinate, carrying out his orders as well as the best. But his real genius began to manifest itself only when he was engaged in independent operations. So far as the record shows, he never of his own volition attempted the impossible, though some of his enterprises must, at their inception, have appeared rash in the extreme to others. But he had the faculty of gauging a situation accurately and adopting projects which were not beyond achievement with the means at hand. Having clearly defined his plans in his own mind, he dismissed all fears and hesitations, and relying upon the practical certainty that the enemy could not guess his intentions as well as he knew them himself, he drove straight through to his objective and generally attained it. Had he come to independent command earlier than he did, it is probable that even more notable successes would have been his, for few commanders have done better than he with very limited resources.

But with all his invincible will, his genius, and power of command, General Rosser possessed another quality which mellowed and humanized all the rest; an unusual ability to inspire and retain the love of friends. His relations with Custer furnish the notable example. But a host of other friendships, in the North as well as the South, similarly illustrate his warmth and sincerity of heart and prove that the words he once wrote of Custer accurately sum up his own straightforward virtues: "There was never a more enterprising, gallant, or dangerous enemy, or a more genial, whole-souled, chivalrous gentleman and friend."



Water

(From The Cavalry School Mailing List, March 15, 1934)

THERE is in the western and southwestern part of the United States an extensive, arid tract of land—the American Desert. Ride for miles through this country, hour after hour, the flora varies but little. Bunch grass, mesquite, grease wood, and cactus, all do their best to hide the sand but more than often fail, having died in the attempt.

But come within the sphere of influence of the Roosevelt Dam or other irrigation project and behold, a veritable Garden of Eden. All Nature proclaims, "Water is the best of drink. . . ."

Many of us who have served along our southern border realize what water means to man and horse, but very few of us know what is meant by the utter absence of water—no water! In the preparation for our peace-time marches we have been able to look ahead, plan our marches based on a consideration of water and to regulate our halts for the night in conformity with the availability of water. The first night we will camp at Jackson's Ranch; the second night at Twin Wells and the third at Red Tank, a railroad siding to which the Quartermaster will arrange to ship water.

When water is available in small quantities, it must not be wasted. We shall probably pay ten cents a head to water our horses and mules, if we are buying water. If it is shipped in by the Quartermaster, it is probably costing us at least that, or more. Besides, there is no more water than is necessary. In the days in our Army when horses had manes and tails—the days of jungling spurs, quirts, mustaches, and blasphemy—watering a command was quite a ceremony which all the officers of the regiment attended. This ceremony might last as long as two hours, but all the horses were properly watered, and the second lieutenants learned a few fundamental military lessons.

Now, let's change the scene a little. The desert and the lack of water remain the same. The horses have their natural thirst, for today it has not been the regular practice march to a camp twenty-five miles away, where the Quartermaster has made arrangements for water. No, it is a maneuver on a larger scale. The horses and men have been out on patrol, on reconnaissance. The men, in the saddle for ten hours, have covered some forty-five miles. The horses were watered this morning but have not been watered since. For there is no water. There will be no water tonight, nor is there any assurance that water will be available tomorrow. All day we have been working on a tactical situation. The country is hot and dry; the wind blows across the sand like a blast from a furnace. Our mission lies ahead; the work must go on. WHAT MAY WE EXPECT OF THE HORSES?

Quoting from an article appearing in the *British Cavalry Journal* for October, 1929, under the title "Animals Going Without Water," we see what the English Cavalry experienced in Palestine in regard to the length of time that animals can and did campaign, under very adverse conditions, without water.

"With the object of obtaining some precise data of such privations, the D.V.S. instituted inquiries, and the G.O.C.'s Corps supplied him with most interesting details of the longest continuous period during which their animals went without water, and which is recorded fully in the Official History of the War, Veterinary Services. Briefly, the longest recorded periods were as follows: The Lincoln Yeomanry 22nd Mounted Brigade, 84 hours; the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, the Australian Mounted Division, and the Bucks Yeomanry 6th Mounted Brigade, each 72 hours; B. Q. Cable Section, 68 hours; 60th Division, XXth Army Corps, 65 hours; 54th Divisional Train, 63 hours; the Berks Yeomanry 6th Mounted Brigade, 60 hours; the 1/2nd County London Yeomanry, the 53rd Division, XXth Army Corps, and the 20th Brigade, R.H.A., each 56 hours; the Dorset Yeomanry 6th Mounted Brigade, 54 hours; the 8th Mounted Brigade, 52 hours; the East Riding Yeomanry 22nd Mounted Brigade, the 7th Mounted Brigade, and the 181st Heavy Battery, each 50 hours. * * *

* * * None of these remarks adequately convey the impression of acute suffering of animals perishing from thirst in the desert, nor do they give any idea of the wastage produced by this cause.

"Colonel Preston mentions in his book that when marching in a waterless country he carried a large biscuit tin or petrol tin full of water on the dashboard of every gun and wagon. At hourly halts he wiped with a wet cloth the eyes, nostrils and mouths of his horses, which practice seemed to revive them. He also wetted their feeds, and following the example of Brig.-General Paul Kenna, 21st Lancers, with his Mounted Infantry in Somaliland, and Colonel P. H. S. Barrow in the Nile Expedition, he had fed his very exhausted horses with pellets of crushed grain and bran (if the latter was available) moistened with water. The latter practice is physiologically correct, for thirst, or rather the expression of it, is a local sensation, and is alleviated considerably by simple moist application to the mouth and lips. It is an adaptation of the rule of the Turcoman of old, who before starting on a long journey used to carry in skins small balls of barley meal mixed with oil or fat for himself and horse."

An American Cavalry March 100 Miles in 24 Hours*

BY CAPTAIN DE LABOUCHERE

THE tendency is more and more towards the mechanization of cavalry. This does not mean that the rôle of cavalry as a mounted arm is diminished—far from it. It is evident that the speed and mobility of mounted troops will still play a very important rôle in the war operations of the future and that the cavalry must be able to displace itself on horseback fast and far.

From this point of view, it is extremely interesting to make known to cavalrymen the remarkable performance in the United States, in May, 1933, of the Fort Riley Cavalry Brigade, told in the August number of the magazine *The Sportsman*, under the title, "Jine the Cavalree."

Having left Fort Riley, May 15th, the brigade accomplished in twenty-three hours and a half a march of one hundred miles, or a little more than 160 kilometers, on metaled, tarred or macadam roads.

The "raid" was made in full pack, or a weight of 42 kilos, to which was added the weight of the trooper, 68 kilos on the average. The horses carried, therefore, about 110 kilograms each.

The pack horses carried loads of about 100 kilos.

At the start there were 687 horses; at the finish there were 681. The loss, therefore, did not reach 1%, a remarkable result for such a large body of troops, over such a long distance and in such a short time.

Twenty-eight horses only were the property of their riders. All the others were troop horses. The horses were ridden by officers or enlisted troopers of the active army and were not specially selected.

The day after the march and after a night's rest, the whole brigade mounted again at 7:15 in the morning and made a march to prove the good condition of men and horses on the day following a long, rapid march.

A light element, composed of chosen riders and of exceptional horses, can achieve a like exploit and make in 24 hours a march of 160 kilometers, arrive fresh and fit at the end of the march and be able to march or fight the following day. But what is remarkable in the example of the Riley brigade is to have performed its feat with a body of troops of nearly 700 horses without any loss, so to speak.

According to *The Sportsman*, this march was made possible, thanks first to the great improvement in the quality of the horses of the American army, improve-

ment due to the efforts of the Remount service; thanks also to the new march formula adopted by the Riley Cavalry School and stated as follows:

The new march rate is 9.6 km (6 miles) per hour, instead of 7.2 km (4.5 miles).†

"In order to achieve this average there has been a decrease in the time devoted per hour to each gait and an increase in the speed of the gaits. Thus, instead of a long trot period at 12.8 km (8 miles) per hour, the time of the trot has been reduced to 7 minutes only and the rate brought to 14.4 km (9 miles) per hour. The walk periods have been reduced to three minutes and the speed of the walk has been brought to 6.4 km (4 miles) an hour. Likewise, the time during which the troopers marched on foot beside their horses, which was six minutes, has been reduced to three minutes and the speed has been brought from 4 km (2½ miles) to 6.4 km (4 miles) per hour.

"The new time-table comprises alternately 3 kilometers' walk at 6.4 km, seven minutes' trot at 14.4 km, and each hour terminates with three minutes' lead at 6.4 km, followed by a five minutes' rest.

"The long noon halt has been eliminated, for it has been judged that the sooner men and horses arrive in camp the better."

The "hundred mile" march in question was broken by two prolonged halts. After the first 48 kilometers an hour's halt was made to water and feed the horses, while the men had their cold meal. Another 50 kilometers, then 4 hours halt in bivouac to water, feed and rest men and horses. Then, after only five minutes' rest at the end of each hour, the brigade marched the last 60 kilometers to its destination.

It appears that, the day after the raid, the men and horses, fatigued on arriving, did not feel tired and were in very good condition.

This result does honor to the training and endurance of the American Cavalry and particularly to the science and horsemanship qualities of its officers.

The Americans are of the opinion that, in Europe, there has never been achieved so rapid a "raid" with such a large body of troops. That is very possible. But, as a comparison, it is not without interest to recall certain feats accomplished on horseback under the First Empire and in our day.

†An inaccuracy; should be 5 miles.

*Translated from French *Revue de Cavalerie*, November-December, 1933, and published through the courtesy of the author and of the French Ministry of War (Section Technique de Cavalerie).

Before the War sensational rides were accomplished with thoroughbred horses or horses very nearly thoroughbred, by riders of exceptional endurance (at the same time very much horsemen), such as Saint-Sauveur, Bausil, Madamet, who rode at fast gaits from Paris to Deauville (215 kilometers) and from Brussels to Ostend (132 kilometers).¹

But these rides were individual; the horses carried their riders only and were fed *en route*. The results were obtained thanks to severe training, to special feeding (in which sugar had a large place), to rapid gaits (the gallop especially), with short halts.

Accomplished in time of peace, without packs, without any war preoccupation, these rides constitute sporting performances and, from a military point of view, have only indirect utility, by demonstrating, on the one hand, the endurance of horses and riders and, on the other hand, by furnishing useful indications as to training, care, feed, and gaits. The technical information given by them continues to be true and may still be studied with profit.

From the military point of view, the rides accomplished with field packs and with arms by large units (cavalry brigades, divisions, and even corps) in the course of war operations are infinitely more instructive. History offers us numerous magnificent examples.

In 1806, from October 14 to November 11, after the defeat of the Prussian Army at Jena and Auerstadt, Napoleon's Army pursued the vanquished from the mountains of Lusatia to the Baltic Sea. The whole army participated in the pursuit, but, constantly in the vanguard, fighting each day, the cavalry of the army corps, the cavalry reserve under the orders of Murat (and especially the light brigade of Lasalle) accomplished stupefying marches.

Each day regiments, brigades, entire divisions, covered 50, 60, even 70 kilometers, through regions sometimes mountainous, launching reconnaissance parties in all directions. The fleeing enemy was fought without respite, and innumerable prisoners were taken.

October 20, General Beaumont, Murat's aide-de-camp, and the deputy chief of staff of the cavalry reserve, who had been sent to the Elbe to insure the passage of the Barby bridges, made, with the 13th Regiment of Chasseurs, a march of more than 70 kilometers.

On the 23rd, Murat, with his staff, Lasalle's brigade and the 13th Chasseurs, covered 60 kilometers from Dessau to Bosdorf and Treuerbritzen.

On the 24th, Lasalle, with his light brigade (5th and 7th Hussars) pushed as far as Charlottenburg (nearly 60 kilometers).

The 25th, 26th and 27th, Murat's cavalry (two divisions

of heavy cavalry, four divisions of dragoons and two light brigades) averaged 50 kilometers a day.

On the 28th, rejoined by Lannes and his army corps, Murat, who had hastened by forced marches and preceded by Lasalle, reached Prentzlow and made Hohenlohe capitulate with 16,000 infantrymen, 6 regiments of cavalry, 60 cannon, and 60 flags.

October 30th, Lasalle arrived before Stettin, 110 kilometers farther on; with 700 hussars he caused the capitulation of the fortress and its garrison of 5,500 men.

The pursuit continued with increased intensity. On the morning of October 31st, General Savary with 457 horses left Fehrbellin; at 9 o'clock in the evening he arrived at Neustrelitz, having covered 70 kilometers.

By forced marches of 50 to 60 kilometers a day, all of Murat's cavalry crossed Prussia. It joined the army corps at Bernadotte and Soult and took part in the taking of Lübeck. Blücher escaped; Murat pursued him north of Lübeck as far as Schwartau. On November 6th, Blücher cornered, exhausted, capitulated with 15,000 men, while to Magdeburg Kleist, with 24,000 men and 700 cannon, was about to surrender to Ney, November 11th.²

In 1914, August 6th, Sordet's Cavalry Corps (1st, 3rd and 5th Cavalry Divisions) marched north from Sedan in order to gain contact and to inform the High Command as to the movements of the enemy at the eastern frontier of Belgium, and to retard his march. August 8th, this whole cavalry corps covered 80 kilometers at 10 kilometers an hour, in order to reach the region of Ciney. It pushed patrols to within sight of Liège, where they came against barricades held by infantry. Certain units traversed 75 kilometers during the day. The 3rd Cavalry Division covered 100 kilometers in the same time; considerably more than this distance should be credited to reconnaissance detachments.³ The forced march was accomplished with high temperature and without watering the horses!

The cavalry corps was brought back south of the Lesse and sent scouting detachments towards la Roche, Houfalize, Saint-Hubert, Libramont, Neufchâteau. Most of the regiments covered with full pack an average distance of 250 kilometers in five days. Certain platoons on missions of reconnaissance or security, for three continuous days, rode an average of 90 kilometers a day, in contact with the enemy, sleeping in the open and subsisting as best they could.

August 25th, the whole cavalry corps made a march of 90 kilometers, with an hour and a half rest, in order to move from Maubeuge to the left of the English Army (which was retiring on le Cateau) and waged some hard fights, August 26th, 27th and 28th.

In a month Sordet's corps covered more than 1,200 kilometers, always in contact with the enemy, in over-

¹The Paris-Deauville raid was executed in two stages: Paris-Rouen (130 kilometers) and Rouen-Deauville (85 kilometers). The first had to be covered in less than fifteen hours; the second, executed at a free gait, was covered in four hours, fourteen minutes, fifteen seconds by Lieutenant Bausil, the winner. The Brussels-Ostend ride was won by Lieutenant Madamet in six hours, fifty-four minutes, fifty-one seconds.

²Foucart, *La cavalerie pendant la campagne de Prusse*. Henry Houssaye, *Iéna et la campagne de 1806*.

³Commandant Trinquand, *L'usage de la cavalerie française en 1914 d'après l'exemple de la 3e division de cavalerie*.

powering heat and without rest. The horses carried the full pack, or with the trooper about 150 kilos for the cuirassiers, 140 kilos for the dragoons and 130 kilos for the light cavalry.⁴

In 1914, August 30th and 31st, von der Marwitz's Cavalry Corps, in pursuit of the English, made a forced march, in the course of which the 4th Cavalry Division (von Garnier) covered 124 kilometers in twenty-four hours, to come and get beaten by the English cavalry at Néry.⁵

September 8th, 9th and 10th, during the Battle of the Ourcq, Cornulier-Lucinière's 5th Cavalry Division, of Sordet's Cavalry Corps, crossed the forest of Villers-Cotterêts, gained the rear of the enemy defending the Ourcq and accomplished a raid of about 160 kilometers in the German lines—through Troësne, the Villers-Cotterêts region, Neuilly-Saint-Front, Nanteuil-le-Haudoin, and return by Verrines, Orrouy, la Croix-Saint-Ouen, and Beauvais. Day and night it attacked the detachments and convoys encountered, cut telegraph lines, harassed the reserves with artillery fire, and almost captured General von Klück and all his staff, who had to fight on foot to escape from the French horsemen. Marching without any respite, the 5th Cavalry Division succeeded in demoralizing the enemy at a critical moment of the Battle of the Marne.⁶

In April, 1918 Robillot's 2nd Cavalry Corps (2nd, 3rd and 6th Cavalry Divisions), concentrated in the region of Neufchâtel, was put at the disposal of the English, April 11th, advanced to the Bresle and, from the 12th to the 15th of April, moved by a forced march as far as the mountains of Flanders. April 12th and 13th, it gained in two marches the region of Fruges-Fauquembergue and, the 14th, by a short march, the region west of Saint-Omer. The night of the 14th, the march was resumed through Saint-Omer, and, on the 15th, before 8 o'clock, the cavalry corps reached the region southwest of Steenworde after having covered 210 kilometers in sixty-eight hours—128 kilometers of this distance in twenty-five hours. The raid was made in the shelter of a front held by friendly troops, but on roads often blocked. The packs had been lightened, but the troopers convoyed more than a thousand *permissionnaires*' horses. The loss in horses was insignificant. Beginning April 16th, following a new giving way of the English front, the cavalry corps was engaged on the Mont des Cats-Mont Kemmel front and participated in counter-attacks. The 17th, it repulsed a German attack on Mount Kemmel.⁷

⁴General Boucherie, *Historique du corps de cavalerie Sordet*.

⁵Lieutenant General M. von Poseck, *La Cavalerie, allemande en 1914 en Belgique et en France*.

⁶Commandant de Cossé-Brissac, *Raid de la 5e division de cavalerie en 1914*, "Revue de Cavalerie," March-April, 1921.—Commandant Doria, *Une incroyable odyssée. Histoire du raid d'une division de cavalerie pendant la Grande Guerre*.—J. Hetay, *Le rôle de la cavalerie française à l'aile gauche de la 1re bataille de la Marne*.

⁷General Boullaire, *Historique du 2e corps de cavalerie*.—Capitaine F. Gazin, *La Cavalerie française dans la guerre mondiale*.

The same year, during the Macedonian campaign, the African cavalry of General Jouinot-Gambetta, with the French Army of the East and the Serbian Army, took part in the pursuit which followed General Franchet d'Esperey's victorious offensive, and, from September 23rd to October 24th, it covered 700 kilometers from Monastir to the Danube, in spite of the desperate resistance of the enemy (Bulgarians, Germans and Austrians) and the difficulties of a region denuded of resources. On September 21st, Jouinot-Gambetta's brigade (1st Chasseurs d'Afrique, 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique and the *régiment de marche* of Moroccan spahis), then in Macedonia, approached the lines near Monastir and marched on Prilep, which it captured. September 24th, it pursued its march by the hilly road from Prilep to the Babouna, mounting from 600 to 1,040 meters' altitude and descending again to 317 meters. It turned Velès by crossing by goat trails the Golesnica Planina mountain range, which was reputed to be impassable (about 70 kilometers).

September 26th, in 15 kilometers, the brigade went up from 820 to 1,797 meters' altitude, in column of trooper, by a rocky path and redescended in the night to Aldince. After this very painful march in the mountains, the brigade waged heroic combats against the Bulgarians, captured Uskub, innumerable prisoners, cannon, and considerable matériel (about 65 kilometers). The IX German Army capitulated, giving up to General Henrys 77,000 men and about 500 guns. Bulgaria signed the Salonika armistice and was obliged to accept the conditions of General Franchet d'Esperey; but the march forward against Austro-Hungary and southeastern Germany continued.

On October 2nd, Jouinot-Gambetta's brigade moved on Koumanovo and, October 3rd, after a march of 65 kilometers, resumed contact with the Austro-German forces and continued the pursuit. On the 5th, in the course of a long march, it passed from 250 meters' to 1,173 meters' altitude and pursued its forward march. On October 9th, it was stopped by intrenched infantry south of Babouchnitzza. On the 12th, it reached Pirot, where it fought again. On the 16th, it entered Kniajewatz. The brigade continued to advance and, October 22nd, it seized Negotin, and it was in contact with the enemy rear guards on the banks of the Danube in the region of the "Portes de fer." The brigade had marched continuously for a month, while fighting, which increased greatly the distance covered by the units engaged, obliged to cover themselves and to send out numerous reconnaissance patrols.⁸

Finally, last example, in Palestine, from September 19th to October 26th, 1918, the Cavalry Corps of Marshal Allenby's British Army and the Desert Mounted

⁸General Jouinot-Gambetta, *Uskub ou le rôle de la cavalerie d'Afrique dans la victoire*.

Commandant Prioux, *La cavalerie française dans la poursuite de Macédoine*. "Revue de Cavalerie," November-December, 1921; January-February, 1922.

Corps, under the orders of Lieutenant General Sir H. G. Chauvel, pursued the Turkish Army from the line Jaffa-Jericho in Judea as far as Syria.

The 5th Cavalry Division, Major General H. J. Macandrew, covered 880 kilometers in thirty-eight days, losing only 21% of its horses, in spite of uninterrupted marches in a country burnt by the sun, often in the nature of a desert and devoid of water. The Desert Mounted Corps comprised an Australian and New Zealand division and the 5th and 4th Divisions of English Cavalry. To the 5th Cavalry Division belonged the French mixed *régiment de marche* (15th and 16th Squadrons of the 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique and the 9th Squadron of the 1st Spahis), under the orders of Major Lebon.

September 19th, after the victory of Megiddo, the whole Desert Mounted Corps crossed the lines and went forward in order to pursue the Turkish Army and to cut its communications. September 20th, the 4th Division, after five nights of approach-march, entered Beisan, having marched 112 kilometers in thirty-four hours, having lost only 26 horses (the division history indicates a still greater distance). The 4th Division made a raid on Nazareth, which it captured and whence Field Marshal Liman von Sanders had just time to flee to Tibériade.

The 21st, the Desert Mounted Corps entered Nazareth. The 23rd, the 5th Division entered Haifa, and, the 25th, the Australian Cavalry Division took Tibériade after a hard fight.

From September 26th to October 2nd, during the march on Damascus, the Desert Mounted Corps marched continuously. In the course of incessant fights, it made prisoner 662 officers and 19,205 men, bringing to 47,000 the number of prisoners taken since the beginning of the operations.

From September 15th to October 5th, out of 25,618 horses there were 3,245 that could not be used; 904 of these went back to the ranks, and many others were ready to go back. Only 1,021 horses died or were killed in action, or less than 4%.

October 5th, the Desert Mounted Corps resumed its

march northwards on Homs, which was entered by its 5th Division (Macandrew), October 16th. October 26th, the 5th Division reached Alep after having covered about 350 kilometers in ten days through a mountainous country (and waging frequent combats). The armistice signed October 30th stopped the pursuit and saved the débris of the Turkish Army, which had lost 75,000 prisoners, 360 guns, 800 machine guns, etc.

The results obtained by the Desert Mounted Corps were extraordinary, not so much because of the distances covered as because of the fighting, of the torrid heat supported and of the lack of water. In order to give an idea of it, it suffices to indicate that it happened to the three mounted divisions to march for seventy-two hours—three days and three nights—without water and fighting incessantly. The horses of the Lincolnshire Yeomanry Regiment hold the record with eighty-four hours! Those of the Dorsetshire Yeomanry Regiment covered more than 100 kilometers in fifty-four hours, without water!⁹

These examples, drawn from history, of marches accomplished in the course of war operations prove that, in spite of the improvement in rapid-fire weapons, cavalry thanks to the extraordinary endurance of horses, remains still at the present time (especially in difficult terrain and in vast areas where it can maneuver and march) one of the factors of the decisive victory which can be obtained only by the complete exploitation of success.

Whatever may be the progress of the motor and of armored vehicles, whose use is also based on mobility and speed, cavalry keeps its whole value, because it fears neither the vexatious breakdown nor the lack of oil and gasoline.


But it must never be forgotten that cavalry, in order to render the great services expected of it, must preserve intact its qualities of speed and mobility, which necessitate at once an excellent mount, troops very well trained mounted, very vigorous troopers, and leaders instructed, energetic and above all *horsemen*.

⁹Official History of the Great War, Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine (from June, 1917, to the end of the Great War; Lieutenant Zamit, *La campagne de Palestine*, "Revue de Cavalerie," January-February, and March-April, 1921.






ACROBATICS,
JUMPING THRU THE
FLAMING HOOP AND
PICKING HANDKERCHIEFS
OFF THE GROUND—JUST
ROUTINE TO THESE
RODEO COWBOYS!




BATTERY A, 16TH FIELD
ARTILLERY GOES
THRU ITS DRILL WITH
DASH!



REMOVING
STIRRUPS, SADDLE AND
COATS WHILE JUMPING—
AN EXTRAORDINARY
STUNT BY THE NON-COMS!

THE TANDEM RIDE BY
TROOP F, 3D CAVALRY
WAS ONE OF THE STELLAR
ATTRACTIONS OF THE DAY!



GYMNASTIC RIDE
M.G. TROOP
3D CAVALRY



THE MACHINE GUNNERS
CERTAINLY ARE OP-
TIMISTS!



THE MOUNTED TROOPS
BY THEIR SUPREME MOBILITY
AND EXCELLENT FIRE POWER
WON THE DAY!

SKETCHES
from the
Exhibition Rides
at
FORT MYER, VA.



The Air Corps and National Defense

BY THE HONORABLE GEORGE H. DERN
Secretary of War

THE Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives has under consideration several proposals relative to the Army Air Corps, other than the specific one submitted by the War Department. In our Army Air Corps we have an excellent group of trained aviators—many of them tested in war, and the others trained in our aviation schools which are not surpassed in efficiency. The performances of our airplanes equal, and in some respects exceed those of any other military airplanes in the world. The strategical and tactical doctrines upon which our Air Corps organization is based represent the most progressive thought influencing military aviation. Consequently the War Department must oppose any change or legislative proposal which it feels would lower the existing high standards of our air personnel, or destroy its efficient organization. It is the firm conviction of the War Department that the legislation proposed would so result.

BALANCED NATIONAL DEFENSE IGNORED

No doubt these proposals have been advanced with a desire to increase the effectiveness of national defense. The considerations involved therein, however, are limited to but one element in the military framework of national defense. While aviation is indeed an important arm, it is only one of several which are comprised in a well-balanced land defense force. Consequently, a fundamental error appears in all of these proposals. They are not well rounded out. They are one-sided and, in fact, appear partisan and even prompted by self-interest. They sacrifice and ignore sound national defense preparedness as a whole, for the aggrandizement of a special group.

The main proposals are embodied in two bills recently introduced in Congress. The first of these two bills, H. R. 7601, would provide an Air Force so far beyond any sane estimate of our defensive needs, and so costly, that its passage could be construed by the world only as evidence either of ardent militarism, or immediate war. The other, H. R. 7872, while as unsound as the former, has the additional defect of being built through a process of tearing down other vital elements of the balanced framework of defense. Both of these bills exhibit complete lack of consideration for the essential modernization of those other vital defense agencies in which the average, humble citizen must play his part if called to war. These two bills contain other definite proposals so fundamentally unsound as to jeopardize the safety of our country in any serious war. They violate principles so basic to sound National Defense organization and system as to risk defeat and disaster in war. The War Department cannot give its approval to any legislation which embodies such false and dangerous doctrines.

Statement to the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, on recent legislative proposals.

In 1926 the President of the United States convened a board comprising leading citizens to consider the nation's aviation problems. This was known as the "Morrow Board." Every essential proposal contained in the legislation now under discussion was considered by this Board. Most of the arguments and presentations advanced today were heard by that Board. Its conclusions were unanimous and did not include the proposals now again advanced by these extreme adherents of an unsound National Defense organization.

Some of the vital principles involved in these considerations are discussed:

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF MILITARY AVIATION—ITS PROPER FUNCTION

Due to an unremitting, though distorted publicity, many Americans are predisposed to the belief that the airplane will dominate future war, and that the possession of a powerful air force, alone, will make our country safe. Such a belief, no doubt, provides the incentive for these bills which, at an annual increase in cost of a quarter of a billion dollars, would provide us with nearly as many modern military airplanes as the combined military aviation strength of any other two nations on earth. Such a belief is romantic.

The military airplane is a valuable weapon, but it has now, and will have as far into the future as can be foreseen, too many limitations to enable it to be decisive, alone. It can act only when in the air. On the ground it is helpless. Yet it is vitally dependent upon the ground. It requires an extensive, complicated, and extremely vulnerable ground organization which comprises about eighty per cent of the total aviation personnel of an army. Such an organization will sustain the airplane in but limited ventures into the air, during which it is capable of spectacular, but momentary, achievement. It is deficient in power of sustained fire, which alone can shake determined resistance. It completely lacks ability to close with an opponent. As demonstrated in the American battles of the World War and frequently since, its ventures are at the mercy of weather. It could no more stand alone than could artillery. Unless its ground organization is adequately protected against hostile ground forces, a large air force would have little decisive and no lasting effect. A disproportionate air force, supported by deficient ground forces, would fall easy prey to an enemy who has created a unified team, with uniformly developed balance of forces.

An air force can attack only by fire, or by dropping of projectiles. Fire is an important agency of combat, but not alone a decisive one. The destruction of armies or populations by projectiles and gas alone is a phantasy of the dreamer. Actual capture of the enemy or the occupation of vital areas is essential before a determined foe can be defeated. An air force alone cannot accomplish these results. The use of balanced forces of destruction, including the due proportion of hand workers on the ground, is necessary. An enemy approaching our shores would be too much concerned over the progress of his ships and his armies to be willing to waste efforts in meaningless aerial bombardment. Such actions beget nothing but increased bitterness of conflict. An enemy would doubtless experiment with some tentative aerial raiding in hopes of causing a diversion of our main efforts. Such efforts, like the bombing of London during the World War, are not decisive in their effects upon the main issues of war. Our own history should convince us that Americans will not yield supinely to the brutality of indiscriminate raiding.

To assume the destruction of armies by attack from the air appears rash. The impressive results of aerial target practice against inanimate objects cannot be taken as a criterion of war. The aviator is human, just like the infantryman who can shoot the spots out of paper targets, yet whose fire scatters all over the landscape when confronted by an opposing human will to destruction. Progress of aerial gunnery has been no more rapid than the progress of antiaircraft fire from the ground. Those demonstrations in which aviators riddle the targets upon which they dive mean very little indeed to the infantryman who, from the experience of his own training, derives confidence that airplanes which approach so close to the ground are going to be shot down like wild ducks from the blind. If the aviator remains at high altitude he can only drop bombs. Harrassed by the fire of antiaircraft artillery, his bombing will be no more accurate nor decisive than the fire of distant artillery; yet far more costly in respect to quantity production.

In land warfare, an air force will be of great value from two viewpoints. Its great mobility coupled with a great though temporary concentration of destructive fires, renders it a most valuable weapon of opportunity. It can be used decisively in a crisis and, when its action is properly coordinated with a ground attack, may strike the decisive blow. Then again it will be of great value in destructive action against distant strategical objectives such as centers and arteries of production, transportation and storage. To be of maximum effect upon the conduct of war, such efforts must be intimately related to the general strategy of war including primarily the movements of ground forces. It is obvious that balanced action of a unified effort will include the best possible means for protection of such critical centers and arteries. This protection will be gained by elastic distribution of facilities; by disposition of antiaircraft defenses; and by the supporting action of friendly aviation. The support of friendly aviation is of extreme importance, and will be furnished by attacks upon hostile

aviation, at times in the air but when possible against air-dromes. It becomes obvious that aerial operations in war are by no means so simple as might appear to the layman after perusal of the front page of his newspaper. The combined intelligence of an Army knows fully the relative values involved, and therefore is so insistent upon measures which will insure balanced and harmonious action.

Admitting all that has been said, the zealot may still hold that a large air force will at least protect our coasts from the approach of a hostile fleet. Once more we must remember that the destruction of a single, undefended ship is nothing like the attack upon an organized fleet, equipped with the best antiaircraft defense, and supported from the air. A fleet can operate at night, in fog, and in weather when airplanes are helpless, if not indeed chained to the ground. Capital ships are supported by cordons of speedy auxiliaries, all equipped for antiaircraft fire. Even in the best of weather, to approach such a formidable armada, to single out the critical targets, and to attack decisively in face of fire from above and below would be far different from striking at a defenseless hulk. It would be a grave error to assume that a large air force, alone, is a protection of our coastline. At sea, as on land, a balanced fighting team is likely to be superior to the most spectacular individualism.

In short, an air force is far too costly, in view of its limitations, to be considered an agency for general destruction. It is a weapon of opportunity. The most important contribution that an air force can make to success in war is to aid our armies or navies to win victories. Properly directed it is capable of delivering powerful blows, by surprise, at the crisis of an action. It is of utmost value as an agency for harassment, for localized destruction, and for general observation. It is not an economic substitute for any of the other arms and services in an army. Regardless of cost, it cannot possibly substitute for the basic combat elements on the ground. It is a valuable agency for support of ground or sea forces in defense of our outposts, our coast lines, and our territory. Its true value as such can be obtained only when it operates as a member of the defense team, subordinated like all other elements to whatever team it happens to accompany. Its true development cannot be obtained unless plans and concepts for its use are woven into the common cloth, with all of the adjustment and compromise necessary in creation of harmony.

To place undue or complete reliance for defense upon an air force *alone* would be fatuous. Yet such would be the effect of passing either of the proposed bills. The passage of H. R. 7601 would double the cost of the Army for years to come. Either bill would result in giving up the balanced structure which is the result of a century of progress. This sort of undue emphasis upon aviation would destroy the balance in preparation which is our only sound insurance against infringement upon American liberties.

On the basis of the above general discussion, the pro-

posals in these bills must be condemned without qualification. A detailed analysis of the potential effect of this legislation prompts emphasizing the following salient and more important violations of vital principles:

NEEDLESS EMBITTERMENT OF GROUND FORCES

This legislation would dishearten and embitter the American ground soldier. The most dangerous and arduous task in war is that of the junior officer of infantry, whether he be regular, national guardsman, or reserve. His is an humble task, not lending itself to the colorful treatment so often accorded tales of combat in the air. The individual football linesman seldom if ever receives the plaudits of the grandstand. Yet the work of the linesman in football or war is of primary importance. The junior officer of the combat arms, on the ground, knows what the casual publicist may forget, that the essence of war consists in effective leading of American citizens, supported by effective weapons and machines on land, in the air, and at sea. The humble lieutenant of infantry works just as hard as does his brother officer in the Air Corps, yet he has been paid much less. He reads in the papers that the air force will decide all future wars, but in his heart he knows that this is not true. He cannot but observe that the plaudits of the crowd are for his friend, the aviator. Year by year he has seen his tiny, skeletonized units grow smaller and smaller to make up increments for expansion of the Air Corps. Reserve infantrymen see more and more of reserve appropriations go into the air. This has all been accepted in good faith. The good soldier knows that the Air Corps, a new arm, needed the sustenance of the matrix to permit it to be built to a balanced proportion. There has been no bitterness of complaint, even over disparity of pay. This is indeed remarkable, for the ground officer knows that a soldier is a soldier whether in the air or on the ground. He also knows that in some other armies the basic pilot is not even given a commission, since he has no need to be a leader of men. In short, the ground officer knows, though he has not yet proclaimed, that the Air Corps has already been given such support as to insure a development beyond that of an efficient balance.

BALANCED MODERNIZATION IGNORED

This legislation would, in marked degree, enlarge one branch beyond balanced proportions, still at the expense of the ground arms and services. Promotion on the ground is to be held up, pending completion of this munificent program. The pitifully small companies, troops, and batteries, on the ground, are to drop a few more of their meager grades and ratings. Facilities for training reserve officers, already deficient, must be affected in proportion. All, supposedly, for modernization. The soldier on the ground, whether he be officer or enlisted man, knows that modernization has been delayed in our ground arms far more than it has in the air. The Army knows that the ground arms need new machines just as desperately as does

the air arm. Modern infantry will need semi-automatic rifles, light machine guns, and modern tanks in considerable numbers. Artillery must have improved weapons and transport and efficient antiaircraft weapons. Cavalry must keep some of its horses, yet also obtain armored cars and combat vehicles. Yet, because of the lack of public interest in the less spectacular forces of war, practically none of these are in sight.

A land based air force, without effective ground forces, would be little more than a provocation for a well-prepared and balanced hostile force. The only sane policy of defense is to insure a balanced progress for all essential elements. Before proceeding with an unmeasured development of the Air Corps, there is urgent need for consideration of a program which would modernize the ground forces to the degree already reached by our air forces. Such a program would necessitate the provision of modernized primary weapons for the combat arms, which we do not now have. It would necessitate the creation of effective nuclei for mechanized forces which could be expanded in war. Such a nucleus for the infantry must include great numbers of tanks and cross country cars; and for the cavalry combat cars, armored cars, scout cars, and reconnaissance cars. These effective nuclei are now lacking. Our program must also include modernization of army transportation which is but partially contemplated under current, special provisions. Finally, it must include the building of an effective war reserve in all essential materials, including aerial bombs and ammunition of all sorts. The lack of a war reserve would handicap us, in war, far more than any shortage of airplanes. To further enlarge our Air Corps, beyond that recommended, without due consideration for a balanced development of the whole army, such as generally outlined above, would be distortion and would risk defeat in war.

UNDUE AND UN-AMERICAN FAVORITISM

The legislation in question would give obvious advantages to Air Corps officers, beyond flying pay, not possessed by officers of other arms and services. This is particularly true of the retirement clause in H. R. 7601. The effect upon morale of the ground forces would be irreparable. The ground officers of all components, have known their brother officers in the Air Corps, from their earliest days in the service. They know them to be men of character and intelligence, no better nor worse than themselves. They have not begrudged them their 50% increase in pay as a reward for exceptional peace time risks. However, they know that in war, regardless of what grade one considers, their own chances for death, in some arms at least, will be greater than those of the air officers. These bills would increase the existing disparity. Such action would be sheer favoritism; fatuous hero-worship based solely on spectacular values. It would be wholly un-American. This is not believed to be the true intent. The true cause is probably merely a mistaken conception of the importance of an air force in war, as compared with other forces on land and at sea.

BUDGETARY CONFUSION

The proposed legislation would give the Air Corps a separate budgetary status. This would result in confusion in governmental administration at a time when special efforts are being made to simplify such processes. National Defense expenses are always limited in peace. The funds appropriated are never adequate for all preparedness needs. They must be utilized for the good of the whole, to insure balanced results. This suggestion removes the Air Corps from such consideration and would divorce its financial problems from those of the other ground arms. Such a procedure is unsound and parallels the discussion in the preceding and subsequent paragraphs.

SEPARATE AND ADVANCED AIR CORPS PROMOTION

The proposed legislation would give the Air Corps a separate and distinct promotion list. In addition to the 50% increase in pay, these proposals would give air officers rank and all that goes therewith, far in advance of ground officers of the same length of service. This would be a step backward into a morass from which the present single list withdrew the Army, the bad odors of which still cling to our progress. One of our great lessons of the World War would be lost. Teamwork, so vital in all human operation, is above all essential in the operations of armies. The tendency of different arms and services to develop selfishly, and to look upon each other with distrust, is lethal, and has ruined armies and nations, in the past. Such tendencies are intensified by separate promotion lists, with which the Army has had a long and painful experience. Much of the difficulty in arriving at conclusions concerning our air needs has been due to prejudices engendered in war. The mingling of officers of all arms in our schools and staffs has gradually reduced this unfortunate prejudice. To separate these officers in their promotion status—the most human factor in any organization—would now put a complete stop to this healthful progress. This would constitute class legislation of a most vicious sort, and would make far more difficult the problem of combined operations in war.

DISUNITES THE LAND DEFENSE TEAM

These proposals would remove the Air Corps from high command and General Staff coordination and control. This would be another step backwards into the morass of inefficiency from which we have made progress by the evolution of the General Staff conception of coordinated control. The general staff is a coordinating agency, which inevitably makes of it a restrictive agency in respect to details. Each arm and service, composed of zealous officers and enlisted men, conceives of its own problems as peculiar and primary in importance. Harmonious development for all necessitates a paternal restraint upon the undue encroachments of each. When such restraints are exerted, the arm or service in question is prone to blame the General Staff for its ills. The General Staff is not a body of permanent membership. It comprises officers of all

branches, including the Air Corps, who serve most of their years in their own arm or branch. In respect to the Army, the General Staff thus occupies a position analogous to that of Congress in the country as a whole. It is popular with nobody, not even its own members, each of whom inherits the feelings of his own arm or service. Yet without the General Staff there would be a reversion to that childish confusion, friction, and fatal inertia which characterized the bureaucratic control of the War Department during the Spanish-American War. From this chaos we were drawn by the statesmanlike efforts primarily of Elihu Root, whose initial experiments were later perfected by Newton D. Baker. Those vital lessons should not be forgotten merely because of partisan prejudices resulting from enforced restrictions which after all are the result of our national policy.

There is no justification for removal of the Air Corps from the coordinating influence of the General Staff. It has had far greater freedom in respect to its own development than enjoyed by any other arm. Because the General Staff could not give it everything it wants, the General Staff has been accused of repression. By the same standard of comparison, the General Staff has been far more repressive upon the other arms and services. It is time honestly to recognize that the lack of development in modernization of the Army as a whole is not due to the failure of the General Staff. If Congressional action would provide the support necessary to modernize the Army, the General Staff can quickly be transformed into a modernizing machine far superior, as far as the Army is concerned, to any other agency in the country. It is true, as often protested in the Press, that the General Staff appears to lack the power to modernize the Army. This is because the General Staff is paid to administer and control the resources granted it by Congress. It is paid neither to propagandize for progress, nor to rob Peter to pay Paul. If the General Staff has sought to keep Air Corps development in pace with the modernization of the entire structure of national defense, then it should be commended for doing just what it is organized to accomplish. Members of the General Staff have been for years straining at the leash to achieve progress. Let Congress give this balanced agency, unified as it is by the well rounded advice of all military specialties, the support necessary for modernization, and there need be no further fear on such grounds. It should be noted that the Air Corps was not under the general coordinating control of the General Staff until last July. Since that date the records will show more effective and efficient action in the development of the Air Corps than existed in the War Department for the last eight years. This is illustrated by the recent War Department request for legislation looking to a further development of the Air Corps.

The proposed legislation would remove the Air Corps not only from General Staff planning, but also from Army command. To the trained soldier, knowing the intimate relationship between air and ground operations in war, and familiar with the special characteristics of our own

military situation, it is difficult to imagine the purpose of such a proviso. It must be assumed only that these bills ignore completely the vital importance of command, in war, or else the relationship that should exist between air and ground operations in order to obtain maximum combined effect. This separatist tendency is comparable to placing parts of a single football team under separate controls. Subordination to command is indeed irksome at times. The Air Corps, like other army agencies, will fret at times under the restrictions of unified direction. Many an inexperienced halfback, on the football field, has run over his own interference in his youthful zeal and strong sense of self competence. To surrender to such tendencies, particularly in our national situation, would demonstrate a willingness to discount the best teachings of history.

Unity of command over the same area, in war, and unity of planning for combined operations in peace, are sacred commandments for national defense. The layman does not always appreciate that the relationships between the Army and its air force, or a Navy and its air force, are far more intimate and intermingled than are the relations between the Army and the Navy in their few joint operations. Coordination between the Army and Navy, in joint operations, is of sufficient difficulty even under the improving influence of the Joint Board. To attempt to coordinate the Army and its Air Corps, through the agency of a Joint Board would be many times as difficult. To confront ourselves with such difficulties, in our own special case, is a wholly unreasonable proceeding. In certain European countries, where powerful forces are intermingled at arms length, and where air force influence would be at its highest expectancy, experimental separation of control has been a tentative expedient. Indications do not point to whole-hearted belief in such organization, even in those instances. In our own case, there is, certainly at the present phase of development, less reason for this expensive form of organization than in the case of any other major power. The

Commander of our General Headquarters must be given control over the air force component in his armies and also over the larger GHQ air force which is such a vital part of his machinery. Its operations must be fitted into all GHQ plans. This can be done effectively only through the normal functioning of our command and staff mechanism. At the same time this GHQ air force is capable of carrying out more efficiently any and all actions contemplated by the proponents of an independent or separate air force.

UNIFIED AND BALANCED MODERNIZATION IS OUR NEED

There is no Royal Road to national defense. The purchase of a great quantity of airplanes, and the creation of a special corps singled out for extraordinary treatment and favors, will never protect the American people from a determined foe. Our best protection is to accept and build upon American tradition. It has been the American tradition that our wars, if unavoidable, shall be fought by the American citizen, and not by a subsidized class in arms. Separatism of groups and individuals must be frowned upon. Class spirit must be crushed out. There must be no special caste either in the air or on the ground. The task in war is to equip men, train, and lead men. The task in peace is to prepare men. Let us not be led astray into an attempt to purchase freedom with gadgets. Neither let us remain content to employ our forces with obsolete equipment all along the line.

These proposals, if they are to receive serious consideration at all, are of utmost importance in the life of our nation. They can, at the present state, represent little more than lay opinion, perhaps, influenced by the viewpoints of a single specialty. To accept such views without bringing to bear upon them the balanced analysis which can proceed only from the combined testimony of all elements concerned in national defense would be unwise, and is probably not intended.

Excerpts from Letter of Transmittal of the Foregoing Statement from Honorable George H. Dern to Representative McSwain:

*** Two contentious policies, which have been threshed out many, many times before in Congress and in various deliberative studies and discussions, have been injected. These two are those which involve the inherent organization of the War Department, including the scope of its coordination through a general staff, and the still more controversial issue of the patronage questions involved in an independent and specialized unit among the fighting branches of the Army.

The necessity for coordination in the Army is a problem which has been so thoroughly considered that it would be superfluous even to outline the steps involved. The issue was finally settled, conclusively and absolutely, in the early days of the century in the establishment, under the leadership of Elihu Root and Theodore

Roosevelt, of the general staff. The value of this system was established beyond any doubt by the experiences of the World War. This policy is in effect in every nation of the world. To destroy it at this time is unthinkable. An equally disastrous effect would be caused by the disruption of the single list for the line branches of the Army. This problem antedates even that of the great problem of general staff control and by evolutionary processes was finally settled many years ago to the satisfaction of practically every military thought that has existed or does now exist.

The result of adding these two disruptive issues to the simple problem which was originally advanced by the War Department is to destroy any possibility of concrete and constructive action. To these two measures I am unalterably opposed—opposed to such an extent that I will not attempt to advance the constructive thought involved in the simple increase of the air corps, if it is your intention to couple it with these other issues. ***

Infantry in Battle . . . Simplicity

WHETHER we like it or not, combat means confusion, intermingled units, loss of direction, late orders, misleading information, unforeseen contingencies of all sorts. Troops must carry out their orders under conditions of fatigue, hunger, unfavorable weather conditions and the devastating psychological and physical effect of the fire of modern weapons. Not to take into account these grim realities in formulating a plan of action is fatal. To attempt elaborate and complicated maneuvers, requiring perfect coordination between many leaders and many units, is to invite disintegration and defeat.

EXAMPLE I

On the morning of October 10, 1918, during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the 30th U. S. Infantry was ordered to attack to the north toward the little town of Cunel. Following an artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion was directed to launch its attack from the north edge of the Bois de Cunel. Of the two remaining battalions of the 30th, the 2d was in support while the 3d was held in Brigade Reserve.

The attack jumped off at 7:00 a. m. The 1st Battalion reached a point about 500 yards north of the wood where it was stopped by heavy fire from the front and both flanks. The men sought holes in the ground for cover.

The hostile fire was so terrific and covered the area so thoroughly that any movement, either to the front or rear, appeared suicidal. This battalion, therefore, remained where it was until dark. The 2d Battalion had not left the woods.

Meanwhile an order was received from the Division Commander directing that the trenches in the 30th Infantry zone, north of the Bois de Cunel, be taken at once. To carry out this mission the following plan was adopted:

The 1st Battalion, under cover of darkness, would withdraw to the Bois de Cunel where it would reorganize and at 7:30 p. m., after an artillery preparation had been placed on the German trench to the north, it would again attack, closely following a barrage. The 2d Battalion would follow the 1st in support.

At dark the 1st Battalion fell back to the wood and began to reorganize for the new attack. This proved extremely difficult. In the darkness the withdrawing units lost direction and became intermingled. No vestige of control remained. To crown the difficulty of reorganization, hostile artillery fire in the Bois de Cunel was terrific. H hour approached. The American preliminary bombardment began. The battalion commander was still struggling to gather the remnants of his command and to

Simple and direct plans and methods are alone practicable in war—FSR-1923

bring at least some semblance of order out of the confusion that existed.

H hour arrived and passed but the battalion was still so disorganized that no troops moved forward at the designated time.

At 10:00 p. m. the 2d Battalion, which had not been committed during the day and which was completely in hand, made a surprise attack and captured the German position.


(From the personal experience monograph of Captain Turner M. Chambliss, Infantry.)

DISCUSSION

The plan of attack for the 7:30 p. m. operation can be explained simply and briefly. But although the words are few, simple, and readily understood, the operation that they dictated was far removed from simplicity.

A battalion pinned down under hostile fire all day was required to withdraw under fire, reorganize in a wood in the darkness, and then resume the attack.

The withdrawal was difficult and had to be made by



Example 1

individual movement. Movement in the dark for 500 yards, across a shell-pitted, fire-swept zone, is not a simple operation for a battalion, which at the start is deployed in lines of skirmishers; neither is a night reorganization in a wood that is being shelled by the enemy.

The simple solution would have been to attack with the 2d Battalion as the assault battalion at 7:30 p. m.

EXAMPLE II

On October 3, 1918, the 5th U. S. Brigade, with the 4th Infantry on the right and the 7th on the left, occupied the zone of the 3d Division. Each regiment was disposed in column of battalions. In the 4th Infantry the 1st Battalion held the front line with Company B on Hill 274 and with Company A along the Cierges-Nantillois road, its right resting at the road junction west of Nantillois. It had patrols in wood 268. The remaining companies of the battalion were located in rear of A and B.

In the 7th Infantry, the 2d Battalion occupied the


northern part of the Bois de Beuge with two companies in the front line and two in support. These companies were all partially deployed. The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, with an attached company of the 8th Machine Gun Battalion, was located south of the Bois de Beuge near a stream and a narrow gauge railroad. This unit was well in hand and more compactly grouped than the 1st Battalion. The brigade had occupied approximately these same positions since the afternoon of September 30th. It had been expecting to attack to the north.

Orders were finally received directing that the attack be launched at 5:25 a. m., October 4th. By this order the boundaries of the 3d Division were moved a few hundred yards to the west and the direction in which they ran was slightly altered. The new right boundary of the division and of the 4th Infantry was the Nantillois-Cunel road while the new left boundary for the division and the 7th Infantry was to the west of the Cierges-Romagne road. The boundary between regiments approximately halved the zone. Therefore, in order that the troops might face their objectives at the start of the attack, both the 4th and 7th Infantry had to move to the west.

At 6:00 p. m., October 3d, the regimental commander, 7th Infantry, issued an oral attack order at his C.P. located south of the Bois de Beuge near the narrow gauge railroad. It was nearly dark at the time. This order directed the 2d Battalion, which was then in the front line in the Bois de Beuge, to sideslip to the left and be prepared to lead the attack the following morning. The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, was similarly directed to move to the left and, in the morning attack, to follow the 2d Battalion in support at 500 yards.

Although the 1st Battalion commander suggested that it would be simpler for his unit to be employed in assault. Since its movement into the new zone would be easier, the order was not changed. This battalion completed its movement successfully. A road, a stream and a narrow gauge railroad all provided guiding features leading from the vicinity of its former position to the new location.

Arriving at its new position, the 1st Battalion was unable to locate the 2d. When the hour for the attack came the 1st Battalion moved forward with two companies leading and two following. Near Cierges a portion of the 8th Machine Gun Battalion was encountered. Its commander requested information as to the location of the 2d Battalion. About this time Company G of the missing battalion was seen moving forward. The company commander, however, had not been in touch with the remainder of the battalion for a long time and had no idea where it was. He attached himself to the 1st Battalion.



Example II

The 1st Battalion commander now reported to the regiment that he was unable to locate the 2d Battalion; that in pushing forward in the regimental zone his unit had come under fire and that, therefore, he was advancing it to the attack as assault battalion. This attack moved forward from the line of departure later than had been intended and, as a result, met with little success.

The 2d Battalion, in attempting to sideslip to the left during the night, had become so badly scattered that, as a unit, it was rendered ineffective on October 4th.

Let us now turn to the 4th Infantry. In this regiment the assault battalion, the 1st, was similarly ordered to sideslip to the left in the dark. It successfully accomplished this movement.

Part of the battalion order, issued at 11:00 p. m., October 3d, which referred to the movement of Company B, then on Hill 274, was in substance as follows:

"Company B will be relieved by units of the 80th Division. It will not wait for them but will withdraw at once and move into Company A's present position."

The company commander returned to his unit and issued his order about 1:00 a. m. The 1st and 2d platoons were in the front line and the 3d and 4th were in support. The company commander ordered the two front-line platoons to withdraw due south until they reached the southern slope of Hill 274 and there assemble in column of twos. He ordered the 4th platoon (on the left) to move to the Nantillois-Cunel road (near its location at the time), form in column of twos and then move south until it reached the Nantillois-Cierges road, when it would wait for the company commander. He ordered the 3d platoon to move to the left and follow the 4th in column of twos. The 2d and 1st platoons, in order, were directed to follow the 3d. All platoon leaders were cautioned to have their men observe the utmost secrecy.

After all platoons had started, the company commander went to the head of the column. When the road junction was reached he directed the 4th and 3d platoons to march to the west along the Nantillois-Cierges road. When the last man had cleared the road junction these two platoons were halted, deployed in squad columns and marched to the south for 300 yards. Here they were again halted and faced to the front. The assault platoons, the 1st and 2d, similarly marched along this road, halted, and deployed in rear of it. Thus, by utilization of distant terrain features and by care in making the movement, this company was enabled to deploy in the dark, in its proper zone, after a flank movement along the line of departure.

About 4:00 a. m. it reported that it was in position. Company A, the other assault company of the battalion, also made the sideslip successfully.

However, after Company B left Hill 274 the Germans

moved forward and occupied it, thereby enfilading the attack with machine-gun fire. Little success was obtained.

DISCUSSION

It is not a simple movement for battalions to sideslip in the dark into positions with which they are not familiar and then to attack at daylight. Much of the failure of the 3d Division attack on October 4th can be attributed to this attempt to sideslip the two assault battalions.

In the 7th Infantry, the 2d Battalion became scattered and lost and the support battalion suddenly found itself in the front line. It would have been far simpler to move the 1st Battalion to the left front and use it in assault. It was better grouped initially; it did not have to make such an extreme movement to the flank; and finally there were distinct, unmistakable terrain features, that could be easily followed, even in darkness, to the new location.

Although the assault battalion of the 4th Infantry, by meticulous attention to the mechanics of the flank movement, successfully completed it, the evil features inherent in it made themselves evident. Obviously the execution of such a complicated maneuver required a considerable amount of time and therefore it could not be postponed too long. Very possibly this was the reason Company B was directed to move at once, without waiting for the arrival of the troops who were to relieve them. As a result, the Germans occupied Hill 274 and enfilade fire from this commanding ground played a major part in breaking the attack on the morning of the 4th.

Attempts to execute complicated maneuvers in combat have both direct and indirect evils. They almost never succeed.

EXAMPLE III

On June 29, 1918, Company D, 26th Infantry, carried out a raid on German positions near Cantigny. The hour set for the action was 3:15 a. m. at which time there was just enough light to see.

The order for this raid was, in part, as follows:

Headquarters, 1st Battalion,
26th Infantry.
France, June 24, 1918.

FIELD ORDERS)
No. 10 }

INFORMATION

The enemy is occupying the woods to our front with one battalion, something in the manner indicated on the attached sketch.


INTENTION

On J Day at H Hour, we will raid the Wood, entering the woods at the angle, 22.8-30.4 (point Y on sketch), and kill or capture the occupants of the trenches running north and northeast as far as the northern edge of the woods, returning from there by the northern edge of the BOIS FONTAINE.

ALLOTMENT OF UNITS

The raiding party will be composed of personnel of Company D, 1st Lieutenant Wesley Fremi, Jr., officer commanding raid.

(From the personal experience monograph of Captain Fred During, Infantry, who at the time, commanded Company B, 4th Infantry, and from a statement of Captain George S. Beatty, Infantry, who at the time, was adjutant of the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry.)



Example III

- (1) Lieut. Dillon —1 Sgt.—2 Cpls—12 Pvs—A Party.
- (2) Lieut. Dabney —1 Sgt.—2 Cpls—12 Pvs—B Party.
- (3) Lieut. Ridgley —1 Sgt.—2 Cpls—12 Pvs—C Party.
- (4) Lieut. Tillman —1 Sgt.—2 Cpls—12 Pvs—D Party.
- (5) Lieut. Freml (O.C.)
—2 Sgts—3 Cpls—18 Pvs—E Party.
(2 Stretchers and 4 stretcher bearers.)

FORMATION

A, B, and C Parties will form left to right on taped ground at point market X (see sketch) at H—30 minutes. They will each be in column of files. E Party will follow in rear in same formation. D Party will, at the same time, be disposed in observation on the extreme eastern tip of the BOIS DE CANTIGNY.

* * * * *

SPECIAL SIGNALS

When he has assured himself that the party has withdrawn to within our own lines, the officer commanding the raid will fire three (3) star RED rockets—this will signify to all concerned that the raid is completed.

TASK

On commencing artillery bombardment, A, B, C and E Parties, preserving their general alignment, will advance as close as possible to the Woods.

A, B and C Parties, in the order named from left to right, will advance directly into the woods. If opposition is encountered, B Party will hold with covering fire from the front, and A and C Parties will advance by the flanks, outflanking the resistance.

On entering the woods, A Party will split off to the left branch of the trench to the north edge of the wood, capturing or killing all occupants and from that point it will return.

B and C Parties will continue down trench running to the northeast, outflanking tactics being employed when necessary. On reaching north edge of the woods, they will function the same as A Party.

E Party will follow in rear. It shall be its particular function to guard the right flank and reinforce the assaulting parties when necessary.

D Party will remain in observation in its original position, ready to engage with fire, any machine guns that may open from the slope of the ridge or northeast of the woods. It will retire on completion of the raid.

* * * * *

THEODORE ROOSEVELT, JR.,
Major (USR) 26th Infantry,
Commanding.

Information and instructions as to fire support, dress and equipment and many other details were included. The fire support by artillery, machine guns, and howitzer weapons in general was as follows:

The assault parties were directed to move forward during a ten-minute preparation by artillery and Stokes mortars. A box barrage would then be formed, while the infantry rushed the position. The plan called only for those supporting fires normally available in the sector. The position and routes followed by the assault parties are indicated on the sketch.

The raid was carried out as planned. Thirty-three prisoners were taken, including one officer, five non-commissioned officers, two artillery observers and two or three machine gunners. Several sacks of papers and other intelligence data were secured. The American casualties were one officer and one soldier killed and four soldiers wounded.

(From Records of 1st Division.)

DISCUSSION

We have previously examined a plan that was briefly and simply stated but that nevertheless was the antithesis of simplicity when it came to execution. Here we have a plan that appears complicated. It requires some time and thought to understand, and yet, simplicity is its underlying feature. It is obvious, then, that simplicity in tactics is not necessarily equivalent to simplicity in words.

Let us examine this plan a bit more closely. In the first place, the order was published several days before the raid, thereby giving all concerned ample time to digest it and to make the necessary preparations.

The work planned for the artillery, machine guns and

Stokes mortars was simple. They were directed to do some shooting on a time schedule. That was all.

It is with the assault parties, however, that we are chiefly concerned. Note that the southern edge of the Bois de Fontaine parallels the route of advance of these parties. To maintain direction to their objective, each group had only to follow this edge of the wood. Arriving at the hostile position the left party turned to the left (north) following the German front line trench until it reached the north edge of the Bois de Fontaine which it then followed back to the American lines. The two right groups moved along the trench that runs to the northeast until they, too, reached the north edge of this wood which they similarly followed back to their own position. All three parties had clear-cut features to guide them and each route formed a circuit.

Thus we see that the tasks for the individual groups were not difficult to carry out on the ground. The chances for possible mishaps were greatly reduced by the care taken in selecting these guiding features for the parties to follow. Their mission was clear and simple. The action of Party A did not hinge on that of Party B. The plan did not depend on any delicate calculation of time and space. It was simple and it proved effective.

EXAMPLE IV

On October 17, 1918, the French 123d Division attacked northeastward toward Grougis and Marchavenne. The scheme of maneuver follows:

Three battalions were employed initially in assault. On the left, a provisional battalion of the 12th Infantry (2d and 3d Battalions combined because of losses) had the mission of maintaining contact with the 66th Division to the north. This was considered particularly important. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 411th Infantry, with a company of tanks attached, were on the right of this provisional battalion. These two battalions were ordered to move forward and establish themselves facing Grougis.

The 1st Battalion of the 411th in second line was directed to follow behind the interval between the 12th Infantry unit and the 2d Battalion 411th Infantry and then, after the two right assault battalions had established themselves facing Grougis, push ahead and take Marchavenne. The 1st Battalion 6th Infantry was ordered to follow the 1st Battalion 411th Infantry at first and protect its right flank, finally taking position on the left of the 2d Battalion 411th Infantry, facing the northwest portion of Grougis.

The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 411th Infantry and the 1st Battalion of the 6th Infantry, having established themselves as a flank guard to the south, were to push forward to Marchavenne when successively liberated by the advance of the 15th Division on the south. Thereafter they would assist the attack of the 66th Division on the north.

The remainder of the 123d Division's infantry, which was holding the line of departure, was ordered to reform and become the division reserve. Artillery fires were to lift on a carefully arranged time schedule. Marchavenne was to be taken in one hour and thirty minutes after the jump-off by a battalion which, at the start of the attack, was some 4,500 yards away.

Marchavenne was captured, practically on time, by an attack from the south and southeast—carried out by the provisional battalion of the 12th Infantry which was to guard the north flank of the division. This battalion lost contact with the 66th Division and got ahead of the troops on the right. Its two assault companies crossed each other's path and the bulk of the battalion, advancing rapidly, crossed diagonally the entire divisional zone. It found cover just north of Grougis (which was still held by the enemy) and took Marchavenne by an envelopment from the south and east about 7:45 a.m.


The battalion that had been ordered to take the town was still more than a mile to the rear, slowly advancing. It arrived at Marchavenne long after the town had fallen, but in time to help hold it against a counter attack. These two battalions in Marchavenne held an isolated position for several hours.

The assault battalions of the 411th Infantry and the 1st Battalion of the 6th Infantry met with some success but after reaching Grougis they were unable to progress farther. At 5:00 p.m. they were still there, facing southeast. On this day, after the initial capture of Marchavenne, which could not be exploited, the division had no success. During the early part of the attack the provisional battalion of the 12th Infantry captured ten cannon and 300 prisoners.

(From the article by Major P. Janet, French Army in the *Revue D'Infanterie*, December, 1926, on the advance of the 123d French Division from the Hindenburg position to the Sambre Canal.)

DISCUSSION

Here is a complex plan of attack devised by officers of



Example IV

long experience in war and which was to be carried out by veterans. The original assault battalions were to fan out and form flank protection while a second line battalion, advancing through the interval, was to take the objective. The flank battalions would then disengage successively, move on to the objective, and take part in a renewal of the advance beyond Marchavenne. Furthermore, the artillery support was arranged according to a carefully worked out time schedule; it would be upset unless this delicate time table worked with mathematical precision.

True, the 123d Division achieved a modicum of success in this attack, but it certainly cannot be attributed to the plan. Nothing happened as expected. The assault battalions of the 411th Infantry managed to make some advance, as did the 1st Battalion of the 6th Infantry, but all three became involved near Grougis and were there the entire day. These were the troops that, according to the plan, were to carry the attack beyond Marchavenne.

The complicated maneuver of attacking to the front, then facing to the right, then disengaging, then pushing forward again, was too much, even for these veteran troops. It could not be carried out at all, let alone according to the carefully prepared time table.

It is interesting to note that the battalion which had been directed merely to maintain contact on the north flank, crossed to the south boundary of the division and took the objective by an envelopment from the south and east. It was to the aggressiveness of this battalion that the division owed such success as was achieved. It appears that the failure or inability to exploit the rapid capture of Marchavenne was due principally to the complicated and involved plan of attack.

EXAMPLE V

On the morning of November 23, 1914, a German force, located south and east of Lodz in Poland, finding itself surrounded by Russians, turned about and struck to the north in an effort to break through the enemy and escape. The Germans who had been fighting for days were at the point of exhaustion. Fresh Russian columns were converging on them from all sides. The situation was desperate.

The 3d Guards Division, part of the beleaguered German force, spent the 23d attacking northward toward the little town of Brzeziny, which it had passed through shortly before in its advance to the south. All day the Guards drove forward through a dense wood, against strong opposition. Russians appeared to be everywhere—on both flanks and in rear.

At 4:00 p.m. the Guards reached a railroad that ran through the wood southwest of Galkow. Here the troops were halted and reorganized. At dusk the situation, as known to the 65-year-old division commander, General Litzmann, who was with the advanced elements, was as follows:

The location of other German units was unknown. Earlier in the day firing had been heard to the east but this had now abated. The artillery of the Guard Division was south of the wood guarded by some infantry. Along the railroad, with the division commander, were some 1,500 men, all that was left of seven battalions of infantry. All units were terribly depleted and hopelessly intermingled. The men were so exhausted that they could scarcely be kept awake. Late in the afternoon the hostile resistance to the front had weakened. Such was the situation as known to this remnant of a division as darkness and the bitter cold of a Polish winter night closed in on November 23d.

Soon after dark a corps ordered arrived. In a stable filled with Russian wounded, the division commander pulled a small candle out of his pocket, lighted it, and examined the order. It had been delayed in reaching the Guards. The instructions it bore pertained only to operations for the 23d, but it did not make clear the fact that the corps commander wanted the Guards to reach Brzeziny on that day.

Therefore, at 7:25 p.m. the division commander rapidly outlined the following plan:

"This division captures Brzeziny tonight. It will advance in column, with advance guard via Galkowek and Malczew, in silence, and gain the road extending from the southwest toward Brzeziny. It will develop when one kilometer in front of the town and press into it by a surprise attack.

"After the storming of Brzeziny, baggage will be brought forward. Messengers will report to receive orders at the market place in the building where Division Headquarters was located before."

The advance guard and order of march were designated and a supplementary order was sent to the artillery.

The division commander marched with the advance guard. The maneuver was successful. Brzeziny was stormed and the staff of the VI Siberian Corps captured. The success of this action materially aided the remainder of the German forces in smashing through the hostile lines. The Russians becoming discouraged, withdrew, while the German units, taking along thousands of prisoners, and much material, rejoined their main army.

(From the German Official Account.)

DISCUSSION

The Guards were in a situation as difficult and desperate as can be imagined. They had no information of the location of other German troops and no knowledge of the hostile dispositions, except that the enemy seemed to be everywhere in superior numbers. Their men were exhausted and their units depleted and intermingled. They were in a dense forest; it was bitterly cold, and night was falling

Under such conditions a master effort could be made only by superior troops, commanded by determined leaders, working under a simple plan. The division commander took these considerations into account. His plan was based on the three essentials for a night operation: direction, control and surprise.


Troops become easily lost in a night march, particularly exhausted troops who are staggering forward in a daze. Things must be made as simple as possible for them. Accordingly the route that was prescribed facilitated the maintenance of direction. First, movement along the eastern edge of the wood to the north edge. From here Galkowek could be reached with little danger of the column getting lost. From Galkowek the march could continue straight to the north and be certain of intercepting the road which led directly to Brzeziny.

To insure the utmost control the division commander ordered that the advance be made in route column. It was no time for half measures. The men were completely exhausted, so much so that unless they were directly under the eyes of their leaders, they would lie down and go to sleep. An attempt to move in several columns or in any extended formation would have meant disintegration and certain failure.

To achieve the third essential, surprise, the order directed that the advance be made in secrecy and silence.

Finally, as a crowning bit of psychological bravado, came the order for establishing the command post in the market place of Brzeziny. A large dose of optimism was required by officers and men, and their commander with the deft touch of the true leader gave it to them. German accounts describe the thrill that ran through the assembled German officers on hearing the resolute words of their leader.

Here one of the most complex, difficult, and desperate situations which troops have ever been called upon to face was met and solved by a simple order. In such a



Example V

dilemma only the utmost simplicity of plan and execution stood any chance of success.

CONCLUSION


In war the simplest way is usually the best way. Direct, simple plans, clear, concise orders, formations that facilitate control, and routes that are unmistakably defined will smooth the way for subordinate elements, minimize the confusion of combat, and definitely increase the chances of success.

In brief, simplicity is the sword with which the capable leader may cut the Gordian knot of many a baffling situation.

The foregoing article is from the book, **INFANTRY IN BATTLE**, which is now being published by the **INFANTRY JOURNAL**. The book will be ready May 1, 1934.


In **INFANTRY IN BATTLE**, tactics have been brought to earth after ages of nebulous flight in the realm of theory. The basic principles of warfare are here illustrated by actual battle experiences.

Improvised Mobile




Reinforced concrete slab, 3" thick and bolted in place, protect driver, motor and crew. The weight, with three machine guns, is 9,700 lbs. All-round fire is provided, and the bullet-proofing is easily constructed of common material. Exposed differential and the time required for construction are disadvantages.



The bullet-proofing material of the truck shown below and to the right consists of two compartments of heavy double timber frames filled with 4" of crushed rock. Motor and radiator are protected by 3/4" iron plates. The nest carries a crew of 8 men and weighs 9,910 lbs.



Boxing inside truck holds 7" of sandbags in nest below and at right. Wire mesh top gives protection from missiles but no concealment. An automatic rifleman sits beside driver.





Another view of nest at left. There are no facilities for firing upward, the differential is exposed, and time is required to construct. There is 3-way fire for the rear machine gun.



These photographs of improvised machine gun nests, constructed in the Ninth Corps Area, are published for the information of post commanders in the event that an emergency should arise requiring such vehicles. In all cases the parts making up these nests may be dismantled and stored nearly intact, making reassembly easy.

Machine Gun Nests






Boxing inside this truck holds in place 5" of dry sand, while $\frac{3}{8}$ " and $\frac{1}{2}$ " armor plate protect the driver. With 4 machine guns mounted on pedestals, the nest weighs only 3,460 lbs. Gunners' heads and flanks of motor are unprotected.

Double $\frac{3}{16}$ " steel plates, $1\frac{1}{4}$ " apart, bolted to steel frame inside truck, give complete protection and concealment for above nest. Single plating is used overhead. Three air-cooled machine guns on pedestal mounts have all-round fire. An automatic rifleman sits beside the driver. Weighing only 8,280 pounds, and easily removed and assembled, this nest is excellent if material is available.

Two corrugated metal sheets set 2" apart, and the space filled with concrete, form slabs that are bolted in place to bullet-proof the nest shown below. The total weight is 3,000 lbs., nest may be installed by 4 men in 25 minutes. The corrugated iron prevents concrete from shattering and gives satisfactory protection, but the differential, transmission and rear gunner are exposed.

There are no facilities for firing upward.



Policies

BY COLONEL J. C. JOHNSON, C.A.C.

NO COMMAND ever functions without policies. At times they are definite, clear-cut, recorded; frequently they are vague, ill-defined, not of record. If of the latter type, they are apt not to be kept prominently in the forefront of daily activities, members of the command will have but a hazy conception of their import, and even the commanding officer would have difficulty in enumerating them. Result: No one in the command has a definite, clear-cut idea of just what is expected of him.

In these days of too frequent changes of commanding officers, policies, like parliamentary governments, are often short lived—ever changing. For this reason, among others, it is important that policies be carefully thought out, *made of official record*, widely distributed, prominently posted, and *stressed as the daily guide of the command*. If well digested and logical, they may be made sufficiently comprehensive definitely to guide the members of the command in their general daily activities, and, if readable, will be eagerly sought by them for study as an aid in personal development of command qualifications. Furthermore, a new commanding officer, finding them in official form, will probably continue them, changing perhaps certain items and adding others to conform to his own concepts of military management but, what is important for the command, perpetuating them *in recorded form*. This is to the decided advantage of all concerned, for it is always conducive to both coöperation and morale to know positively just where the commanding officer stands and just what he expects.

The Inspector General's Department has found a *live*, up-to-date set of recorded policies to be a most important factor in the successful administration of a command—so important, in fact, that inspection guides issued by that department contain the remainder: "Are policies well defined and recorded?"

The accompanying list has been successfully used as the basic policies of command. Distributed, prominently posted, *stressed* at conferences, and *kept alive*, they brought decided results. Local conditions and personal experience of commanding officers and staff will suggest pertinent additions which should supplement this list.

The ten last enumerated are the "Precepts of a Soldier" made familiar to many of us by Major General R. P. Davis under whom many of us have served. Although duplicating one heading, they are kept intact as such. The basic policies as used are as follows:

1. *Command*: Exercise command as far as possible outside the office. A commander's desk is the place for concentration, study, formulation of plans, and action on papers prepared either tentatively or finally by his staff or assistants. Outside the office is the place for him to

observe, supervise and command. The former should occupy a very minor part of his time, the latter the major part.

2. *Chain of Responsibility*: Develop a definite chain of responsibility within your command, organization, office or activity. Responsibility goes with command and a chain of responsibility must go with the chain of command. This chain of responsibility must extend from the commander down to the lowest rank or file who ever exercises authority. Require definite responsibility and definite command functions of each officer, noncommissioned officer and other person in your chain of command.

3. *Thoroughness, System*: In any activity, undertaking or job: first plan; second, organize; third, supervise. Always know *what* is going on, and *how thoroughly* it is being done. Never start any undertaking without first carefully planning and thoroughly organizing it. Never allow it to meander along without supervision. To do so means a decided waste of man power.

4. *Information*: Keep the next higher commander always informed as to instructions received from sources other than his own headquarters, as to progress made or handicaps encountered in any activity, and as to anything under your control in which he should be interested.

5. *Staff Officers*: Staff officers must expedite business by acting for the Commanding Officer in accordance with policies established by him, *keeping him always informed as to action taken*. In the interest of mutual understanding, the Commanding Officer will likewise keep them informed of his actions.

6. *Observation, General*: In the interests of efficiency, all officers should assist in the administration of the command by observing generally and reporting to headquarters any defects or deficiencies not within their jurisdiction to correct, which would add to the efficiency of the command. These should include: defective methods, abuses, neglects, waste, shabbiness of post appearance, defective structures, roads, railroads, water pipes and faucets, automobile speeding, parking or visiting by visitors in "no admittance" areas, and inefficiency and violations of post regulations in general in any department, activity or place.

7. *Conferences*: Periodic conferences at Officer's call are of inestimable value in obtaining and disseminating information and understanding. At these conferences *policies* are stressed, resulting in the coöperation on the part of all personnel as well as the coördination of all activities of the command. Such conferences should be brief and held once or twice a month or whenever found desirable.

8. *Team Efficiency*: A subordinate commander should develop his own team to the maximum state of efficiency

possible, but in so doing must guard against any action which may handicap similar efficiency in the next higher team. In case of conflict of team interests the next higher commander should be consulted.

9. *Coöperation*: Be coöperative. Selfishness or indifference in teamwork is destructive of both efficiency and morale. It is especially destructive of efficiency in the next higher team, such efficiency being dependent largely upon even and coöperative teamwork on the part of all units of which it is composed.

10. *Initiative*: Develop initiative in all subordinates. This can be done by giving them definite responsibility together with freedom of choice of methods in accomplishment, and by exercising over them the necessary supervision to insure results.

11. *Treatment of Subordinates*: Avoid harsh and arbitrary treatment of subordinates. Such action is not "military." It is destructive of both efficiency and morale. Even temperament and justness are prize assets in leadership and command work.

12. *Helpfulness*: Be helpful to both subordinates and superiors. Criticism to be of value must be constructive; an inspection to be of value must be helpful.

13. *Outstanding Accomplishments*: Reward outstanding accomplishment. The instinct of pride is one of the strongest of human instincts, and through it good leadership will seek results.

14. *Competitive Standards*: Encourage competitive standards. These can be brought about only by constructive work in their development, and by thorough and fair constructive inspections of the details involved.

15. *Saluting*: Develop spontaneous, whole-hearted saluting in your command. The salute is the soldier's greeting—his "Good morning"—his "How do you do." When given grudgingly, poor leadership is at fault.

16. *Military Qualities*: Develop discipline, military bearing, smartness of appearance, uniformity and precision. These together with whole-hearted saluting are among the prime requisites of a military command.

17. *Harmony*: Cultivate harmony and community spirit within the command. Neither official nor social activities will thrive without them. Arbitrary dealings, cliques and snobbishness are detrimental to morale, and therefore to efficiency.

18. *Community Spirit*: Cultivate community spirit with neighboring civilian communities. Encourage visits to the post of prominent organizations, clubs, boy and girl scouts, school classes and other groups and individuals. Detail suitable guides to conduct them to historical and other permissible places. Develop public speaking and accept community dinner and speaking invitations. Assist communities in any practical way possible. Isolation breeds contempt of the military. *The service needs the support of public opinion.* Community service needs you.

19. *Messes*: Develop the best messes obtainable with the funds available. This requires supervision and personal attention in buying and to the proper training of

all personnel used in any way in the preparation and serving of food. Messes must not be left to mess sergeants and cooks to plan and manage.

20. *Grades, Ratings*: In the interest of morale, ratings and grades should be distributed among as many members of the command as practicable, having in mind always the importance of the job and the skill or intelligence of the incumbent. Usually the best results can be obtained by giving a new incumbent a lower rating or grade, with the understanding that higher ones will be forthcoming as merited and as available.

21. *Programs, Schedules*: Have definite programs and schedules. Systematize all work. Let no task go by haphazard.

22. *Weekly Schedules*: In any course of instruction, always make out and submit to headquarters weekly schedules of instruction, setting forth for each instruction day:

Course or courses to be pursued.

Period and subject matter to be covered.

References, by texts and paragraphs, to be studied.

Names of senior and other instructors.

Daily period and subject matter, with references for daily refresher instruction of instructors.

Names of instructors for such refresher course.

23. *Athletics, Recreation, Social Activities*: Athletic, recreational and social activities are essential for proper morale and must be included in any well-balanced program. See that such activities are patronized by good command turnouts. At all sports fill the side lines and "root" hard for your team. *Whenever possible*, team practice will constitute a part of the daily scheduled activities, at least for certain days each week.

24. *Duties, List of*: Be definite and explicit. Each charge of quarters, chief of squad room, section leader, squad leader, mess sergeant, supply sergeant, janitor, fireman, orderly stableman, chauffeur, or other person in charge of any activity should have in his possession a list of all duties required of him. This list should be charged to him and inspected for as part of his equipment. Each clerical desk should have permanently attached to it and kept up to date a list of the duties of its occupant. From this list a new occupant will learn his new duties in a minimum time with minimum instruction; and neglects and errors will decrease in proportion to its completeness. Many an individual falls into routine procedure for lack of definite instructions. If initial lists are found to be incomplete, add to them as delinquencies are noted from time to time.

25. *Post Maintenance*: Post maintenance must be given equal importance with training in determining the efficiency of a command. The command which disregards the maintenance of armament, buildings, installations, and grounds is low in general efficiency.

26. *Maintenance Programs*: Outside painting and other outside maintenance work will, in other than exceptional cases, take precedence over inside work in good

weather, the latter to be done in inclement weather. Approved maintenance programs will be kept showing priorities by buildings, roads, railroads, wharves, storerooms, grounds and all other structures and places. These will be kept separate, 1st, for clement weather and, 2nd, for inclement weather, and must, except in emergency, be adhered to. If the prosecution of any task is desired, it must first be made a part of the maintenance program and be assigned its priority therein. No job may be considered complete until the premises are placed in a state of thorough police.

27. *Troop Labor*: As a general practice, due to small appropriations, all funds allotted for maintenance purposes must be spent for materials, troop labor being employed wherever possible.

28. *Time Tasks*: In maintenance work, well planned time-tasks are encouraged. A good reasonable day's work well planned and laid out through the use of good judgment and common sense, and the detail turned in as soon as completed even if before recall from fatigue is sounded, will usually result in more and better work being done, and in increased will and morale on the part of the laboring personnel. The same may often apply to training. A good snappy drill is of more value than a longer one that drags.

29. *Maintenance Responsibility*: Personnel on duty at any place should, as far as possible, maintain their own buildings, structures, installations, and material. Battery mechanics should ordinarily make repairs to the barracks, buildings and material of their own organizations. Personnel on duty at places such as stables, shops, storerooms and plants can, by proper coördination of their work, usually find time to paint and make at least minor repairs to their own buildings and material. Even one window painted per week will soon make a showing. All persons residing on the reservation are responsible that their own grounds and premises are kept in proper state of police and sanitation, and free from fire hazards.

30. *Man Power*: Economy of man power is mandatory in the present-day garrison. This can be brought about only by careful *planning*, proper *organization* and thorough *supervision* in both training and maintenance. It is imperative for efficiency, thoroughness and contentment of a command. Plans for each job should include a supervisor.

31. *Overhead*: Reduce overhead to a minimum consistent with efficiency. Combine part-time jobs into one. Where two or more offices are located in the same building, arrange to handle peak loads by mutual coöperation between office forces. The tendency to detail permanently in each office a force sufficiently large to carry peak loads must be avoided.

32. *Landscape Work*: Beautify the post. Keep a trained gardener and a substitute available for duty in the greenhouse and on the lawns. Establish and maintain a plant nursery. Procure suitable soils and fertilizers before setting out plants and shrubbery. Loss of plants is often

due to improper soil. Keep compost pit in operation. Keep lawns clean-cut, well drained and free from vehicular incursions, and pirate weeds which kill out the grass.

33. *Safeguarding of Property, Funds*: Make the safeguarding and economical use of government property, supplies and funds among the prime duties of all officers of the command. All supplies purchased, including those for messes, must be inspected by a commissioned officer for quality and quantity. All expenditures must be authorized and supervised by an officer. Security and economical use of property should be obtained *definitely* through the successive links of the chain of responsibility. By proper use of these links, the responsibility for property, supplies and equipment and the economical use of such as water, electric current and fuel become a simple matter, and the necessity for "show down" inspections of equipment may be reduced to a minimum.

34. *Fuel, Lights, Water*: Require maximum economy in the use of fuel, lights and water. These are three evasive elements of army "allowances"—all "come easy, go easy"—and are generally the least supervised as to expenditures. Avoid leaky faucets, superfluous lights, and unburned coal and coke in ash cans. Keep automatic dampers in adjustment. Use all the lights, fuel and water you need, then stop—conserve them as though they were to be paid for by yourself.

35. *Firing*: As an economy measure, permit no one to fire a furnace, boiler, or heater who has not qualified in the course of instruction for firemen. Supervise methods of firing and care of all heating apparatus for which responsible. Observe them daily. Get the habit during firing season of entering or leaving through the furnace room any building for which responsible.

36. *Warehousing, Inventories*: Require proper warehousing as a prime safeguard against inaccurate property accounting. In all inventories, require at least a double check to be made by two competent persons counting independently of each other. Have a system which will insure that every article is counted.

37. *Inspections by Higher Authorities*: Strive to make an inspection held by superior authority a prideful exhibit of appearance, neatness, orderliness, smartness, arrangement, condition of equipment, discipline and efficiency, exhibiting your display with confidence, and with pride in your accomplishment—rather than fearing criticism and hoping merely to get by. Such confidence can be attained only by continuously working toward a definite standard, making each periodical inspection a definite step toward the results desired. In this connection, at any inspection, all irregularities and defects should be made of informal record and inspected for at next inspection to insure positive and definite correction.

38. *Inspections by Responsible Officers*: Make frequent inspections of every activity, battery, installation, barracks (including basement and attic), storeroom, and other place, and of all personnel and sanitary requirements for which responsible. See that there is a definite

chain of responsibility for each thing to be done in each place and activity. At every inspection, especial attention should be directed to fire hazards.

39. *Inspections by Commanding Officer:* In general, approximately eleven half days each month will be devoted by the Commanding Officer to inspection and survey of the command, including the troops and every element and activity of the command. These will, as a rule, be supplemented daily by further outside observation of methods, administration, and efficiency. The above will be so conducted as to interfere least, consistent with the best interests of the command, with training and maintenance activities in progress at the time, and will be made rain or shine. Many defects in evidence on rainy days may not be detected in dry weather.

40. *Test Checks:* From time to time an officer or non-commissioned officer will be detailed as assistant to the Commanding Officer for the purpose of making, under the latter's immediate supervision, test checks of property accounting, accuracy of property and money accounts, methods and records of the Post Exchange, Commissary and various administrative offices, and any other matters deemed necessary for survey or examination.

41. *Loyalty:* Be loyal ever. Loyalty is the keystone of the military arch.

42. *Saluting:* Salute with a gleam in your eye and a snap to your motions, showing that you take a pride in the military appearance of your organization and of yourself as a soldier.

43. *Even Temperament:* Be cheerful always, whatever comes meet it with a smile. The grumbler is a man to be shunned.

44. *Results:* Never say "No" when asked if you can accomplish something—the ways and means may not be apparent but you can find them.

45. *Firmness, Justness:* Be firm and just. Human nature always responds to fairness and firmness.

46. *Courtesy:* Be courteous always. Courtesy is the foundation stone of both military and civil life.

47. *Obedience:* Never discuss nor question orders; execute them to the best of your ability.

48. *Explanations:* Never explain unless directed to do so. If corrected say "Yes sir," and conform cheerfully to instructions.

49. *Conduct:* Live in peace and charity with the other members of the command. Duty first, self afterwards. He who concentrates on self will never be a soldier.

50. *Example:* Make yourself appreciate subconsciously the foregoing precepts. Unless you do, and live up to them, you are not a soldier.



Pathé News Reel of Army Activities*

AN outstanding tribute which gives civilians a new perspective of our Army and its work is a picture released in the Pathé News, a newsreel seen by twenty million Americans. In a foreword, Secretary of War Dern states:

"In commemorating Army Day this year, I would like you to think of our Army as I have learned to know it . . . not only as our defender in time of war, but as a force with a peacetime record of constructive accomplishment that is unequalled.

"From the very beginning of the Republic our Army has served as a pioneer, colonizer and organizer. Its soldiers have won as brilliant victories against the forces of Nature and disease as they have on the battlefield . . . victories which have benefited all mankind."

*Pathé News, Contact Dept., 35 West 45th Street, N.Y.C.

Exploration and pioneering in the West, protection of early settlers and the Army's part in the building of our railroads are dramatized. Actual scenes of the construction of the Panama Canal, Wilson Dam at Muscle Shoals and many other triumphs of Army engineering are included. The successful battle of Army surgeons on many fronts, fighting the ravages of yellow fever and other tropical diseases, are recalled, and many pioneer trails blazed by Army flyers are graphically shown.

Scenes of West Point are included and General Johnson is shown as typical of the administrative ability of the Army officer in civilian life.

This interesting film will no doubt be a revelation to many Americans. Major A. G. Rudd, formerly editor of the *Army Recruiting News*, is one of the executives of Pathé News who assisted in its preparation.

NATIONAL GUARD NOTES

Source Materials for the History Of the National Guard

IN order to procure a list of source materials from which a history of the National Guard as a whole, in the various states and territories, or of units thereof may be compiled, the National Guard Bureau has decided to cooperate with other agencies in order to take advantage of the Civil Works Act.

To this end a National Commission has been formed and provisions have been made so that this task may be accomplished in connection with a national survey of local archives and with a minimum of expense and effort on the part of the State Adjutants General.

The National Guard Bureau has requested State Adjutants General to designate a suitable person to make such arrangements as will insure that the interest of the military and naval history of your state shall not be neglected in this undertaking, and that the National Guard of your state shall not be overlooked when a history of the National Guard of the United States is written.

The Bureau has urged that, in addition to the survey of local archives already contemplated, the following be included in State C.W.A. projects:

A separate list of source materials relating to state military forces, whether contained in archives, libraries, historical societies or other collections.

A list of printed source materials, or secondary histories with information relating to the National Guard or other state militias.

While the materials for the history of the state military forces are being listed, it is believed that the opportunity for cataloguing all source materials relating to the military and naval history of the state (whether of Regular Army activities, volunteer troops, or other organizations) should not be neglected. Therefore it is suggested that in each state three separate lists be drawn up as follows:

Documentary sources for a complete military history of the state.

Sources for a history of the Militia or National Guard of the state including a list of *printed* sources, and secondary works.

Such source materials for naval history as may be disclosed during the progress of the inventory.

The National Guard Bureau is anxious that the list be made as complete as may be possible under the circumstances. It realizes that the states will wish to take advantage of this opportunity to make a wider list embracing state volunteer and other military and naval activities.

As the form in which the present Civil Works Act has

been passed by the Congress makes no provision for federal supervision, it will be necessary, in order that the work described above may be brought to a successful conclusion, that the Adjutant General of each state, territory and the District of Columbia use his personal influence and the influence of his office:

To insure that C.W.A. funds are allocated to his state, territory or district, to further this survey as a whole.

To insure that the project include adequate provisions for a list of military and naval sources.

As the Civil Works Act is an emergency measure and will be put into effect immediately and last for a short time only it is urged that Adjutants General act immediately and cooperate continuously to secure the benefits of the Civil Works Act and the cooperation of the scholars in each state interested in this survey.

If carried out as contemplated the result should be a complete survey, not only of source materials for the history of the National Guard, but of the sources for the military history of each state and territory.


Training Memorandum No. 2

240th C.A., Maine N.G. (Lieutenant Colonel James Dusenbury, Instructor).

1. A list of lectures on military subjects together with lists of officers to deliver the same is hereby annexed.
2. These lectures are made available to the various batteries of the 3rd Bn. for use on "Old Timers" nights or similar occasions when talks on military subjects would be appropriate.
3. The plan is entirely voluntary and can be made use of or not as the various batteries see fit.
4. The engagement of the lecturer should be made by letter from the battery commander to the officer whose lecture is desired and the latter if a subordinate to a battery commander should obtain his commander's permission to be absent from drill if drill nights conflict.
5. At least two weeks' notice should be given to the lecturer to avoid complications.
6. It is suggested that the battery desiring the lecturer should contribute four cents a mile to reimburse him for travel expenses.
7. Lecturers should avoid making use of information marked "CONFIDENTIAL" on occasions when non-military persons may be present.
8. The idea behind the plan is to exchange views on military matters, to learn what the other batteries are doing and create a battalion *esprit de corps*. When you help the other batteries you help the Regiment.

NOTES FROM THE CHIEF OF CAVALRY


What Would You Do in a Situation Like This?



LEGEND



WOODS



MAIN
BATTLE
FRONT

COLONEL GOOFUS, commanding the 1776th Blue Cavalry at peace strength, one platoon caliber .50 M.G.'s attached, has been operating in friendly territory under orders from the First Army. At 1:30 p.m., a motorcycle messenger delivers to him at Point A (see sketch above) a marked map and the following message:

"No change on main battle-front. Our 18th Division will detrain at 'H' beginning late tonight and will advance tomorrow night against the Red north flank. A motorized Infantry detachment is establishing a stationary screen on your right extending north from B, to cover the detrainment. At G a strong combat patrol is in position covering the Army right flank. Your scout cars available tomorrow afternoon. Your command will initiate counterreconnaissance in the regimental zone indicated on the marked map herewith, establishing the final line B-D-E-C by 5:00 p.m. today. Hold the final line

and deny hostile ground reconnaissance east thereof until further orders. A plane will spray the area D-E-F with persistent gas at 5:00 p.m. today."

Further information by dropped message:

At 2:00 p.m. a Red troop estimated at peace strength was going into bivouac near X. Three Red patrols of about one-half squad each were moving east toward B, E, and C, respectively, and what seemed to be the remainder of the Red Cavalry regiment was in road formation headed in the general direction of X and about ten miles to the southeast.

Says Colonel Goofus to Lieutenant Colonel Mistem: "How shall we dispose our command so as to hold the final line?" and says Lieutenant Colonel Mistem to Major Hipower, S 2-3:

WHAT WOULD YOU DO?
(For Solution, Turn the Page.)

Solution and Discussion

Major Hipower, the S 2-3, after considerable cogitation, takes a deep breath, points to his sketch and says:

"Colonel, I would divide the area into two sectors. West of here about 1½ miles is a wooded area in a draw. Starting at that point, I would place a boundary through point E, thence through point X. The boundary all inclusive to the left (south) sector. I would assign one squadron, with one platoon of .30-caliber and two .50-caliber machine guns attached, to prevent hostile reconnaissance in that sector, and place the other squadron, less one troop, with one section of .30-caliber and two .50-caliber machine guns attached in the right (north) sector. I would establish the regimental command post in the wooded area I have mentioned before, keeping one rifle troop and the remainder of the Machine-Gun Troop there in regimental reserve."

"But," chimes in S-1, who has been looking over S 2-3's shoulder, "doesn't that tend to violate some accepted principles? Such as dissipating the force and having all messages and orders relayed through an intermediate (the squadron) commander—to me an unnecessary channel. I would hold the line lightly, committing a large reserve as the situation develops. They may not attempt a penetration, but should that be the Red plan it will probably be in the early morning. The terrain in either sector is favorable. You know that the shifting of troops from one sector to another under the conditions would be extremely difficult in hours of darkness. I would want the bulk of the regiment in reserve. It strikes me that if a complete squadron were held out it would be more

logical. The terrain lends itself to a penetration by force to the north of the gassed area, as well as to the south, and then you'd have only one troop to oppose such an attempt—probably against the bulk of the Red regiment."

"But," concludes S 2-3, "if the Red mission is one of reconnaissance, we may anticipate an attempt of the Reds pushing patrols through our screen. The line E-C must be strongly enough held to prevent that. The line B-D must be equally well defended. Should they attempt a penetration by force, we must be prepared to resist it by force, bearing in mind that a feint will probably be used to divert attention from his main effort. Look at the length of the line we must hold. Can a squadron hold it?"

"Consider the difficulties of coordination, particularly with a gassed area in the line. I would consider two squadrons less a troop each better than your solution. On this duty scary things occur, information is not properly evaluated, and as far as I am concerned, I'd like to have a field officer in each place to handle local situations, including the sending out of patrols, and so forth. By using both squadron commanders there will be a definite, fixed responsibility, and Colonel Goofus will not be annoyed by routine details. And another thing, look at the shape of the sector—sort of triangular. Let's assume that our front line is pushed back. They would be driving our force toward the vertex of the triangle, and by shortening our line we would be strengthening it. So, Colonel Goofus, I recommend my original plan." (Department of Tactics, The Cavalry School.)

Statement of Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry, Chief of Cavalry, in Hearings Before the Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations on the War Department Appropriation Bill for the Fiscal Year 1935

MR. COLLINS. General Henry, if you have a general statement to make with regard to your branch of the Regular Army, we shall be very glad to have you present it to the committee at this time.

General Henry. Mr. Chairman, in the estimates of the various supply services you gentlemen find items calling for money for the purchase of horses and various types of material for cavalry. In addition there is my own estimate for the maintenance of our Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas. As modern cavalry is a much discussed and frequently much misunderstood subject I am going to take the liberty of making a brief résumé of the subject as an introduction to my defense of the Cavalry School estimate and also with the hope that it will help you better to understand the need for cavalry items appearing in the supply department estimates.

In America, since the Civil War, we have properly described our Cavalry as that arm principally mounted on horses, capable of independent action and able to close with the enemy in close combat. Its essential characteristics have been great mobility, fire-power, and shock. We in the United States have stressed mobility and fire-power; whereas, prior to the World War, European Cavalry stressed mobility and the shock of the mounted charge. Because of our heavy fire-power and efficiency in dismounted combat, Europeans frequently referred to American Cavalry as mounted Infantry.

European cavalry performed a most important rôle on all fronts in the World War in spite of its inefficiency in fire-power and dismounted action. I say with conviction, however, that if either the Allies or the Central Powers had started that war with a cavalry armed and trained as

was our American Cavalry, the campaigns of that war would have been materially changed, as would possibly the final result of the war itself.

Cavalry and Infantry are the only two ground arms of the service capable of independent action and possessing the essential of victory, that is, capable of closing with the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. Their essential difference is one of mobility.

Because of this difference of mobility, the missions assigned cavalry are: Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance; seizing advanced positions; protection of the front, flanks, and rear of the infantry; pursuit; covering retreats; and acting as mobile reserve.

In modern war, is an arm capable of performing these missions needed? Most assuredly, yes.

Every war brings tactical changes. The World War brought the great extension in depth in the attack and defense caused by the long range and efficiency of artillery and the machine gun.

The next war for most conceivable theaters of operation will be a war of maneuver—not trench warfare with protected flanks. Maneuver requires mobility, and with the rapidly increasing system of good roads, improved motor vehicles, airplanes, and radio we will have much more mobility than heretofore. This will force the tactical changes of a far greater extension of the security elements of the main forces to front, flanks, and rear, a greater demand for forces to strike these weak spots of the enemy, and a greater need for mobile reserves.

While the mobility of whole armies will be greater than before, such masses must move relatively slowly and have smaller forces of higher mobility ready to make the quick thrusts, or to be the security elements covering the movement of the masses. Such forces must be numerous, must be capable of independent action, and must also be able to close with the enemy in hand-to-hand combat; in other words, be troops capable of performing the missions of cavalry.

What will be the armament, mode of transportation, and character of personnel for such troops? To explain, I must digress a little.

Since the World War there has been great improvement in roads, motor transport, and armored fighting vehicles—that is, tanks and armored cars. These armored vehicles possess mobility, fire-power, and shock or—in other words—ability to close with the enemy in combat. Further, if formed into correct types of organizations, they possess a considerable degree of independence of action. Therefore, they possess the general characteristics of cavalry; but please note that I say, “when grouped in correct types of organizations they possess a considerable degree of independence of action.”

If such organizations can perform the missions of cavalry, they should be manned by men tactically trained for these missions—such specialists are cavalrymen.

To decide what the equipment of our cavalry is to be, we should clearly analyze the situation and reach a logical conclusion. If this is done you will find that our

probable theaters of operation or probable opponents are less localized than those of any other first-class power, Great Britain alone excepted. This then demands a cavalry capable of operating in all terrain. We can not plan for one or two small theaters of operations.

Armored fighting vehicles are incapable of operating over all types of terrain. There are many square miles in any theater of operation where they cannot deploy for attack or close with the enemy, and their usefulness in minor warfare is limited. They have, however, great road mobility and on suitable terrain high cross-country mobility, fire-power and shock. Wherever usable they are a weapon of tremendous power and most essential to the cavalry of a modern army.

Horse cavalry, on the contrary, has less road mobility but can successfully operate over practically all types of terrain. In a war of movement its horses will rapidly transport its fire-power over average terrain to within dismounted combat range of the enemy. It is most efficient in minor warfare, and it stands preëminent for detailed and close-in reconnaissance. It is the equal of infantry, man for man, for dismounted attack or defense, and thus is most useful as a mobile reserve. Some will ask, can horse cavalry do these under modern conditions? In a war of movement, decidedly yes. In such, due to the horse's mobility, cavalry presents only fleeting targets to enemy artillery; its antitank weapons give it the same protection against armored vehicles as have other troops, and because of the accidents of terrain small-arms fire is seldom effective at over three-fourths of a mile. This gives cavalry great battlefield mobility and permits it by maneuver and fire-power to strike suddenly, withdraw, and strike again. In that last phrase “withdraw and strike again” lies the great power of horse cavalry. No other troops can send large or small units into combat against superior forces, break off the action at will when further progress is impossible, and possess the sure cross-country mobility to go into action again at another point.

From the foregoing you can see that both mechanization and horses have their powers and limitations and neither without the other will give us our maximum efficiency. Both in proper proportions are needed and both must be used in coöperation and coördination with each other.

This is the combination that American Cavalry is striving for and this combination is the general scheme of all first-class powers for their cavalry of the future. The proportions of mechanization and horse will vary with their national pocketbooks and probable theaters of operation.

The American Cavalry is by training and tradition most efficient for modern war. We are most anxious to retain this efficiency and to improve it by proper equipment.

The money asked for in the Quartermaster Corps estimate for the purchase of 1,000 horses, and that in the estimates of the Ordnance Department for .50-caliber

machine guns, is urgently needed to replace losses of horses in our horse regiments and to continue equipping the Cavalry with efficient antitank weapons. That asked for by the Ordnance Department for combat and armored cars and by the Signal Corps for radio is badly needed to continue the equipment of our mechanized regiment.

Even if well equipped an arm to be efficient needs competent and well-instructed leaders.

CAVALRY SCHOOL, FORT RILEY, KANSAS

The Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas is the Cavalry's principal center for this instruction. Full advantage is taken of its facilities to give students both theoretical and practical experience with all material employed by the Cavalry and in all types of tactical exercises, students functioning in grades they may be expected to fill in case of war. They are also instructed in the capabilities, limitations, and employment of associated arms and services.

NUMBER OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN ATTENDING SCHOOL AND NATURE OF COURSES TAUGHT

The school conducts six courses for officers and three for enlisted men, including Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserves. The details of these courses are shown in the table submitted herewith.

(table omitted)

COURSES

Tactics include: Tactical handling of Cavalry alone and in conjunction with other arms; logistics; staff procedure and functioning; map reading, sketching, and aerial photograph interpretation; field fortifications; signal communication.

Weapons include: Cavalry weapons; combat principles of the squad and platoon (musketry); pack, wagon, and motor transportation, and maintenance thereof.

General instruction includes: Military history and research; Army of the United States; training management; technique of instructing and lecturing; military aid to the civil powers.

Care of animals and horsemanship includes: Forage and feeding; conditioning; care of animals in accident and disease; stable management; horseshoeing; mounted pistol and saber instruction; combat leadership of small mounted units; horsemanship.

Horseshoers' course includes: Theoretical and practical horseshoeing; clinical horseshoeing, etc.

Saddlers' course includes: Stitching and cutting leather and fitting of parts; finishing, preserving, and cleaning leather; duties of saddler in the field.

General Henry. In addition to purely school duties, the school staff prepares and reviews various technical manuals, and the entire school is used as a laboratory for tests and experiments with material and in tactics and organization.

NUMBER OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN IN CAVALRY BRANCH

Mr. Collins. General, how many officers have you in your branch?

General Henry. We have 983 officers and 7,700 men.

HORSES AND MULES

Mr. Collins. How many horses and mules have you?

General Henry. Our allowance is 7,951 horses, less the private mounts, and 120 mules.

Mr. Collins. How many private mounts will there be?

General Henry. There are 275 now in the Cavalry.

Mr. Collins. How many of these officers are actually with troops?

General Henry. A little over 50 per cent. actually with Cavalry troops.

Mr. Collins. That is what I mean. And what percentage of enlisted men are on troop duty?

General Henry. Practically all; probably 99 per cent, or very close to it; practically all.

Mr. Bolton. What is the war-time strength of a Cavalry troop?

General Henry. The war-time strength is 120 men.

Mr. Bolton. What is the peace-time strength, or the skeletonized organization?

General Henry. About 80.

Mr. Collins. General, you will have more horses per unit in the Cavalry from now on than you have had in the last two or three years, will you not?

General Henry. No, Mr. Collins; we will not have. We will have just about the same.

Mr. Collins. Somebody testified here the other day that you will have a larger unit strength of horses than you have had for the last two or three years.

General Henry. No; that is a mistake. We have reduced the number of horses, and have practically done away with all mules, since I was up here last year.

Mr. Collins. Why is it that the National Guard has a larger unit strength in horses and mules than the Regular Army?

General Henry. They do not have. The National Guard only have about 40 horses per troop.

Mr. Collins. There is not any reason why their tables of organization should be larger than yours, is there?

General Henry. The tables of organization; yes. In my previous answer I was talking about actual conditions.

Mr. Collins. I am talking about their tables of organization.

General Henry. Yes. Our tables of organization were forced on us about ten years ago by legislative restrictions as to the number of men we could have. Therefore we had to declare inactive a number of troops that we think should be in a Cavalry regiment. We reduced from three squadrons of four troops each down to two squadrons with two troops each, plus a headquarters troop and a machine-gun troop.

Mr. Collins. The National Guard is operating under another law, is it?

General Henry. They are operating more nearly on the basis of what we think a Cavalry regiment should be, without the legislative restrictions of being forced down to something that is below real fighting efficiency.

Mr. Collins. Where does this legislation occur?

General Henry. It occurred in making a limitation on the strength of the Regular Army.

Mr. Bolton. Was that done in the National Defense Act?

General Henry. Yes, and gradual reductions have later taken place.

Mr. Collins. Everybody wants more men in their particular branch. Nobody ever cares anything about equipment. They just want more men, more horses, and more perquisites, and less material.

General Henry. We had a great many men taken away from us by the Air Corps.

Mr. Collins. I understand that.

General Henry. The National Guard Cavalry in strength of men is better prepared to go to war than the Regular Army.

Mr. Collins. I do not want to get crossed up with you on that because I know, if we just let your ambitions for personnel run along, we would build up our Army on the pattern of the Chinese army, with more men and more men, and less equipment.

General Henry. I do not think the officers of the Regular Army are attempting to do that.

Mr. Collins. It seems to me that every time they come here they always want more men. Nobody ever makes a plea for more equipment.

General Henry. I am asking you for equipment.

Mr. Collins. But you want more men and more men, and the more men you get the less equipment you can get, because you cannot get both.

General Henry. We would like to have enough equipment to equip ourselves properly now.

Mr. Collins. But you will do it at the expense of personnel, and you cannot have the equipment as long as you put uniforms on all the man power in the United States.

Mr. Bolton. Do I understand that the National Guard are not limited in their strength?

General Henry. They are limited in their strength, but in some of their cavalry organizations they have a better table of organization than we have.

Mr. Bolton. Did not the table of organization come from the same source in both instances?

General Henry. No.

Mr. Bolton. Did not the General Staff decide that question both for the Regular Army and the National Guard?

General Henry. No, they did not force the National Guard into the Regular Army's reduced table of organization for cavalry.

Mr. Bolton. As a matter of fact, I suppose the National Guard is practically in the hands of the State, in any event, is it not?

FORAGE COST OF ANIMALS

Mr. Collins. I noticed in the table you have furnished us you have 300 animals. So you have reduced the number of animals at Fort Riley?

General Henry. Yes, sir.

Mr. Collins. From 400 to 300?

General Henry. Yes, sir.

Mr. Collins. And you figure the maintenance of those animals will cost only \$50 a year?

General Henry. Fort Riley is the cheapest place in the United States to keep animals.

Mr. Collins. In other words, those animals will not cost over \$4 a month.

General Henry. I did not figure that out; I got the figures from Fort Riley.

Mr. Collins. What do you mean by maintenance?

General Henry. Fort Riley cuts its own hay.

Mr. Collins. We are very happy to get this figure, because it will give us a figure on which we can take care of the maintenance of all animals in the Army. The \$50 a year is a good figure.

General Henry. That is true for Fort Riley, but it is not true for other places, because Fort Riley cuts its own hay. It has a large reservation.

Mr. Collins. Outside of hay, you buy the same things that you buy elsewhere, do you not?

General Henry. Yes, but hay is quite an important item.

Mr. Bolton. That figure is just for the forage?

General Henry. For the forage for that particular station.

PRESENT NUMBER OF HORSES AND MULES IN CAVALRY

Mr. Collins. How many animals did you say are in the cavalry?

General Henry. We have 6,972 public animals.

Mr. Collins. And how many private mounts?

General Henry. There are 275, giving a total on hand of 7,247.

Mr. Collins. How many did you have this time last year, that is, how many public animals?

General Henry. This time last year we had 7,816.

Mr. Collins. And the difference has been brought about because of mechanization?

General Henry. In part by that, and the loss of mules by the motorization, when it takes place. We are not asking for any mules for the next fiscal year.

Mr. Collins. How many mules are you getting rid of?

General Henry. Seven hundred and eighteen.

Mr. Collins. You will have slightly more horses than you had and fewer mules?

General Henry. We will have 140 horses less than we had, and 718 mules less than we had, or a total of 858 animals less than we had last year.

Mr. Collins. What organizations have you mechanized since then?

General Henry. Only the First Cavalry.

Mr. Collins. That is the only one that has been mechanized?

General Henry. Yes, sir.

Mr. Collins. How many horses did you displace because of that mechanization?

General Henry. Approximately 550.

MOTOR EQUIPMENT SECURED THROUGH P. W. A. FUNDS

Mr. Collins. How much motor equipment are you getting out of these public works programs?

General Henry. Four passenger cars, 28 motorcycles, 203 trucks, and 91 trailers.

Mr. Collins. What kind of passenger cars are you getting?

General Henry. One is a 7-passenger car and three are 5-passenger cars.

Mr. Collins. What is the cost of them?

Major Carmody. The estimate for the seven-passenger car is \$2,000, and \$500 for the 5-passenger cars.

Mr. Collins. What are you going to do with those cars?

General Henry. The 7-passenger car is part of the regular equipment of the headquarters of the First Cavalry Division.

Mr. Collins. Where is that?

General Henry. At Fort Bliss, Texas. The 5-passenger cars belong to the headquarters of the two brigades of that division.

Mr. Collins. What is the price of these trucks?

General Henry. About a thousand dollars.

Mr. Collins. That is the average?

General Henry. Yes.

Mr. Collins. How much equipment of that particular nature are you getting through the C. W. A.?

General Henry. None.

Mr. Collins. You have used no C. W. A. money at all?

General Henry. None that I know of at all.

Mr. Collins. Would you know of it if it were being used?

General Henry. I think so; yes.

Mr. Collins. Are you getting any C. C. C. money because of any supplies you turned over to them?

General Henry. No, sir; none at all.

Mr. Collins. Is that all the money you have gotten from the P. W. A.?

General Henry. In the way of equipment, yes, sir.

Mr. Collins. What other money have you gotten?

General Henry. We have gotten indirectly some ordnance money under P. W. A., but very little.

Mr. Collins. Is that all?

General Henry. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bolton. All of that comes through the Ordnance Department or the Quartermaster Department?

General Henry. Yes; either through the Ordnance Department or the Quartermaster Department. It does not come through me.

Mr. Bolton. You are not a supply department at all?

General Henry. No.

Mr. Bolton. Was this equipment that was highly recommended by the head of the Cavalry branch?

General Henry. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bolton. It is all in accordance with recommendations?

General Henry. Yes, sir. The equipment was recommended by me.

Mr. Collins. General, there was some complaining last year, either in our hearings, or on the floor of the House, to the effect that a certain general officer down in Texas could not get a Government-owned automobile to transport him, and that he was using a buckboard to get to his office. Is this \$2,000 car for him?

General Henry. I do not know who he was. I cannot answer that question.

Mr. Collins. You heard about it?

General Henry. No; I never heard it until just now, Mr. Collins.

Mr. Collins. Who asked for this \$2,000 car?

General Henry. It is part of the regular tables of organization equipment.

Mr. Collins. You knew there was an express limitation in this bill prohibiting you from buying a car costing over \$750, did you not?

General Henry. I do not know about that.

Mr. Collins. You knew it was in this bill, did you not?

General Henry. It was bought by the supply department and turned over to the First Cavalry Division, or at least will be, I suppose.

Mr. Collins. It looks as if there is not any use in carrying a provision in this bill putting on such a limitation if you can go out and buy equipment from some other funds.

Mr. Bolton. Does the regimental headquarters of an artillery regiment have the same equipment as the regimental headquarters of a cavalry regiment, so far as passenger cars are concerned?

General Henry. They have the small car.

Mr. Bolton. Is there a headquarters car for an artillery regiment?

General Henry. A five-passenger car.

Mr. Bolton. The seven-passenger car is for a cavalry division headquarters?

General Henry. Yes.

Mr. Bolton. It is not the same way in the artillery?

General Henry. The artillery does not run up to a division; they simply run up to a brigade.

Mr. Bolton. General, have you any plans in view for a new carbine or rifle for the cavalry?

General Henry. If this semiautomatic rifle which is being tested works out, we hope to be equipped with it.

Mr. Bolton. The cavalry will be equipped the same as the infantry?

General Henry. Yes; it is being worked out for the infantry and the cavalry.

Mr. Bolton. It is the same rifle for both?

General Henry. Yes.

Mr. Bolton. There is no distinction between the old carbine and the Springfield?

General Henry. No, sir.

Mr. Collins. We are very much obliged to you, General. I believe you are doing a little more than most chiefs of cavalry we have known. You are trying to have some mechanization. I think you are going in the right direction.

General Henry. We want a good army, and we are trying to get it at maximum efficiency.

Mr. Collins. We are sorry your tour as Chief of Cavalry is about up, General. We wish you luck and shall always be glad to have you come in to see us.

* * *

Cavalry School Publications

IT IS considered important that the Cavalry service should be in close touch with the Cavalry School. To this end Cavalry School publications pertaining to the tactics and technique of Cavalry or other arms associated with Cavalry, whenever published, will be sent to the Commanding Generals, 1st Cavalry Division, 1st and 2d Cavalry Brigades, and to commanding officers of all cavalry regiments and detached squadrons of the Regular Army.

Funds will, probably, not permit the sending of these data to National Guard and Organized Reserve Cavalry organizations. However, notices will appear in THE CAVALRY JOURNAL of the data available, with the prices at which they are sold.

* * *

The Fort Riley Maneuvers

ALMOST coincident with the War Department's announcement of policy to create a mechanized brigade of two regiments of cavalry, the employment of mechanized units and defensive measures against them were included in the courses of instruction at the service schools. As mechanized units were new to our service, however, the instruction given had had little basis other than imaginative thinking. During the past year the 1st Cavalry has been intensively active, concentrating on the technical and tactical employment of its mechanized equipment, and the Cavalry School has been equally active, not only in developing protective measures against hostile mechanized forces, but in studying how horsed and mechanized cavalry can work in conjunction with each other.

With the object of testing our present thoughts on the tactical employment of both horsed and mechanized cavalry, the 1st Cavalry will go to Fort Riley to participate in the Cavalry School maneuvers to be held during

the latter part of April. It is hoped by these maneuvers to answer some of the questions which have been the subject of academic discussion as to the proper employment of mechanized units and to bring out the powers and limitations of both in an effort to gather data of value in guiding the further development of mechanization and its bearing on the future equipment, organization, and employment of horsed cavalry.

The initial exercises are primarily for the purpose of instruction of student personnel at the Cavalry School, in which the Cavalry School Brigade, consisting of the 2d and 13th Cavalry, reinforced by Artillery, Engineers, and Aviation, will operate against an outlined enemy. One exercise will illustrate a combined attack against hostile Cavalry, and the other will illustrate the employment of Cavalry in a delaying action.

Following these exercises will be a series of demonstrations by units of the 1st Cavalry (Mechanized) for the purpose of giving the personnel at the Cavalry School an opportunity to observe the operation of mechanized units. The first will be the conduct of an armored car platoon on reconnaissance in hostile territory and will include overcoming obstacles. The second demonstration will be an attack by a combat car platoon reinforced by a machine gun platoon (mechanized) against a represented enemy. This demonstration will include field firing with ball ammunition on targets representing the enemy. The final demonstration will be an attack by a mechanized regiment over varied ground against an outlined enemy.

Following the demonstrations a series of maneuvers will be held employing mechanized cavalry opposed to horsed cavalry for the purpose of trying out our present theories on the employment of one against the other. This series opens with a 24-hour free maneuver of opposing forces making contact with the 1st Cavalry (Mechanized) having an aggressive reconnaissance mission and the Cavalry School Brigade, reinforced, having a counterreconnaissance mission. The next exercise is designed to result in combat between a mechanized regiment and a horsed cavalry regiment as the result of a meeting engagement. This will be followed by a 24-hour free maneuver to illustrate the employment of a mechanized regiment reinforced by artillery in securing and holding a position by delaying action when opposed by a horsed cavalry brigade. The final exercise (3-day free maneuver) of this series depicts a large force withdrawing under cover of a horsed cavalry brigade, reinforced. The opposing force is employing a mechanized regiment supported by field artillery on a mission of parallel pursuit, with the object of gaining a strategic position in rear of the withdrawing forces.

The maneuvers will close with a series of exercises illustrating the employment of horsed cavalry and mechanized cavalry in conjunction with each other, operating against a represented enemy. The first of this series illustrates their dispositions in march formations and employment on reconnaissance and in attack against a simi-

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RESERVE NOTES

Reserve Officers

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. W. SUTPHEN
Infantry Reserve
Executive Officer, 182d Brigade, 91st Division

THERE can be no doubt that in case of a general mobilization for a major emergency, Reserve officers will be called upon to fill positions on regimental, brigade and division staffs to even a greater extent than occurred during the World War.

During 1918, in practically all National Army divisions, the regimental staff rarely had more than one Regular Army officer, he being the Colonel in command. In the brigade, although the staff organization was rather loosely constructed, there was seldom over one Regular Army officer besides the brigade commander. With the division, aside from the commanding general, there was usually the chief of staff, the four G's, and the division quartermaster who hailed from the Regular Army, the balance of the staff being composed of Emergency officers. There is every reason to believe that in another emergency more Reserve officers rather than less will be called upon to fill such staff positions.

Since the war, tables of organization have been greatly changed. Staffs of regiment, brigade and division have been enlarged and augmented by officer specialists, and through subdivisions in staff organization the officer personnel necessary to proper functioning has been tremendously increased. Obviously, officers to fill these newly created positions must be drawn from the Reserve Corps. There is no other reservoir from which they can be drawn.

This article confines itself to a discussion of the peacetime assignment and training of Reserve officers for staff duty, primarily with the regiment, brigade and division.

Official comments upon the functioning of the lower staffs during the World War agree that inefficiency, confusion and lack of team play was the rule rather than the exception, until after the personnel of these staffs had had actual battle experience. In other words, training in staff duties was obtained in the school of battle—a most costly educational institution. It was largely to avoid a repetition of this experience that, in the Reserve division now organized on paper, provision has been made for definite assignment of Reserve officers to the various positions on the staffs within the division.

Theoretically, these Reserve divisions, when mobilized, will be fully staffed by Reserve officers, trained to their jobs and ready to function efficiently with a minimum of refresher study. Does the present system of assignment and training warrant any such assumption?

Their assignment and training for staff duty.

The idea seems to be prevalent in Army circles, including the Reserves, that these staffs will never be called upon to function as at present organized; that in case of an emergency even divisions as at present allocated will be broken up, and that therefore staff assignment and training need not be taken too seriously.

Only this attitude of mind can explain many of the assignments made to staff positions. Certainly, in many instances, the qualifications of the officer assigned could not have been considered, or even inquired into. In picking Reserve officers for staff positions, particularly with the brigade and division, there are certain basic qualifications which should be present before such an assignment is considered.

It was demonstrated during the war that those emergency officers assigned to staff positions, who had not had actual experience with troops prior to such assignment, miserably failed in efficiency in the majority of cases. Hence, if possible, no officer should be assigned to staff work unless he has obtained the viewpoint of the company or battalion commander through having functioned in that capacity.

Actual combat upsets the best laid plans. New plans must be made on the spur of the moment to meet rapidly changing conditions. A staff officer with actual battle experience, who can visualize what is happening from the terse reports he receives, is invaluable. Hence, whenever possible, officers with such experience should be selected for staff work.

No staff can function properly unless the keenest type of team play is developed. Hence, no officer should be assigned to staff duty unless he is temperamentally capable of full coöperation with other members of the staff, and with the commanders of units making up the command.

Many Reserve officers combine the three essentials mentioned above, but few seem to have found their way to staff assignment. The reason is obvious. Such officers are in great demand by regimental commanders and many are now holding assignments to positions which others could be trained to fill, while the staff for which they are particularly qualified endeavors to train officers who have not their outstanding abilities.

Therefore, to improve the present quality of staff officers, the first requisite is that only those officers who are

peculiarly fitted for the work receive staff assignments. The staff should be given at least an even break in the assignment of manifestly qualified officers.

But it is to the matter of training, even more than to assignment, that particular attention should be given.

Officers of the Regular Army are trained so that they can fill almost any position with varying degrees of efficiency. Aside from their training with troops, they attend various schools, including staff schools. Obviously, such complete training is impossible in the case of the Reserve officer. The best that can be expected of him is that he can be trained to handle one particular job. The Reserve officer can never be expected to become a thoroughly well rounded officer. He can be trained to efficiently handle a platoon, company or battalion, to command a truck train or a motor repair outfit; but he cannot be expected to be an efficient company commander and also able instantly to assume the duties of a Brigade S-3. The best Reserve officers are successful business men. The time they can devote to military matters is limited. This time should be devoted to training them to the job for which they are best qualified. This particularly applies to those officers assigned to staff duties.

Bearing this in mind, the ideal training of Reserve staff officers can be divided into four parts

- (1) Purely theoretical training in the duties of the particular staff sections to which they were assigned, and the coordination of this section with the staff as a whole, and with the corresponding section of the staffs of higher and lower commands.
- (2) Training in the functioning of the staff from M Day to M plus 120.
- (3) Tactical training through the media of map problems, conferences, etc., bringing into play the coordination of the various staff sections.
- (4) Field training, during which theoretical training is practically applied—the coordination of the various staff sections with similar sections of the staffs of higher and lower commands is stressed—and training with the staffs of the other arms is emphasized.

The first three parts would comprise inactive duty training, the fourth, active duty at summer camp.

The same tendency on the part of higher authority that fails to seriously consider the question of assignments to staff positions has resulted in a lamentable lack of tangible objective in the courses of training offered Reserve staff officers. Unit commanders and unit instructors have evolved various courses of inactive duty training, most of which leave much to be desired.

Naturally, the number of officers assigned to regimental, brigade and division staffs is small. The regimental commanders prefer to either look after the training of their staffs themselves, or else these staff officers are assigned to conduct troop schools. In the one case, staff officer receives only such training as the regimental commander deems necessary, and in the other, no staff training whatever. In no event does he receive any training in which coordination with staffs of higher and lower units is stressed.

Hence, attendance at staff schools, after eliminating those officers attached to regimental staffs, is reduced to officers of the brigade staffs of the various arms and to such officers as may hold division staff assignments, together with a heterogeneous collection of other officers of every branch of the service who have no troop schools and are anxious to accumulate credit hours.

That serious work can be done in such classes is out of the question. Tactical training in the handling of a brigade during an attack does not help a Lieutenant Colonel of the Dental Corps whose assignment is administrative, or the commander of a military police battalion, when the employment of such a battalion in the problem would be ridiculous. The very composition of such a class hinders rather than helps those staff officers who are anxious to learn more of the duties to which they may be called. All training in cohesion is lost, and the work of the class degenerates into the solving of simple problems in minor tactics with the instructor wracking his brains to insert into the problem some situation that will call for a solution by officers of branches of the service that obviously have no useful function to perform in so far as the problem is concerned.

To properly conduct inactive duty training of staff officers, classes should be formed which should be attended by the executive officer of regiments and the officers assigned to the four staff sections of the Regiment, the executive officer of brigades and the officers assigned to the brigade staff sections, and such division staff officers as are in the locality.

A course of study can then be prepared along intelligent lines and the need of cooperation between sections and between staffs actually demonstrated. Instruction can be made progressive, all leading up to the independent functioning of the staffs during the active duty training period.

To accomplish this end it will first be necessary to impress upon regimental commanders the necessity for training their regimental staffs in the regularly organized staff schools and not in the regimental schools. Second, manifestly unqualified officers must be removed from staffs and given other assignments and their places filled. Third, and most important, the courses of study should be the same as those required for the Staff and Command Course at Leavenworth. It follows that the utterly senseless regulation now in effect, that only Reserve officers of field grade can take such courses, should be abrogated. (It would be interesting in this connection to check with the Leavenworth School and ascertain what percentage of Regular Army officers below field grade attend the school.) Further, Reserve officers satisfactorily completing these courses should be listed as qualified to hold staff assignments, regardless of the grade held at time of completion.

In this manner, it will be possible to give the maximum of inactive duty training to those Reserve officers who hold staff assignments. Whether or not it is a fact that

these staffs as at present constituted will never function, the training of a large number of officers qualified for staff assignment will have been accomplished. That there will be a need for officers so trained goes without question.

In the Ninth Corps Area, arrangements for staff training during the active duty period were inaugurated in 1929 and were followed by similar training in 1930. Although officers attending received much that was beneficial in the matter of coordinated training, even more can be accomplished in the future, with the experience gained as a background. The Regular Army personnel did wonders with the facilities at their disposal and the limited time allowed for preparation.

However, the inactive duty training and the active duty tour were not coordinated. With early announcement as to the nature of the active duty training, the classes conducted during the inactive season could have been more efficiently instructed. Further, it is extremely difficult to conduct a problem calling for the functioning of several staffs, without troops. Time elements are overlooked and those officers without battle experience obtain faulty impressions, sometimes hard to eradicate.

As a solution to the problem of proper training of staffs during the active duty period, the following is suggested:

In almost every corps area, joint maneuvers of the Regular Army with some Reserve or National Guard units are conducted. These maneuvers cover a period of approximately two weeks. Problems are carefully worked out so that both staff and line officers receive the maximum of training. It is therefore suggested that Reserve brigade and division staffs be included in the conduct of these problems. Such an arrangement would give to the Reserve staff officer the opportunity of working with officers of the Regular establishment, bring him in closer contact with troops and above all give him training with branches of the service other than his own, which training is now entirely absent from any curricula and which must be obtained before any officer can consider himself properly qualified to perform his staff duties in time of war.

What the C.M.T.C. Did For Me

Written by a young man en route to Washington, D. C., January 7, 1933, as a guest of the Civilian Military Education Fund. The paper was unsolicited and not written with a view of publication.

I HAVE travelled some 3,200 miles for the privilege of representing my beloved C.M.T.C. The four letters mean more than just Citizens' Military Training Camps. They represent the third line of defense of the Army—the school of equality, where everyone has an equal chance to show his mettle regardless of class standing.

Go back with me to 1929. In one of the public high

schools of a large city there was a boy, none other than myself, who lacked ambition and whose school grades showed evidence of this. These grades ran A, B, C, D, and E: "A" highest, "E" failure. The boy was receiving "D" in geometry, and had received "D" in algebra the previous year. No one seemed to care about this lad of fifteen years; he drifted with the current.

In 1931 a friendly teacher noticed his failure and urged him to go to a C.M.T.C. camp situated some 360 miles distant. I had lived now seventeen years in one state and had never been farther away from home than 125 miles, and that only once. I feared travelling so far, so my teacher persuaded a friend to accompany me. It is difficult to describe my feelings when shortly after arrival I found this fear replaced by courage, and an ambition slowly developing. My officers told me to forget the past, and to think of the future. I was given a little responsibility, but no more than the others received. I listened, took notes and practiced after mess and into the night. At the end of camp I was chosen "Best Basic" student in my company, an honor I did not deserve.

I returned home a better citizen both physically and mentally. Somehow, ambition had driven away my laziness. Last semester my grades showed no "D's." My card at least shows evidence of hard work, for recently I have seen it. The grades run something like this:

Chemistry	A	Chorus	A
Economics	A	Gym	A
Spanish	A	Algebra	A

If the C.M.T.C. did this for one boy, what has it done for those other boys in America of whom we have heard nothing?

We are the citizens of tomorrow, but we can not all be leaders. We can, if trained properly, learn to pick and follow good leadership. The C.M.T.C. taught me how to follow, and I must know that first if I am ever called on to lead others.

I pray these camps will never be discontinued; otherwise, the youth of America will lack that discipline and precision, that ability to take orders that comes with Military Science and Tactics. Without the camps, the ambition in many boys will never be fired. I realize that not all boys return home as changed as I, but a great philosopher has told us that one good outweighs a thousand of the opposites.

I have been told that it cost the United States approximately \$10,000 for each man killed or wounded during the World War. How small is the cost to build a man at the C.M.T.C. Is not the difference the cost of unpreparedness?

(The author of this article was recommended by his Corps Area as its outstanding C.M.T.C. student, and on that basis was awarded an educational trip to Washington, D. C., by the Civilian Military Educational Fund.)

SPORTS

Military Horse Shows

By Captain Frank DeK. Huyler, Cavalry Reserve

(From *The Rider and Driver*, February 10, 1934; reproduced through the courtesy of the author and of *The Rider and Driver*.)

THE second of a series of military horse shows was held on Sunday afternoon, January 28th, this time at the United States Military Academy, in the spacious Riding Hall at West Point.

Of primary importance were the classes which brought together seven Military teams from New York, New Jersey and Connecticut.

The 122nd Cavalry, Connecticut National Guard, stationed at New Haven, was successful in both classes, The Individual Jumping Championship and the Team Class. Lt. Scott Patterson rode the big jumper *High Compression* to win the Individual. Eight horses went clean the first time around the half-mile course, only four surviving the second round with unblemished records.

Judged under International military rules, the time element entered into the final scoring. Even then, two horses were tied for first honors. *High Compression*, ridden by Lt. Patterson, and *Prince*, ridden by Lt. John W. Wofford, both had clean performances and completed the course in the almost unbelievable time of 58 seconds. Rather than ask their horses to take the course again, the two officers tossed a coin. *High Compression* won the blue, 2d place going to *Prince*. The writer's *Captain Kidd* was 3d with another perfect round, but with a time total of 1 minute and 2 seconds. Lt. Hal Forde, riding the good jumper *Geronimo*, was 4th, also clean.

The team class increased the excitement to its highest degree: once again the 122nd Cavalry, Lt. Patterson on *High Compression*, Corporal Dwyer on *Harry Carter*, and Sgt. Welch on *Mint Julep*, being the victors. Once again a jump-off was in order, the 2d Squadron, 10th Cavalry, of West Point, working itself into the tying position with a score of 8 faults, made by Major John Tompson, Lt. Wofford and Lt. Samuel Walker, on *Lady Biff*, *Queens Own* and *Round Up*. The 122nd held their own however, and captured the coveted ribbon, scoring a clean sweep for the day.

The teams competing represented the Essex Troop of Newark, the 10th Cavalry of West Point, which entered two teams, the 112th Field Artillery of Trenton, N. J., the 122nd Cavalry of New Haven, Conn. (2 teams), and the Freebooters, composed of National Guard and Reserve Officers from New York City and vicinity.

Four other classes were on the program, and from the viewpoint of West Point residents, the handicap jumping class was the most interesting, the final event of a series

of competitions held throughout the winter. Thirty horses had survived previous eliminations, in which the winning of a blue ribbon called for higher jumps.

The ultimate winner was Lt. Riepe, riding the good jumping mare *Princess*, after a jump-off. Lt. Draper was 2d on *Marshall*, while Lt. Pierce rode *Grizzly* to 3d. Lt. Greear was 4th, riding *Bardelys*.

A polo pony blending race, open only to cadets, brought out a number of really handy ponies, for the most part used on the Cadet Varsity Polo Team. The winner was a clever little pony named *Rookie*, ridden by Cadet Palmer. Cadet Proctor was 2d on *Kid Boots*, while 3d and 4th were *Bandy* and *Rosalie*, ridden by Cadets Brown and Estes, respectively.

In Cadet Jumping, Cadet J. P. Craig excelled, riding *Grizzly*, the veteran which had previously taken 3d in the Handicap Class for Lt. Pierce. 2d was Cadet Womack on *Alsace*. Old *Pleasanton*, that has kept his name in the list of blue ribbon winners at shows dating as far back as 1917 (at which time he appeared as aged), carried Cadet Proctor to 3d place; 4th was *Buell*, ridden by Cadet Lynn.

A class of interest was that open to parents and their children. Major D. E. McCunniff and his son, Master Tommy, were the winners, riding *Coco* and *Missouri*. Mrs. Woodruff rode *Kid Boots*, while Master Barney Woodruff had the leg up on *Warner* to place 2d. 3d was the Bathurst family, consisting of Mrs. Bathurst and her son, Richard. The horses were *Morgan* and *Velvet*. *Lady Biff* and *Top Kick* were 4th, ridden by Mrs. Thompson and her daughter, Miss Jacqueline.

One of the main objectives of the show was to try out the fences under consideration for the proposed big outdoor show. While the jumps were formidable, they were by no means insurmountable, as was proved by the large number of perfect performances. The sporting character of the courses is such that no exhibitor should miss West Point, if possible to make it.

After the Show, which was held under the auspices of the West Point Horse Show Association, headed by Major General William D. Connor, a buffet supper was served to the contestants and their friends, tables having been set up at one end of the hall, from which were dispensed generous portions of scrambled eggs, coffee and good old Army Beans.

The next Military show of the series will be held on or about February 22, at the Armory in New Haven.

THE NEWARK SHOW

The first of the military horse shows was held early in December in the armory of the 102nd Cavalry at Newark, New Jersey. Two classes, the Individual and Team, were open to other regiments. The teams competing were the

Essex Troop, 102nd Cavalry, two teams from West Point, the 112th Field Artillery of Trenton, N. J., and the 122nd Cavalry of New Haven Conn.

Lieutenant John W. Wofford, 10th Cavalry, West Point, rode *Round Up* to a perfect performance, taking the Individual Championship.

West Point won the team class, the horses being *Lady Bing*, owned and ridden by Major Thompson, *Geraldyn*, ridden by Lieutenant Reardon, and *Queens Own*, with Lieutenant Frierson up.

THE SPRING HORSE SHOWS

The idea of National Guard and Reserve competition has taken very well in the East. On invitation of the management of the Atlantic City Horse Show and of the New York Spring Horse Show, teams from the 101st and 102nd Cavalry, the 122nd Cavalry, the 112th Field Artillery, and the 61st Cavalry Division will appear in both the shows mentioned. There will be military classes each session, with a team of three championship, as in Madison Square Garden, on the final evening.

The 61st Cavalry Division Team, of which Captain Frank DeK. Huyler is Captain, is now schooling under Lieutenant Colonel John K. Brown.

The dates for the New York Spring Horse Show are April 24th and 25th; those for the Atlantic City Horse Show, May 16-19.

Coming International Horse Shows

THE Aachen-Laurensberger Renn-Verein of Aix-la-Chapelle, Germany, has invited the U. S. Government to send an officers' team to participate in the Official International Horse Show to be held there from June 26th to July 1st. The national contests take place from June 23 to 25.

There will be an International *Dressage* contest at Thun, Switzerland, in the latter part of June.

Horse Show Dates — 1934

April 19-21, New Haven, Conn.
 April 24-25, New York Spring.
 April 26-28, Brooklyn, N. Y.
 April 29, Saxon Woods, White Plains, N. Y.
 May 2-5, Philadelphia Annual.
 May 2-5, Newark, N. J.
 May 6, Harrison, N. Y.
 May 9-12, National Capital, Washington, D. C.
 May 13, Lawridge Horse Show, Port Chester, N. Y.
 May 12, Rockwood Hall Country Club, North Tarrytown, N. Y.
 May 16-19, Atlantic City, N. J.
 May 19, Longmeadow, Mass.
 May 19, Poughkeepsie, N. Y.
 May 24-26, Atlanta, Ga.
 May 26, Bronxville Riding Club, N. Y.
 May 24-30, Devon, Pa.
 May 26, Millburn, N. J.
 May 29-30, Westchester-Embassy Club, Armonk, N. Y.

June 1, Front Royal, Va.
 June 1-2, Tuxedo, N. Y.
 June 1-4, Wilmington, Del.
 June 4-5, West Point, N. Y.
 June 7-9, Westchester County, Port Chester, N. Y.
 June 7-9, Allegheny Country Club, Sewickley, Pa.
 June 9, Watchung Riding and Driving Club, Plainfield, N. J.
 June 9, Jacobs Hill Hunt, Seekonk, Mass.
 June 11-14, Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla.
 June 13-14, Oconomowoc, Wis.
 June 14-17, Troy, N. Y.
 June 14-15, Upperville, Va.
 June 15-16, Riding and Hunt Club, Washington, D. C.
 June 16, Cranford, N. J.
 June 17, Sands Point, L. I.
 June 21-23, Watertown, Conn.
 June 22-23, Plainfield, N. J.
 June 23, Toledo, O.
 June 29-30, Buffalo, N. Y.
 June 29-July 1, Albany, N. Y.
 June 30, Long Ridge, Stamford, Conn.
 July 7, Oxridge, Darien, Conn.
 July 7, Westhampton Beach, L. I.
 July 12-24, Fairfield County, Westport, Conn.
 July 19-22, Westchester Country Club, Rye, N. Y.
 July 25-29, Coronado, Cal.
 July 27, Southampton, L. I.
 July 27-28, Lenox, Mass.
 Aug. 2-4, Monmouth County, Rumson, N. J.
 Aug. 5-12, San Mateo, Cal.
 Aug. 9-10, Hot Springs, Va.
 Aug. 11, Litchfield, Conn.
 Aug. 17-19, Lake Placid, N. Y.
 Aug. 18, East Hampton, L. I.
 Aug. 18-19, Pittsfield, Mass.
 Aug. 23-25, Cohasset, Mass.
 Aug. 24-25, North Shore, L. I.
 Aug. 24-26, Mt. Pocono, Pa.
 Aug. 26, Babylon, L. I.
 Aug. 27-Sept. 1, Ohio State Fair, Columbus, O.
 Aug. 29-30, Dutchess County Fair, Rhinebeck, N. Y.
 Aug. 30-31, Genesee Valley Breeders Ass'n, Avon, N. Y.
 Aug. 31-Sept. 1, Flemington Fair, N. J.
 Sept. 1, Smithtown, St. James, L. I.
 Sept. 3-7, New York State Fair, Syracuse, N. Y.
 Sept. 8, Dutchess County, Millbrook, N. Y.
 Sept. 14-15, Junior League, Middletown, N. Y.
 Sept. 10-13, Brockton, Mass.
 Sept. 15, Suffolk County, N. Y.
 Sept. 17-22, Eastern States Exposition, Springfield, Mass.
 Sept. 19-20, Mineola, L. I.
 Sept. 21, National Polo Pony Society.
 Sept. 21-22, Boulder Brook Club, Scarsdale, N. Y.
 Sept. 21-22, Westfield Troop, N. J.
 Sept. 23, Soldiers and Sailors, Old Westbury, L. I.
 Sept. 26-29, Bryn Mawr, Pa.
 Sept. 27, Montpelier, Va.
 Sept. 28-29, Montclair, N. J.
 Oct. 4-6, Philadelphia Riders and Drivers.
 Oct. 5-6, Orange, N. J.
 Oct. 5-6, Piping Rock, L. I.
 Oct. 20-27, American Royal, Kansas City, Mo.
 Nov. 7-13, National, New York City.
 Nov. 21-29, Royal Winter Fair, Toronto, Canada.
 Dec. 1-2, Albany, N. Y.
 Dec. 8, Westchester Indoor Horse Show, Scarsdale, N. Y.
 Dec. 15, Brooklyn Junior, N. Y.

BOOK REVIEWS

SOLDIERS—WHAT NEXT? By Katherine Mayo. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1934. 474 pages, VI Appendices. \$3.50.

During the World War Miss Mayo spent months with American troops in France. Standing on that experience, she maintains with deep feeling that the typical American combatant soldier reflected upon his country a credit unsurpassed by the soldiers of any other army in the field; that he came home from France bearing rich gifts of patriotism and idealism; and that, at his home-coming, he was the greatest potential asset of America.

Of late years, however, an ugly cloud has grown and blackened around his name until the man who in 1918 was acclaimed as our democracy's gallant crusader, in 1933 was widely denounced as a grafter, a parasite, and a menace to the law.

What could account for so vast a change, whether in fancy or in fact? Her sympathies and his incredulity alike aroused, Miss Mayo began a search for the answer to that question. First she visited the European countries, to get from their experience a measure to test our own. Had the same troubles arisen there as here? Were such things the essential aftermath of war? Government and ex-service men's organizations in each country visited gladly furthered her inquiry. With their help she examined the records in France, Germany, Italy, and England, set down the results, and returned her manuscripts for checking each to its source. This checking, carefully done, makes the statement concerning each country authoritative as far as it goes.

Miss Mayo then returned to America, to complete the inquiry in the home field. *Soldiers—What Next?* therefore, exposes the World War ex-service man's story and his government's relation thereto, as existing today, in the five great belligerent nations.

The comparisons that emerge, expressed in exceedingly plain language, are little flattering to America. They show, for example, that in the year 1932 we spent in the name of our World War ex-service men more money than was spent by France, Great Britain, and Germany combined, in the same period for the same purpose. Yet, it is also shown that the combined number of war-disabled ex-soldiers thus pensioned by the three European countries exceeded by over two million, four hundred thousand those pensioned by America.

But lest this be taken to imply that our war victims are better cared for than are those of the other belligerents, Miss Mayo brings proof to the contrary.

Where, then, do the dollars go and what has happened to the men?

A detailed account of what has been done to the money, and why, is given in this book with complete analysis and with a comparison to the details of the pension laws of foreign nations. A clear, complete analysis of the subject is presented in a remarkably simple manner. These details are used as a background for presenting an indictment of the political work of the American Legion since the World War.

OVER THE TOP WITH THE 80TH, by Rush S. Young. Washington, D. C. Price \$1.35.

Mr. Young presents a new and most interesting type of source material, the history of a division through an individual's eyes. The style of the book is simple and free from any affectation, and yet contains information indicative of long and painstaking research.

The 80th Division was one of the many units called into being by the declaration of war, the personnel of the division was drawn from the Blue Ridge region of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia, hence it received the name of "The Blue Ridge Division." On September 5, 1917, the first units of the division were mobilized at Camp Lee, Va. The men were almost entirely without military experience, and the officers were from the first officers' training school at Fort Meyer. After a short six weeks at this training center the division was entrained for France, sailing from New York and landing at Brest.

The 80th was put into training almost immediately, joining the 16th division, B.E.F., in the Samur area. After more training with the British along the Somme front, the 80th was transferred to the American 5th Army Reserve on August 18, 1918. The 318th Infantry of which Young was a member took no part in the Saint Mihiel offensive, their first test was on the Meuse-Argonne front.

For forty-six days the 80th was either in the lines or in rest areas, back of this front; and was the only American Division that returned to the lines three times in this offensive. This Division was a part of the Third Army Corps under Lieut. Gen. Bullard, many times proving itself to be one of the best units in the American Army.

Mr. Young himself did not participate in the whole of the Meuse-Argonne struggle; on November 3rd he was wounded, and was sent back to Vichy. The remainder of the division remained in the Meuse-Argonne sector until the signing of the Armistice. On May 17, 1919, the 80th division sailed from Brest, closing its military career.

LA CAMPAGNE DE L'IRAQ, 1914-1918: The Siege of Kut-el-Amara. By Major M. Moukbil Bey. 196 pp. Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1933. Price 20 francs.

An interesting account by a Turkish officer of the Mesopotamian campaign and the siege of Kut-el-Amara. As will be remembered, the Turks took at Kut about 13,000 prisoners, among them five general officers including General Townshend, the British commander-in-chief in the Mesopotamian theatre of war. The author writes that Townshend had three chances to cut through the lines of the besieging Turkish 45th Division which for a time had been reduced to an effective strength of about 2,000 men. Although Townshend's forces outnumbered the besieging Turks by about five or six to one, the author observes that food shortage, doubtful morale of the Hindu troops representing more than one half of the total, disease, and inundation of most of the terrain around Kut-el-Amara had a decisive influence in forcing General Townshend's surrender. This circumstance, the author emphasizes, must be seriously weighed before a final judgment is passed over what had happened; and he adds, that General Townshend demonstrated unquestionable talent in making his dispositions for the defence of his position, and in the execution of his mission he preserved the honor of British arms. "We may leave to his peers to pass judgment upon his conduct as a soldier; here," the author writes in conclusion, "we are content to bow with deference and esteem before the memory of our old and gallant adversary who, after the war, became a sincere friend of our country".

A general map and twenty-eight sketches assist the reader in following the progress of the campaign in that remote theatre of operations of the Great War.

SLANTING LINES OF STEEL. By E. Alexander Powell. 307 pp. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1933. Price \$2.50.

The author, a prolific writer and distinguished war correspondent, relates in this volume some of his adventures in the World War both as a correspondent and an active participant. His many and varied experiences include the siege and fall of Antwerp, fighting in the Champagne, warfare in the battle-scarred Italian Alps, and carefully planned sordid raids upon the slender income of army officers and soldiers by "patriotic" merchants and war profiteers in communities near our great war cantonments. Colonel Powell deserves a vote of thanks for his belated exposure of this insidious enemy against whom the army was wholly unprepared and completely defenceless.

Written in his usual vivid style, Colonel Powell's latest book is informative as well as entertaining. It is dedicated to Brigadier General Frederick S. Foltz, U. S. A.

CAN WE LIMIT WAR. By Hoffman Nickerson, New York. Frederick A. Stokes Company. 308 pages. Indexed. Price \$2.75.

The author is a writer of considerable experience and note, an independent thinker with no axe to grind. He held a position in the Intelligence Section of the General Staff of the A. E. F. and has remained in close touch with, and apparently has interested himself extensively in, military preparedness ever since the war.

His book is deep and interesting. He concedes the inevitability of war but maintains that wars always have been limited morally, politically, economically and technically and that they will likewise be limited in the future. He cites the fact that disarmament is but the football of politics and is far from the solution of the elimination or limitation of future wars.

He is all for scrapping the National Defense Act without even giving it the credit for being virtually the first instrument which ever gave the United States a Military Policy.

He states (without argument) that "the battlefield rôle of cavalry is almost nil," and although he only favors "a great reduction" in the proportion of cavalry in the U. S. Army, one gathers the impression that he would not consider it a great loss if the horse cavalry disappeared from the army altogether. On the other hand, he advocates extensive use of tanks. Briefly his formula for combining economy with national security is: "No clumsy and expensive skeleton of an enormous army never likely to be needed for defense; a well balanced regular army and national guard armed and equipped in modern fashion with machine power supplementing man power, especially a good sized Tank Corps with a due proportion of artillery on self-propelled mounts; the reserves organized to fill out the regular army and national guard in case of emergency."

He advocates a reorganization of the Regular Army with four full divisions ready for immediate service, not built around the infantry but around a Tank Corps. Money for such an organization to be secured by retiring all but enough officers to officer such a force and reducing the cavalry. He accuses the army, tolerantly, of being backward and timid for not going to such an organization at once. Here one cannot refrain from noting that, if the army were called upon to perform a mission similar to any of the missions assigned to it in the past 30 years, and if it found itself sitting out in the mesquite, unable to move because local bridges would not carry its ponderous tanks, those responsible for transforming the army into a Tank Corps would be preparing their defense before irate Congressional Investigating Committees while the howls of inefficiency from the whole nation rang in their ears.

Mr. Nickerson lays down this policy for the United States: stop meddling, especially with land and air armaments; apply sound principles to naval problems, not ratios—misleading as to actual naval strength; sub-


stitute a moderate but real covering force for our present huge but brittle foundation for a horde army.

His book is quite interesting—in most instances well thought out, and one does not have to agree with him in all that he advocates to appreciate the sound worth of the book. It is highly recommended for any man's library, especially for one who interests himself in military affairs and matters of national defense.

THE GREY BATTALION, by May Tilton, Nursing Sister with the A.I.F., 1915-1918. Angus and Robert-

son, Ltd., 89 Castlereagh Street, Sydney, Australia, 6 shillings.

The narrative is built around the diary of the author during the War from 1915 to the end. Miss Tilton served in Egypt, England, France, and Flanders. She gives a very vivid and apparently accurate picture of the daily life of an army nurse, the endurance, cheerfulness and bravery of those helpful individuals who not only attended to the medical needs of the wounded, but gave spiritual aid to many who suffered far more from disconsolation and mental depression than they did from their wounds.



CROSS SECTION METHOD OF PROFILE PLOTTING. (To illustrate "New Map-Making Device," by 2nd Lieutenant H. G. Hamilton, Cavalry Reserve, pages 12-13. The use of the new device obviates the necessity of plotting on cross-section paper, the more laborious method shown above.)

THE FOREIGN MILITARY PRESS

REVIEWED BY MAJOR ALEXANDER L. P. JOHNSON, INFANTRY

CANADA — *Canadian Defence Quarterly* — October, 1933.

GERMANY UNDER THE NAZIS. By Major T. V. Scudamore, V.D., R.G.G.S., the British Columbia Regiment.

Observing that Hitler's fiery oratory is largely for home consumption, the author states that Germany is unlikely to force war in Europe to achieve her ends, as there is little really worth fighting for. Thus, the author notes, the small area of Slesvig-Holstein ceded to Denmark, and the districts of Eupen and Malmedy, ceded to Belgium, are of little value. The ultimate fate of the Saar Basin is to be decided by a plebiscite in 1935. The outcome, the author thinks, is not nearly as certain today as it seemed to be in the recent past, when an overwhelming German vote appeared a foregone conclusion. Alsace-Lorraine are permanently settled in favor of France, and Germany has no wish to reopen this question, notwithstanding the fact that the population is overwhelmingly German.

Although the Polish Corridor has been a fruitful cause of dispute for fifteen years, the author seems to attach great significance to the fact that the new German Government actually recognized the right of Poland to exist as a separate state, an admission no previous German Government has made. Upper Silesia, in the author's opinion, should belong to one state or the other in its entirety. But, he adds, if it were to go to Germany, it would upset the balance of power, whilst if it were to go to Poland, the Polish disregard of minority rights would unquestionably cause serious trouble with the German population of this province.

The author believes that the danger has switched to Austria, where Nazism is spreading rapidly and, unless French and Italian money can keep the present Government in power, the Nazis are bound to gain control, and that would bring forth the demand for a close economic and political alliance with Germany.

The principal change effected by the Nazi régime within Germany, the author observes, is the attitude of intolerance towards foreigners which resembles the growing suspicion and rudeness that prevailed in the years before the war. It is being fanned, he adds, by the same kind of propaganda. On the other hand, the author credits Hitler with having achieved the unification of Germany. He secured the support of the great industrialists and curbed the great landowners. He reduced unemployment, and is credited with other important achievements in the domestic field. "On the whole," the author states, "the

revolution in Germany has been carried through with the minimum of bloodshed, but possibly not with the minimum of injustice, but the great test is yet to come."

The future, the author writes, is uncertain. When Hindenburg passes from the scene, the power may pass to Hitler as President and Dictator, and the power of the new Chancellor may be materially reduced. There is a possibility of a Hohenzollern coming to the throne, either in the person of the eldest son of the Crown Prince, or a member of the Catholic branch of the Hohenzollern family. "Whatever the outcome," the author concludes, "democracy in Germany, as elsewhere, has failed."

MEXICO — *Revista del Ejercito y de la Marina* — September, 1933.

ORGANIZATION OF THE CHILEAN ARMY.

The Republic of Chile, with a national domain 752,000 square kilometres and a population in excess of four and a quarter millions, maintains an army of 1,430 officers and 20,950 men. It consists of fifteen regiments of infantry, three battalions of alpine infantry, five battalions of chasseurs, nine regiments of cavalry, five regiments of field artillery and three battalions of mountain artillery. Five battalions of heavy artillery and five batteries of A. A. artillery are projected but have not yet been organized.

The infantry regiments consist of four rifle companies and two machine gun companies. The alpine Battalion consists of two rifle and one M.G. companies. The chasseur battalions have two rifle and one signal companies. The cavalry regiment contains three troops of lancers and one M.G. troop. The field artillery regiments consist of four batteries, the mountain battalions of two batteries.

The army is organized into five divisions and one cavalry division. One regiment of engineers and five battalions of trains complete the military establishment.

The Air Service consists of one air regiment of two observation, two pursuit and two bombardment squadrons.

The Army is supplemented by the constabulary consisting of 852 officers and 15,981 men.

Military service is compulsory for both sexes between ages of nineteen and forty-five. Active service covers one year. Nine years are allotted to service in the first reserve, and the remainder in the second levy. Active training periods of varying lengths are exacted of each reservist. The Military School supplies the officer personnel for both the active and the reserve list. Reserve officers are not eligible for promotion above the grade of captain.

AUSTRIA—*Oesterreichische Wenzzeitung*—December 22, 1933.

RUSSIAN FORCES IN THE FAR EAST. By Gok.

According to reports, the Soviet forces in the Far East under General Blücher, whose headquarters are at Chabarovsk, consists of two main groups. The first of these, in Primorskaya Province, on the Pacific Coast, comprises the XIX Corps consisting of eight infantry regiments, four cavalry regiments, 184 field pieces, three armored trains, 40 tanks, fifteen auto M.G.'s, and chemical warfare troops. In addition to these, there are two regiments of foreign communists (1 Korean, 1 Chinese), a detachment at Blagovitchensk (1 infantry regiment, 1 cavalry regiment, artillery, frontier guards, state constabulary and 1 regiment Mounted Police).

The second group, in Transbaikial Province, comprises the VXIII Corps consisting of nine infantry and seven cavalry regiments, one-half regiment of Mongol cavalry, 117 artillery pieces, 45 tanks, fifteen auto M.G.'s, one battalion chemical warfare troops, detachments of the frontier guards (V.O.X.R.) and the State Constabulary (G.P.U.).

The Soviet Air Force in the Far East consists of 250 airplanes including fifteen seaplanes, and eighteen Mongolian planes. Troops of Outer Mongolia may be considered as auxiliaries. These consist of about seven cavalry divisions, two infantry divisions, heavy and mounted artillery, and eighty light tanks. These troops were reorganized in 1929 and include a cadre of 2,000 Russian officers and specialists.

The author observes that the Soviet Government apparently is planning the establishment of military frontier districts to be populated by specially selected colonists who are to be granted special privileges, including the right to own property, in return for their perpetual availability for the defence of the frontiers.

The author quotes *Tchassovoi*, military periodical published by Russian emigres in Paris, to the effect, that Vladivostok and Chabarovsk have been fortified and provided with heavy artillery. Fifty submarines are said to have been shipped by rail for assembly at Vladivostok. Soviet authorities apparently regard the troops actually in the Far East adequate to meet any emergency, and they do not contemplate additional mobilization. They consider their air service and chemical warfare equipment superior to that of the Japanese, and believe that the latter will be seriously handicapped by insurgent elements behind their backs.

BELGIUM—*Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires*—January, 1934.

WITH THE 26TH U. S. DIVISION. By A. Du Boisrouvray.

An interesting review of an article published under this title in the September 15, 1933, number of the periodical

Revue des Deux-Mondes (pages 334-365) by one of the French army instructors attached to the Yankee Division early in 1918. The author tells of his experiences in that assignment which, he writes, required tact and diplomacy in addition to professional attainments. He observes that in his dealings with Americans he had to guard against two things: American sensitiveness and French politeness. It was imperative, he states, to avoid even the semblance of a desire to assume command over the American troops, and he found it preferable to wait until his American comrades asked his advice rather than to offer it unsolicited. On the other hand, suggestions couched in the most tactful form Americans would often pretend not to understand and accuse the French instructors of lacking in frankness. The author believes that most Americans completely misunderstood French politeness. "Their race," he writes, "their education, their inclination towards brusque and quick action makes of them, with some exceptions, strangers to fine words and demeanor. Many of them reciprocated 'French politeness' in form but transformed it into a defensive weapon; dissimulation."

The author completes his narrative with interesting character sketches of the leaders of the 26th Division, among them Colonel John Henry Parker, "the hundred per cent American, who rejoiced when his division went into battle for the first time under its own commanders." General Charles H. Cole, commander of the 52d Brigade, Colonel Edward L. Logan, Colonel Duncan K. Major and General Clarence Edwards. He remembers all of them in eulogistic praise.

The author quotes General Degoutte's citation of the 26th Division, published in an Order of the Day of the French Sixth Army after the first phase of the attack on July 18, 1918, and which concludes with General Degoutte's statement: "I could not have done better with my own troops."

M. Du Boisrouvray concludes his article with a narrative of the severe and costly engagements fought "by units of this glorious division" on October 16, in Bois de Haumont, and October 17-23 in Bois d'Bruppy, hill 360 and Belleau Wood.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA — *Vojenske Rozhledy* — July-August, 1933.

THE RUSSIAN CAVALRY ON THE FRONT OF THE RUSSIAN EIGHTH ARMY, AUGUST 6-23, 1914. By Captain Alexander Mizinov, G.S.

The author discusses an interesting incident in course of the operations of the Russian 12th Cavalry Division and the 2d Cossack Division under General Zhigolin along the Zorucz River, on the Austro-Russian frontier, during the early phases of the World War. These cavalry divisions covered the front of the Russian Eighth Army, which was deploying along the line: Proskurin—Jarmolince—Dunajevsce. As soon as General Zhigolin deter-

mined that Hungarian Honvéd Hussar Division was marching on Gorodok, a town directly behind the center of his cavalry screen, he decided to organize for defence. He concentrated his Cossack Division in front of Gorodok and sought to frustrate hostile reconnaissance activities.

The Hungarian 5th Honvéd Hussar Division, reinforced by the Austro-Hungarian 15th Cavalry Brigade and the 32d Jäger battalion, deployed along the west bank of the Zorucz River in the evening of August 15. It effected a river crossing at 5:00 p.m., on the following day and, after pushing back the three Cossack troops which had opposed them, threw a bridge across the stream for its trains and went into bivouac near Kozina. At the same time the 2d Cossack Division reported that the Austro-Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division, which had bivouacked on the night of August 15 near Skala, likewise effected a crossing of the frontier stream on the morning of the 16th, and was advancing on Kamieniec-Podolsk.

On August 17th the 5th Honvéd Hussar Division resumed its march on Gorodok, while the Russian Cavalry fell back towards Lysovody. The Russians made the first serious stand to oppose the enemy advance at Gorodok, where the 1st Volga Regiment and the Don Cossack brigade supported by fourteen pieces of field artillery occupied a defensive position of the Gorodok-Jarmolince road. The Austro-Hungarian commander, believing that he was being opposed by the Russian main forces, ordered an attack. His 19th and 23d cavalry brigades attacked Gorodok from the north, and the 15th cavalry brigade attacked from the south. Artillery supported the action by concentrations placed upon the Russian trenches. The attack on the north progressed very slowly. The 15th brigade, having the advantage of wooded terrain, succeeded in closing in upon the Russian trenches. A portion of the 7th Hussar Regiment charged in three lines. They came within 800 or 900 paces of the Russian trenches without difficulty. At that moment, however, the Russians opened a deadly rifle and machine gun fire which enfiladed the assault waves and threw the attacker into confusion. The attack of the 8th Hussars fared no better even though they managed to inflict severe losses upon the Russians. The defeated Hungarian cavalry division withdrew under cover of darkness. All went well until they approached the river crossing. The infantry battalion, which had been left behind to guard the crossing, it seems, already heard the news of the defeat and became panic stricken. In the darkness and the downpour of rain the infantrymen mistook the retreating cavalry for pursuing Cossacks and opened fire on them inflicting further casualties upon the defeated troops.

Although the fortunes of war favored him in the end, General Brussilov was not at all satisfied with the conduct of operations by General Zhigalin. He relieved his cavalry commander and appointed General Pavlov to take his place.

FRANCE—*La Revue D'Infanterie*—November, 1933.

THE PROBLEM OF INFANTRY OBSERVATION. By Commandant A. Mathieu.

Quoting *Combat Instructions for Small Units* issued in January, 1916, to the effect that "observation is one of the principal sources of military intelligence, it should, therefore, be organized on a permanent basis in all echelons. . . .," the author undertakes to examine this important phase of infantry activity with a view of arriving at a satisfactory solution of the problem.

The author believes that the infantry battalion should have two observation groups of one N.C.O., and two privates each. Moreover, each machine gun or heavy infantry weapon company should be equipped with long-range binoculars or scissors instruments of artillery type, but having tripods which permit their use in the prone position. Training of intelligence personnel should be placed in charge of the regimental intelligence officer. In this connection the author notes that the best intelligence reports are without value unless they are transmitted promptly to the proper commander. Hence he believes that the training of intelligence and communications personnel should go hand in hand. It likewise should emphasize liaison between the infantry and supporting arms.

Personnel should be trained to establish observation posts and in their proper functioning both under stabilized and mobile conditions of warfare. Men must be trained not only to be accurate in observation, but to be precise and exact in expression. Training of intelligence personnel, both individual and collective, should appeal to intelligence, develop technical knowledge and aptitudes, and physical qualities under the most variable conditions, day and night, in every type of terrain. The attainment of the highest degree of efficiency is imperative, the author concludes, because in the final analysis, superiority of observation is the basic condition of superiority of fire which, in turn, decides the result of modern battle.

GERMANY — *Militär Wochenblatt* — December 18, 1933.

ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE ARMY. General Military Information.

According to "Krasnaya Svezda," official Soviet military periodical (No. 263), the Japanese are planning the modernization of the armament of their seventeen divisions with a view of increasing their fire power some 200-300 per cent. The project includes the organization of three or four new divisions, and eight tank regiments. It is believed that this program is now about one-third completed. Japan has approximately 2,000 airplanes. The number of light planes has been materially increased, but there still exists a considerable shortage in the heavier type of aircraft. The four-year naval program provides for 8,500-ton cruisers with five triple-gun turrets mount-

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ing 15 cm. guns. They are to be capable of a speed of 33 knots. The plan includes the construction of two 10,000-ton airplane carriers, one mine planter (5,000 tons), fourteen destroyers, six submarines, eleven auxiliaries, and eight air squadrons. Appropriations for this project will total 670 million yen, of which 80 million yen have been appropriated for the current year.

GREAT BRITAIN—*Journal of the Royal Service Institution*—August, 1933.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. By Major E. W. Polson-Newman, B.A., F.R.G.S.

Among other topics of current interest in the field of international affairs, the author discusses the existing relations between China and Japan. The armistice of May 31, 1933, provided that the Chinese Army remain west and south of the line: Yenching-Tung-Chow-Lutai; the Japanese Army to have the right to inspect the Chinese withdrawal by airplane or other means; upon confirmation of the Chinese withdrawal, the Japanese to withdraw north of the Great Wall; formation of a Chinese police force to maintain order in the area north and east of the agreed line. Since the signing of the armistice no further military operations have taken place. Although the Chinese have complied with the terms of the armistice, some Manchukuo troops still appear to be south of the Great Wall. The Japanese, however, deny control of them.

The general situation in Manchuria and Jehol outwardly at least appears to be quiet. Minor operations without importance are in progress against brigands in Jehol. By assuming control of all railways in Manchuria, except the Russian-owned Chinese Eastern, the Japanese have greatly consolidated their position. They are aiming at adapting the railway system to military needs.

The Chinese-Eastern Railway question remains unsolved. The author states that the situation is most difficult. The Soviet Union complained that the Japanese have interfered with the operation of the line, imprisoned Soviet citizens, and have forcibly used the Soviet railways to transport troops. Change of ownership of this railroad, and the conversion of the Russian gauge to the Manchurian normal track, would separate Vladivostok from Siberia and render it untenable by the Russians in case of war.

Chinese feeling still runs high against the Japanese, and the boycott of Japanese goods continues. The Nanking government realizes, however, that its cause in Manchuria is lost. Only the desire "to save face," the author states, prevents an early understanding with Manchukuo and Japan. The Canton plan to fight the Japanese failed to materialize and it seems that the move was in reality intended more against the Nanking government than against Japan. Communists manifested renewed activity. The Red Army gained some successes last May, but the situation has not shown any signs of

growing worse. A more serious rebellion of Moslems in Sinkiang was finally liquidated by the setting up of a compromise administration of Chinese, Tungans and Turks, which apparently enjoys the confidence of the Moslem population.

Journal of the United Service Institution—November, 1933.

ITALY AND THE BALKAN STATES. By Commendatore L. Villani, M.C.

Referring to Italy's historic interest in the Balkans, the author outlines in brief summaries existing relations between Italy and the several Balkan states. Although the seizure by Italy of certain islands in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Italo-Turkish war of 1911-1912, and subsequent Italian aspirations in Asia Minor conflicted with the ambitions of Greece and was the fruitful cause of friction between the two nations, the failure of the Greeks in the Smyrna campaign served to eliminate the disturbing causes of rivalry, and the present relations between Italy and Greece, the author states, are those of cordial coöperation. Italians are playing an important part in the development of Greece.

Italian relations with Turkey were at first difficult, largely because of Turkish suspicion. Today better feelings prevail, and the political and commercial relations have grown more intimate. Italy has concluded treaties of friendship with both Greece and Turkey.

In Albania, the author states, "Italy's interests are almost purely negative," not unlike those of Great Britain in Portugal. The Italian-Albanian treaty of alliance, he adds, was deliberately drafted on the lines of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty. Italy is anxious that Albania should never fall into the hands or sphere of influence of any foreign power, and she has no wish to occupy any part of Albanian territory herself. The author defends the construction with Italian help of alleged "military roads" in Albania on the ground that these roads merely link up communities of the interior and connect the producing agricultural districts with the coast. Although capable of military uses, he states, these roads are a primary necessity of a very backward country. Italy has helped Albania in organizing her army which consists of one full division and one skeleton division. This army is primarily designed for the protection of the country against roving armed bands which abound in the Balkans.

Italy's relations with Yugoslavia are more difficult than with any other Balkan State. This is largely due to a clash of interests which owes its origin to certain territorial arrangements perpetrated by the Paris Peace Conference in favor of Yugoslavia and to the detriment of Italy or *vice versa*. The principal bone of contention at present seems to be the Yugoslav claim to all of "Venezia Giulia" awarded in its entirety to Italy, and the author charges the Belgrade Government with encouraging terroristic activities seeking to foment trouble between

the Italian and Slav populations of the disputed territory. Although the ratio of the Italian and Slav population of that province is germane to the issue, the author ignores such data completely, but denounces France and Czechoslovakia for encouraging Yugoslav annexationist designs by supplying that country with large quantities of war material. With the recent improvement in Franco-Italian relations, the author believes, the stream of war material pouring into Yugoslavia will tend to dry up, and without French help or encouragement Yugoslavia will cease to be a menace to Italy.

Although Italians engaged in some hard fighting with Bulgarian troops during the World War, relations today between Italy and Bulgaria are most cordial. This is to some extent due to the marriage of King Boris and an Italian Princess. Italo-Bulgarian trade is active, and on the whole very satisfactory to Italian commercial interests.

Italo-Rumanian relations are somewhat affected by Italy's friendship with Hungary. The author states, however, that it is not Italy's policy to play one of these countries against the other, but rather "to play the part of the honest broker." While Italy regards certain provisions of the Peace Treaties as unsatisfactory, and believes that their perpetuation will tend to keep Europe in a state of dangerous unrest, a revisionist policy, if insisted upon at once, may prove equally dangerous to peace. He believes that the Four-Power Pact sponsored by Mussolini furnishes a safe middle-course and serves as a reminder that Article 19 of the League of Nations Covenant provides for treaty revision when favorable circumstances arise.

The author concludes by pointing to the fact that the most deplorable effect of the Paris Peace settlement was the Balkanization of Central Europe. This condition existed 250 years ago when Turkish rule extended almost to the gates of Vienna. It was driven back southeastward with the expulsion of the Turks from Central Europe, but advanced once more as an aftermath of the World War. The author expresses the hope that civilized countries will agree "that the movement be now stopped, and if possible driven yet further back."

HUNGARY — *Magyar Katonai Szemle* — November, 1933.

PRINCIPLES OF MODERN MILITARY TRAINING FOR SHORT-TERM SERVICE. By Captain Francis Horváth.

The World War demonstrated that long protracted conflicts are as detrimental to the victor as to the vanquished. Hence, the author concludes, it may be assumed that nations in the future will seek to bring wars to as rapid a conclusion as possible. This, he thinks, can best be accomplished by striking before the enemy is fully prepared for action. Wars of the future, therefore, are likely to begin with startling suddenness—without any preliminary warning whatever. Such course naturally presupposes the maintenance even in time of peace of a

military force sufficiently strong and well-trained for such a purpose. With this objective in view, the careful planning of military training assumes particular importance in view of the prevailing systems of short terms of active service.

The author divides the training of the soldier into three phases: (1) preliminary, in civil life; (2) military, during the period of active service; and (3) supplementary, both in civil life and periods of active service with the colors.

The preliminary phase is charged with character building, physical development and discipline. This should be completed before the eighteenth year of age. Between eighteen and twenty-one the individual receives instruction in the school of the soldier, elementary drill and marksmanship. During the second phase, in active service, the individual is being developed into an efficient soldier, while the objective of the third phase is to keep the reservist abreast with military developments and changes, to keep up his interest in military matters, and to qualify him for functions of leadership in a higher grade.

The author believes that the period of active service should be devoted to a thorough training of specialists. As far as possible each individual should be assigned to an arm or weapon of his own choice or special aptitude. Six months should suffice to make of him an expert in the service of that weapon. These six months the author would divide into three periods: two months for individual instruction, three months for training in small units and one month for training in the larger units. Promotion to N.C.O. grades would require additional service and training for especially selected candidates having the necessary aptitude for leadership.

Only young men of adequate education, the author thinks, should be admitted as candidates for reserve commissions after having served with the colors one full year. He emphasizes the importance of uniformity of training and indoctrination. This, the author states, is particularly important in officers. Homogeneity in the corps of officers will most likely result if the officer personnel is composed of graduates of the same institution. Company officers should be experts in the technique of the principal weapons of their own arm, and they should possess some knowledge of the essential characteristics of the other combat arms. Before promotion to field grade, officers should be afforded an opportunity to become thoroughly familiar with other arms, their tactics and technique. He advocates in all training the practical, applicatory method of instruction, and favors the use of talking films.

Pesti Naplo—September 29, 1933.

The usually well-informed Budapest daily, *Pesti Naplo*, publishes an interesting account by a special correspondent concerning a recent lease by Japan of several millions of acres of cotton land in Abyssinia. Japanese settlers are to make their first appearance on the African conti-

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ment in the near future. The Japanese leasehold is in close proximity of the Italian colony of Eritrea. According to the correspondent, American interests sought to obtain a lease on the same tract of land, but lost out to the Japanese. He states that Japan no longer conceals her determination to pursue a policy of frank aggression. Of course the promotion of the Japanese plan requires a good deal of money, and this they seek to obtain by means of systematic dumping of their cheap products upon the markets of the world. The ambitious plan of economic and military imperialism, the writer observes, has evoked grave concern among all nations, but more especially among the workers of the Anglo-Saxon world, who with good reason see their high standard of living menaced by Japanese coolie labor capable of subsisting on a bowl of rice.

ITALY—*Rivista di Fanteria*—January, 1934.

The new year saw the advent of a new military magazine devoted to the interests of the infantry, the *Rivista di Fanteria*, successor to another similar periodical which has been dormant since 1904. In reality, however, this "new" Infantry review is the well-known *Rivista Militare Italiana* under a new name assumed by direction of Il Duce, head of the Royal Italian Government and Minister of War. The reason for this change of designation is made apparent by Mussolini's dedicatory message. "Whoever speaks of Infantry," writes Il Duce, "speaks of the 'people' in the broadest and profoundest sense of the word. Whoever speaks of 'the Infantry,' speaks of the heroism of the people from the dawn of history to the present day. Whoever speaks of 'the Infantry,' speaks of the decisive element of the battle and of war: today as yesterday, tomorrow as today and forever . . . The Fascist Government has recognized this historic and moral precedence of the Infantry, and for the past decade has conferred upon it the honor of guarding the Unknown Soldier; it is recruiting to its ranks the flower of the levies; it is providing that arm with all the effective instruments of war." It is meet and proper, that this glorious, basic arm be provided also with a medium of information of its own in order that it may be the better prepared to perform its difficult tasks in any future emergency.

The first number of the *Rivista di Fanteria*, published in Rome under the auspices of the General Staff and the Ministry of War, is wholly dedicatory. First of all, there is a replica of the Royal Patent of the Order of Military Merit of the House of Savoy, conferred upon the Infantry arm for valiant services rendered in the World War. It is followed by the citation of the Infantry for this signal honor by the Duke of Aosta and Italy's generalissimo during the World War, General Armando Diaz. Letters of homage by the Marshals of Italy, the generals of the armies and army corps and other dignitaries of the Italian Army fill the remainder of 108 pages.

May we join this chorus of eulogy and praise, and with hands stretched across the seas felicitate our comrades in

arms, the Doughboys of Sunny Italy, upon the advent of the *Rivista di Fanteria* which, we are sure, will live up to the best traditions not only of the worthy periodical whose place it now takes, but equally to the highest ideals of the "Queen of the battle" of all ages: the Infantry.

JUGOSLAVIA—*Pesadisko-Artilleriski Glasnik*—July-August-September, 1933.

TRAINING PLANS AND SCHEDULES. By Lieutenant Colonel Ivan L. Matagic.

The author bases his program of instruction upon the theory that the thorough training of the individual is by far the most important phase of military training. He devotes 56 per cent of the available training period to the instruction of the individual as against 24 per cent to the squad, and 20 per cent to the platoon. He lays great stress upon the marksmanship training as part of the individual instruction, and his program allots 112 hours to this subject. Bayonet training receives twenty-six hours, gas defence only seven hours. Combat training and tactics receive a total of 211 hours during the training period January 1-July 31.

The author believes that battalion commanders are responsible for the collective training of the units under their command. They should, therefore, prepare the program of training for that phase of instruction, and they should provide for the training of specialists, such as automatic riflemen, intelligence and communication personnel, and of N.C.O. replacements. The author presents a complete training schedule to include the platoon.

SWITZERLAND—*Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitung*—July, 1933.

THE BAYONET IN THE WORLD WAR AND AT SHANGHAI. By Colonel von Loebell.

The author endeavors to answer the question frequently asked, whether or not the bayonet has become an obsolete weapon. Citing examples of its use in the World War, the author states that these experiences warrant the conclusion that the war of the future, like those of the past, will inevitably abound in incidents of hand-to-hand fighting, and although he recognizes the fact that hand grenades have materially limited the use of the cold steel, the bayonet is by no means obsolete, and that it will continue to play an important part at the decisive moment of the battles of the future. The recent fighting at Shanghai, the author states, fully bears out this view even though we make allowances for the peculiarities of the situation. Hand-to-hand combat occurred frequently at Shanghai, and the combatants used the bayonet as freely as rifle butts and hand grenades. The author observes that in these encounters the Chinese proved superior to the Japanese, notably the Japanese marines, who failed rather miserably. Chinese longswordsmen were particularly effective in their death-defying assaults.

ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

Third Cavalry

(Less 1st Squadron, Fort Myer, Virginia)

WAR DEPARTMENT ORDERS recently received have announced the transfer of Captain George I. Smith, 3rd Cavalry, from Fort Myer, Virginia, to duty with the staff and faculty of the Cavalry School, Fort Riley, Kansas, effective not later than June 30th, 1934.

Major John F. Davis, Cavalry, now on duty in the Office of the Chief of Cavalry, Washington, D. C., has been assigned to the 3rd Regiment, effective July 15th, 1934.

Colonel Kenyon Joyce, Commanding Officer at Fort Myer, Virginia, has announced that Captain Claude O. Burch, 3rd Cavalry, has been, detailed to command the Machine-Gun Troop of the 10th Cavalry, to succeed Captain Clyde D. Garrison, recently ordered home to await retirement.

The basketball team representing Fort Myer, Virginia, has been awarded the championship of the Third Corps Area, following its victory over the Fort Monroe, Virginia, team in the final game of the Third Corps Area Tournament.

The Fort Myer team has played a schedule of twenty-eight games and won twenty-five. One of the three games lost was to the Heurich Flashes, the strong Washington independent team.

The 1934 basketball season was started with but two players from last year's team, but Lieutenant W. H. Barksdale, officer in charge, selected the outstanding players from the different organization teams in the Fort Myer Post League and drilled them as a separate squad. This group readily fitted into a fast team and developed quickly into a well-rounded squad.

There were no outstanding stars on the Fort Myer team but each player contributed his best efforts into the team play, and the decisive victories gained during the season were the results of team play.

Colonel Kenyon Joyce, Commanding Officer at Fort Myer, attended the final games in the Corps Area Tournament, and congratulated the team coach and players for their clean sportsmanship displayed during the entire season and for their winning of the Army title.

War Department Orders of recent date announce the relief of Captain Clyde D. Garrison, 10th Cavalry, Commanding Officer of the Machine-Gun Troop, 10th Cavalry, Fort Myer, Virginia, and direct that he proceed to his home to await retirement.

Captain Garrison was born in Saybrook, Illinois, and entered the Military Service on April 11th, 1901, serving

with the 14th Cavalry from that date until June 5th, 1917, when he was appointed a captain with date of rank as of May 11th, 1917. Captain Garrison's World War service included duty as Instructor at three Officers' Training Camps, Leon Springs, Texas, and with the 315th Cavalry, remaining with that Regiment, when it was transferred as the 71st Field Artillery and later with the 83rd Field Artillery. Captain Garrison is the possessor of two Silver Star citations for gallantry in action in the Philippine Islands during the campaigns there against the Moros.

Since the World War, Captain Garrison has been on duty with the Headquarters of the District of Arizona; 1st Cavalry; 7th Cavalry; Headquarters Troop, 1st Cavalry Division and with the 10th Cavalry, his present assignment. In addition, Captain Garrison is a graduate of the Cavalry School, Troop Officers' Course, Fort Riley, Kansas in the Class of 1926.

Captain and Mrs. Garrison anticipate making their home in San Diego, California, after their separation from the active list of the Army.

Fourth Cavalry

Fort Meade, South Dakota

ON March 2nd, the regiment celebrated its Organization Day. Forming at 9:30 a.m., the regiment occupied the eastern half of the main parade ground, in the form of a hollow square, for the simple but impressive ceremonies.

Second Lieutenant Carroll H. Prunty, whose father, Colonel Leonard W. Prunty, retired, formerly commanded the regiment, delivered a brief address to the assembled troops, in which he sketched the regiment's splendid battle history and explained the standards, their decorations and the meaning of the coat of arms.

The band, directed by Assistant Bandleader, Quirino Ferretti, played the Regimental March, "Riders for the Flag," composed for the Fourth Cavalry by the late John Philip Sousa, and Ferretti's composition, "The Colonel W. R. Pope March."

Greetings from the Chief of Cavalry, Major General Guy V. Henry, who, incidentally, was born, back in the Indian warfare days, at Fort Robinson, Nebraska, were as follows:

"On the occasion of the approaching Organization Day of the Fourth Cavalry, I send my hearty greetings to the officers and men of your regiment. The Fourth Cavalry has always performed its tasks and missions in peace and in war in a manner worthy of the best traditions of our

Army. Your Organization Day should be one of pride for the entire command."

An interesting sidelight of this year's birthday of the regiment was that its present commander, Colonel William R. Pope, saw his first military service with one of its oldest troops, Troop F, in which he enlisted May 8 1899, serving therein as private, corporal and sergeant during its participation in the Philippine Insurrection, during 1899 to 1901, when he was commissioned a second lieutenant of Cavalry, February 2, 1901. Colonel Pope was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal for services in the World War; he commanded the 113th Infantry, 29th Division. He also received the Silver Star citation, with oak leaf cluster, and the Croix de Guerre for gallantry in action during the Meuse-Argonne offensive. Following the Armistice, he was Deputy Provost Marshal General, A. E. F.

The history of the Fourth Cavalry was written by Master Sergeant Lloyd L. Wardell, Signal Corps, and appeared in the *Rapid City Daily Journal*, March 12, 1934, 1,000 copies of which are being distributed to officers and men of the garrison.

Sixth Cavalry

Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia

COLONEL W. S. GRANT assumed command of the 6th Cavalry, relieving Colonel Gordon Johnston early in January.

The officers, band and standards of the 6th Cavalry participated in the Roosevelt Birthday Ball held in Chattanooga on January 29th.

Second Lieutenant Don Cubbison was the recipient of a life-saving medal presented by the Treasury Department and a review in his honor by the 6th Cavalry on February 14th.

The 6th Cavalry horse show team captained by Major Fred Boye went to Florida for the Miami and Tampa horse shows.

The Regiment has been active in Civilian Conservation Corps work, and for the first time in several months officers and men are back with their organizations.

The regiment was shocked upon the receipt of news of the death of its former Commanding Officer, Colonel Gordon Johnston, in San Antonio, Texas. Just the week previous Lieutenant W. F. Grisham of the 6th Cavalry met a tragic death in an automobile accident near Jacksonville, Florida.

Plans are rapidly being made for the receipt of motor equipment in the Regiment to take the place of the animal-drawn transportation. This equipment is expected to arrive in the late spring.

Colonel Walter Grant is convalescing from an attack of pneumonia.

The Sixth Cavalry Polo team returned on the 20th of March from a successful invasion of Augusta, Georgia,

where they overwhelmed the "Minnick" team in two victories and one tie of three games.

C. M. T. C. activities have started, with the organization of the procurement force now functioning for Fort Oglethorpe. The 6th Cavalry will have the C. M. T. C. camps, as well as the C. C. C. conditioning camp and the National Guard, all at the same time.

During the illness of Colonel Grant the regiment has been training under separate squadron commanders in squadron drills, and the Executive Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Walton Goodwin, in regimental drills.

The following officers have been assigned to the regiment:

Lieutenant Colonel Kinzie B. Edmunds, Major Robert W. Strong, Captain Alexander G. Olsen, Herbert L. Earnest, and Rufus S. Ramey.

Seventh Cavalry Fort Bliss Texas

GARRY OWEN, the regiment's most famous horse, died January 29th. Bred at the Fort Reno Remount Depot, this horse was trained at Fort Bliss by Sergeant George B. A. Lewis and developed into a beautiful mount of over 17 hands and of 1,360 pounds in weight. He was named *Garry Owen* by the regimental commander, Colonel Fitzhugh Lee.

In 1927, *Garry Owen* attracted the attention of horsemen of international fame and was entered in a Horse Show Tournament at Fort Riley to test his mettle for a tour of the country. He won many blue and red ribbons and placed in every event entered. Appearing next at West Point, he carried off many honors. Then, he made an enviable record at Boston, and civilian horse lovers offered the Government seven thousand dollars for him. At Madison Square Garden, he was entered in twenty-eight events, winning fifteen blue and seven red ribbons and placing in the other six events.

Garry Owen won the Hunter Championship in the First Cavalry Division Horse Shows for four years in succession and won countless prizes, trophies and ribbons, as well as a considerable amount of money, for the regiment.

The grey gelding was not only a show horse but was also an excellent service mount; he participated in the long, hot, dusty hikes and maneuvers of the regiment.

Garry Owen was buried with honors in the Seventh Cavalry Area at Fort Bliss.

103rd Cavalry Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

IN orders dated February 22, 1934, Headquarters 1st Squadron (Major Edward Hoopes, Commanding; First Lieutenant Ralph V. H. Wood, Adjutant) announced Troop B as the winner of the Major George A.

Schwartz Trophy, the award in the cal. .22 rifle match held on the armory 50-foot range during January and February, 1934.

Corporal G. S. Ruffee, Troop A, is the individual small bore champion of this squadron for 1934, second place going to Sergeant J. M. Williams, Troop C.

The winning team of Troop B was composed as follows (arranged according to scores): Corporal A. H. Vasey, Private L. H. Maisel, Corporal H. A. Rule, First Sergeant J. Rule, Sergeants E. A. Elwell and J. C. Weeks, Corporal R. N. Sangro, Privates C. M. Pomeroy, C. H. Zeigler, and W. J. Slipp.

305th Cavalry

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

SINCE the publication of the last issue of the JOURNAL, there have been two promotions in the regiment. Captain Harold A. McKinley and First Lieutenant John W. Watson are to be congratulated. They are most active and enthusiastic young members of this unit.

The regiment has attacked, with vigor, the new inactive training schedule which has been especially designed to prepare the officers for their work with the CMTC trainers at Fort Myer this summer.

Colonel John D. Long, Cavalry, Chief of Staff, 62nd Cavalry Division, spent a day with us the latter part of January, attending one of our Wednesday noon conferences. Colonel Long spoke briefly, giving cheerful encouragement to the work that is being carried on. Colonel Long also attended our night instruction on the same day. We are looking forward with pleasure to his presence among us again on our annual Organization Day in April.

Colonel Harrison Smith, Inf-Res., Commanding the 315th Infantry in Philadelphia, has invited the regiment to join in a sand-table problem with his unit and to be his guest for an informal entertainment after the problem. We anticipate benefiting by, and enjoying thoroughly, this experience.

306th Cavalry

Baltimore, Maryland

MANY Reserve officers of other branches foregathered with the 306th Cavalry officers on February 26th to listen to a very instructive illustrated lecture on "Modernization of Cavalry" by Colonel Aubrey Lippincott, Executive Officer, Office of The Chief of Cavalry. At the conclusion of the talk, the moving picture, "The Life of Riley," was shown and the dismounted officers were greatly impressed by the fact that a good rider on a well trained horse can go anywhere that a man can go without using his hands.

Lieutenant William I. Irby has left for Fort Riley,

Kansas, to take the National Guard and Reserve Troop Officers' Course at the Cavalry School.

Second Squadron and Machine-Gun Troop, 306th Cavalry

Washington, D. C.

DEPRIVED of their Unit Instructor, Major Harley C. Dagley, Cavalry, who was absent because of sickness, the 2nd Squadron and Machine-Gun Troop reflected his activity and training by arranging a most successful Regimental Day program.

On February 6th, at 4 o'clock, a service in memory of the deceased members of the 306th Cavalry was held in the Washington Cathedral. The officers, and military guests assembled and marched to their seats. Bishop Freeman conducted the services and made a short address to the members of the regiment.

At 6:30 p.m. a stag dinner was held at the Army and Navy Club. The Secretary of War, Honorable George H. Dern, was the guest of honor, and other distinguished guests included Major General Paul B. Malone, Commanding General of the Third Corps Area, Colonel John D. Long, Cavalry, and Colonel Harry N. Cootes, Cavalry.

The entire program was so successful that it was decided to follow this custom each year.

307th Cavalry

Richmond, Virginia

SECOND LIEUTENANT R. G. SOUTHALL, II, is enjoying his duty with the CCC in Riggins, Idaho, which is a long way from "Sunny Virginia."

Captain Joseph J. Matthews, now on duty with the CCC, and company commander of the 376th Company, Camp S-55, Virginia, is making an enviable record. Recently his camp was rated one of the best in the State of Virginia.

The following officers have been ordered, for another six-month period, to duty with the Civilian Conservation Corps: Captains James Joseph Matthews, and William Miles Stokes; First Lieutenant Sam Howell Franklin, Jr.; and Second Lieutenants John Lewis Peyton, Robert Goode Southall, II, and Woods Garth Talman.

Many of our officers attended the lecture given by General Malone here on January 9th, 1934. Over 300 Reserve officers attended that meeting.

First Lieutenant Henry Solon Kane, Jr., now PMS & T at the Greenbrier Military Academy, Lewisburg, West Virginia, drives over fifty miles a month to attend the Reserve meetings in Covington and Clifton Forge, Virginia, each month.

Second Lieutenant Hope C. Miles, Richmond, Virginia, has been promoted to First Lieutenant, Cav-Res.

We are sorry to relate that our commanding officer, Colonel Wm. Henry Clifford has been transferred to the

Aux-Res. The officers of the regiment presented him with a beautiful cigarette case; a token of esteem, friendship and remembrance.

3d Squadron and Machine-Gun Troop, 307th Cavalry

Norfolk, Virginia

CAVALRY, its organization, armament and tactics, was the subject of discussion at the group schools conducted by the Unit Instructor during the month of February. These schools were held in Suffolk on the 13th, Newport News on the 14th, and Norfolk on the 15th. All schools were well attended, and officers of all arms and services were present. All present showed a great deal of interest in this subject. Several officers of the Squadron were present at these meetings. Mechanized Cavalry will be the subject of discussion at the group schools during the month of March. These schools will be held at the same places and on the same dates as those held in February.

An inspection trip of the U. S. S. *Ranger*, the new air-plane carrier for the U. S. Navy, is being planned for March 17, 1934. The *Ranger* is fast nearing completion at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Newport News, Virginia. It is expected that a large number of the officers of the Squadron will be present.

The Squadron is very pleased to have First Lieutenant Robert B. Batte in Norfolk again. For the past year he has been employed in Richmond, Virginia, and has just recently been transferred to Norfolk. He is employed by the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company.

Second Lieutenant William T. Talman has been transferred by the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company from the Norfolk office to the Richmond office.

Second Lieutenant Kenneth W. Chapman has been transferred to the Fourth Corps Area and has been relieved from the Squadron.

308th Cavalry

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

THE 308th Cavalry celebrated the 16th Anniversary of its organization with a dinner and dance at the Keystone Athletic Club in Pittsburgh on Saturday February 24, 1934, at 7:00 p.m. There were one hundred and twenty-eight for dinner, leaving nothing to be desired in the way of attendance. Guests of the regiment included Colonel Harry N. Cootes, Cavalry, in charge of civilian components at Headquarters Third Corps Area, Colonel Charles C. McGovern, Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners of Allegheny County, who was accompanied by Mrs. McGovern, and Lieutenant Colonel F. A. Prince, FA, and Mrs. F. A. Prince. Colonel Prince is the Chief of Staff of the 99th Division, with headquarters in Pittsburgh.

A number of officers of the 308th Cavalry who are on duty with the Civilian Conservation Corps attended the celebration.

Captain Edward R. Ayres, 308th Cavalry, is to be congratulated for the reason that Company 319, (his company) Allegheny National Forest, near Kelletsville, Pennsylvania, has been announced by the *Army & Navy Journal* in its issue of March 3rd as the winner of the *Army & Navy Journal* award for the best Civilian conservation Corps Company in the Third Corps Area. The 308th Cavalry takes just pride in this achievement by Captain Ayres and his Company.

862nd Field Artillery (Horse)

Baltimore, Maryland

MAJOR JOHN WILLIAM MIDDENDORF, Jr., and Second Lieutenant Leo Francis Dunn, 862nd F.A., have been ordered to active duty at Fort Hoyle, Maryland, for a period of fourteen days, effective March 18, 1934.

This regiment has been designated to send three field officers and thirteen battery officers for two weeks' active duty at Fort Hoyle during the month of August. The course of inactive training being pursued by the regiment is intended to prepare the individual officer for this duty.

Active Duty Training of the 463rd Armored Car Squadron, 63rd Cavalry Division

By Morris Bush, 1st Lieut., Cavalry Reserves

HEADED by its commander, Major John C. Carter, Cav-Res., of Columbus, Georgia, 20 officers of the 463rd Armored Car Squadron of the 63rd Cavalry Division, arrived at Fort Knox, Kentucky, March 4th, for two weeks' active duty training. As all of us but two were from Georgia, it seemed like a Cracker reunion, many of us having attended the University together in that State.

After the routine physical examination we were welcomed to the Fort by Brigadier General Julian R. Lindsey, Post Commander, and to the 1st Cavalry (Mechanized) by its Commander, Lieut. Colonel Adna R. Chaffee, 1st Cavalry.

We were assigned to different troops in the Regiment, and in addition to our troop duty, there were special lectures, conferences and map maneuvers to illustrate the different actions of Armored Cars and Mechanized force.

Heretofore the training of this unit had been with a horse regiment, this being our first experience with a Mechanized Regiment. Instead of trots and gallops we had horse power and miles per hour instead of miles as a basis for distance we dealt in minutes. To the signals and communications we had added radio telephony, telegraph, motorcycle messengers, lights and flags, and oats and hay were replaced by gasoline and oil. We began to think in entirely new terms.

We worked with the armored cars, riding in them, and had practice firing the .30 caliber machine guns while in motion going at 25 miles per hour.

We were taken out and shown examples of employing armored cars in reconnaissance, delaying and harassing actions, how the cars within the platoon covered their own advance; what a platoon did when the road is blocked and many other interesting situations. These problems were arranged especially for us, and they were very instructive.

We spent some time with the Combat cars (Christie tanks). We were fortunate to be on hand when a T-4, a new type combat car, arrived at the Fort. It had been driven overland from Aberdeen and was to be given service tests. We also witnessed a demonstration of firing at targets by three Christie combat cars and the T4.

On Tuesday, March 13th, we accompanied the Regiment on a night problem. We were all at the motor park at 11:00 p.m. and prepared to move out at midnight. The vehicles, one hundred and fifty of them, consisted of tanks, armored cars, trucks, scout cars, and radio cars, moved out at that time and travelling at the rate of between 20 and 40 miles per hour, presented an imposing sight when they got strung out along the road with their lights on. At about 5:00 a.m., we were served a field breakfast brought up by the kitchen trucks. After breakfast the Regiment made an attack at dawn against an outlined enemy. We arrived back at the post at 8:00 a.m., tired and cold, but feeling that we had greatly benefited by this experience—our first dose of a mechanized regiment in action.

Our Sunday was spent at Mammoth Cave, Louisville, and other points of interest.

We were very delightfully entertained by the officers at the Fort with a smoker, at which every one had a most enjoyable time.

We were very fortunate to have had Major Herman F. Rathjen, Cavalry, our Instructor, with us during our stay, and it gave us an opportunity to meet him and know him. He enlightened us on several important points regarding Reserve work and did much toward making us feel that we were individually important to him.

Before we left Fort Knox we all joined the Reserve Officers' Association for the year 1935 and hope to be back again soon for two more weeks of active duty with the 1st Cavalry (Mechanized).

The Fort Riley Maneuvers

(Continued from page 61)

lar force. The next exercise will demonstrate the combined use of horsed and mechanized cavalry reinforced by other arms, covering the front and flank of a larger force. In this exercise, opposition will be represented by umpire control, and one of the principal features will be the staff work involved in coordinating the various elements of the command. The final exercise will be a three-day continuous maneuver under rigid field service conditions. In this exercise a reinforced cavalry brigade with a mechanized regiment attached is shown on a march involving strategic missions, in which command, control and staff procedure will be stressed.

In addition to affording an opportunity to try tactical principles, these exercises will permit to a certain extent tests of equipment and to a greater extent the effectiveness of the armament. While war is the only true test of this effectiveness, a great deal can be learned through efficient umpire control. Besides testing our present theories on the employment of mechanized cavalry and our defensive measures against mechanization, these maneuvers afford an unusual opportunity to develop the combined use of our two types of cavalry.



Officers of 463rd Armored Car Squadron, 63rd Cavalry Division. Taken at Fort Knox, Ky., during active duty training of unit

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
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